

AMBASSADOR HARLAN CLEVELAND

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: This interview was not edited by Ambassador Cleveland]

Q: Today is the third of February, 1999, and this is an interview with Harlan Cleveland. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Harlan, could you start out by telling us when and where you were born and something about your family.

CLEVELAND: I was born in the middle of New York City, in 1918. The war was still going on, the First World War. My father at that time was an Army chaplain, but his profession was being an Episcopal minister and actually an Episcopal student chaplain by trade. Shortly after I was born, he was the Episcopal student chaplain at Princeton University, and then he moved to the University of Wisconsin, in Madison, and wound up in charge of a complex of Episcopal operations there: a boys school and a sisterhood, where he died when I was eight because he was gassed during the war. He never really recovered from that. Although he had these jobs, he was, we gather, deteriorating pretty rapidly.

Q: Were you aware of this? I mean, what sort of a figure was he for you?

CLEVELAND: I remember him with white hair, which didn't seem to be very astonishing at the time. I knew he had to be terribly old, if he was my father. He actually died when he was 36, I think. The people at the hospital said they couldn't believe he wasn't in his 60s, at least. I don't have a very clear recollection of him. My brother and I were acolytes in the churches and chapels where he... so we kind of grew up with that around us, but he really died before I got to know him as a person.

Q: What about your mother?



CLEVELAND: She was a very strong person. Her name was Lauren Van Buren. Her mother came from Virginia. Her father had been consul general in Nice. That was before they moved consuls general around so much as they do now. He must have been there for the better part of two decades. She, judging from her stories about Nice was sort of queen of the roost at least when the [consul general] was in town. We got to know her very well because she had a place on Cape Cod which had started as an old fishing shack on the bluff, a place called Harbor's Point. Then various new sections of the house had been built as the family grew, and eventually houses were built on other parts of the land that she owned on that bluff. We always went back for Sunday breakfast, for example.

Q: That was your grandmother.

CLEVELAND: Yes. She would really put on the dog with real silver and then she had somebody waiting on table, that sort of thing. So she was still acting as though she was the [consul general's wife], which at any rate she was.

My mother was quite tall; she must have been close to 5'10", a striking woman. Her early pictures indicated she was a very beautiful woman. When my father died, one thing she decided she didn't want to do was to stay in Vandalia, Ohio, [near] Cincinnati, which was full of Clevelands. She didn't want to be just an appendage of the Cleveland clan. She had been quite ill during the last year he was alive, so her doctor was recommending that she move south and get out of the bad weather, the winters and so on. Her story is, she said to him, how would the south of France be. That surprised him and he answered that would be all right.

The first 13 years of her life she lived in Nice. She was fluent in French and also spoke German and Swiss-German. Every time she went on vacation, she went to Switzerland. I remember her singing lullabies in Schweitzerdeutsch. Once I learned a little German and heard the Swiss-German talking, I wondered how anything so guttural with so many consonants in it could be converted into a lullaby that rhymes. So we moved to a very lovely little town. There was a school run by a British group, but in French. So we learned French.

Q: This would have been you started there in the mid-'20s?



CLEVELAND: This would have been 1926, or '27 probably. During the whole winter, I know this sounds ridiculous; we moved to Geneva. I had an older brother and sister, twins, just 18 months older, so we were all growing up together; and a much younger brother five and a half years younger. My brother was a Foreign Service officer as a matter of fact. Then I went to school which was about an hours commute from Geneva, overlooking Lake Geneva, a place called Coupe. My sister was put in a school in Lausanne. My younger brother who was very young, about five or so was put into a little boarding school. I am not exactly sure how all of this was managed since she was living on a minister's pension.

Q: I was just going to say that...

CLEVELAND: She didn't have a lot of resources of her own, but her grandmother had some relationship with Mrs. Proctor of Proctor and Gamble.

Q: Who came from the Cincinnati area.

CLEVELAND: But that wasn't the connection. I don't know what the connection was, but she had inherited from her some Proctor and Gamble stock. That was split up among the four of us, but that stock today, our quarter of a quarter roughly, with all the splits and stock market increases, is worth something around a million dollars to my astonishment. So that stock has always been in my whole life kind of an anchor. We were very careful with it; we didn't sell it. We borrowed against it, and that by far turned out to be the best strategy. All of my siblings have all of theirs and they haven't run into trouble themselves. My mother did not have much income, but she certainly had some backup from my grandmother. Apparently in those days the dollar must have been relatively strong even though it was depression times because it went quite a ways getting us into private schools and so on.

So we were two years in Switzerland. When I was 12, I was essentially completely bilingual in French. I kept rusting over and reviving and then rust over some more. My French has always had a little bit of an accent from the canton near Geneva. They were good schools except for the fact that I got the impression that the metric system was so natural that it must be universal. When she decided to bring us all back home, I was 12 or 13 or so, I took an exam, a series of tests for Andover. I got 98 in the [other exams, but] and flunked the arithmetic. They were so astonished by this that some young instructor dug into it and found out that I had done all the problems as if a ton was a thousand pounds. If I had known about the non-metric system, I would have scored very well on the thing, so they let me in.

She moved to Andover. She had a free choice of where to move and she decided that the place to move was where there was a good girls school and a good boys school.



Q: Sure, Abbot Academy.

CLEVELAND: Abbot Academy was there, so we moved to Andover. She never had worked in terms of getting a job before, but after a while, she felt that she needed to pick up some more income, so she went to work, first as a hostess in what we called the beanery, the student dining room.

Quality was kind of for the others, students who worked; it was quite a dramatic thing to have a grande dame sweeping in the dining room. It sort of toned the place up. I still remember the first night she turned up in that garb. Students were doing the normal thing, throwing buns at each other across the table. A bun came her way so she reached out and caught it. The place was dead silence.

We trained her well; we practiced baseball with her and so on. Everybody wondered what she was going to do with this bun, and she threw it back at the student who had thrown it. That stopped the bun throwing from then on.

Q: What about before while you were in Switzerland, were you getting any American studies by reading? I mean were you reading Mark Twain, or were you pretty well getting a continental education?

CLEVELAND: It was basically run by a Swiss who was our hero because he was also the driver of a four-man bobsled that was the world's champion at the time. Most of the faculty were European. There may have been one or two Americans and a couple of British. We were forbidden to speak anything but French.

Your sanctions, one of the punishments, was to page. We had to write out three pages of longhand. For a while it was sort of an underground network of writing, three pages in different handwritings, and selling them to different students. There was always a black market. In any rating system there is always a black market. The result was that we really did speak French most of the time and studied in French, and then I got to know Latin very well. It was a good school, it had athletic facilities and it was quite well set up. I played soccer and tennis.

Q: When you came back to Andover, did you find yourself disadvantaged? I mean you obviously had the French and the math and all of that. I was sort of wondering about baseball, American history and that sort of thing that a student normally...



CLEVELAND: No. I probably didn't get much American history, but I had this comparatively cosmopolitan education for a 12 year old. I had French at that time and a lot of German; the result was that I actually skipped a grade. I applied there as what they call a freshman first class. They put me into the second year already. The result was when I graduated, I was only 16. So then I went to Princeton and graduated from there at 20. So, I was kind of younger than everybody else through most of my youth.

Q: Well, at Andover, what were your major interests both academically and for entertainment?

CLEVELAND: Well, as far as academically, I was really just interested in getting good marks and did. I didn't know what I wanted to do except that I wasn't particularly drawn to science, partly because it was such a different mathematics and partly because I was really more interested in society. I was always kind of interested in politics and public affairs. Athletically, I played tennis pretty well. I actually went on to be on my college tennis team later on. Really most athletic enthusiasm was devoted during the summer to sailing.

Q: This was up in Cape Cod?

CLEVELAND: Cape Cod. Wherever we were during the rest of the year, we were always in Cape Cod for a couple of months during the summer. So I kind of began thinking of that as home, and other places as outlying precincts, you know.

Q: What about reading, you know, novels or history. What did you like to read at Andover?

CLEVELAND: Well, I read some novels, but I was never a big voracious reader. I read a lot of current stuff. I read newspapers and magazines. We had Popular Mechanics for several years in the house, this kind of thing. I soaked up a good deal of normal literary culture, I suppose, just because you had to read it for school. So I knew who Walter Scott was. I think I probably missed a good deal of the reading that Lois did. She is a voracious reader.

Q: But also, it was a time when publications were very important. I mean, almost everybody got Life Magazine or the Saturday Evening Post and they read the various stories and other things in the Post and then Time Magazine and maybe Liberty. I mean these were a major, everybody was reading these then.



CLEVELAND: Right. Today you have television as an alternative. I was always interested in music. I never really got to play the piano very well, but I loved to sing. I was in the choir and everything that was involved with singing, I was into. We lived in town so we were townies. That was kind of an inferior category to be in as a student, to not have one of the dormitories as a residence. But, I survived that academically, and socially.

Q: Was Princeton always sort of a goal of yours because your father had been associated with Princeton?

CLEVELAND: No, not particularly. He had actually gone to Princeton for one year, and didn't apply himself very well, and was failed out of Princeton. Then, he went to the University of Virginia, where he did very well. As I look back on it, I think that I went to Princeton as what I perceive now as a very active minor revolt against the fact that most of my classmates were either going to Harvard or Yale. I was going to do something different. To do something that different these days, you would probably have to go to the University of Djakarta. But that was a minor affair.

As I say, there was no difficulty getting into Princeton. My roommate all through Princeton was a guy I had known well at Andover who still lives here I think. I was young and socially not very self confident yet, depending more on my brain than anything, than on any other factors. At Princeton, I was lucky in one way, I played football on the freshman team. I never thought I was particularly good at it, and it took so much time, about six or seven hours a day during the season. Anyway, I stopped playing football at the end of the Freshman year, which was indeed the time to stop. Quit while you are ahead because our freshman team was undefeated, untied, and unscored on in the Ivy League. In those days the Princeton varsity was the best of the lot. My fellow tackle on the freshman team disproved my theory because he became captain of the team and was compared to a running back. He was 6'5" and over 200 pounds which was a lot in those days. He was also a Phi Beta Kappa, so he disproved my theory that you couldn't do both.

Q: You were at Princeton from when to when?

CLEVELAND: '34 '38. I came back in '31 and then for three years at Andover.

Q: You were a member of the Kneading club, I assume.

CLEVELAND: I got a Key and Seal which was sort of intermediate.

Q: Was there a rather discernible class system at Princeton at that time?



CLEVELAND: Oh yes, as far as wealth, and old Princeton ties too. I forget the others, but the older the ties, the nearer the campus. Prospect Avenue was the street. One thing that was very good from my point of view in a later career was that I got very much involved as a freshman in the political debating societies, two societies which are really one big club. the American Greek classic society. A friend of mine, a tall blond named John Van Ness was following a school, a missionary school in Basra, Iraq.

John and I were great friends and we were both sort of active in this public affairs club. We decided in our sophomore year to run for president, he president, I vice president, which was a very unusual thing to do. It was usually just marching orders. Our candidacy was opposed by all the upperclassmen but delighted all the freshmen. We organized all the freshmen like Tammany Hall, and won the offices by one vote. The head of the society was Gordon McRay, who later on became a very well known historian. He also ran the Californian. One of my freshmen cell leaders was Bob Goheen, who later became president of Princeton.

Q: Later ambassador to India.

CLEVELAND: That's right he became Ambassador to India. In fact, we visited him there. Also we got something around here, Herb Green for one thing; he became a valuable man. He cost me a hundred dollars at the time. I kept in touch with him during later years. So Princeton was kind of exciting. we would now call it an education for leadership as a subject but they didn't call it that at that time.

Q: What about the studies? Did you major in or concentrate on any areas?

CLEVELAND: I majored in what they call politics. Now it is called political science but politics is a much better word for it. It is obviously not a science. I majored in that and I took everything I could in the Woodrow Wilson School which at that time was not a graduate program. It was sort of just beginning public affairs concentration at the undergraduate level. It was interesting, their way of teaching. They would have conferences. The seniors in the class would be a congressional committee, and the juniors would testify back. There was one issue about education in the cotton south. I testified on behalf of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). I went and visited the NAACP and found out what they were about.

Q: You might explain for somebody who does not know what the NAACP is.



CLEVELAND: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which still exists today as a lobby organization in Washington. So it was very exciting and a very different kind of education.

Q: Talking about the NAACP, my impression is Princeton was sort of the place where gentlemen from the south were sent in those days so it had a rather heavy southern cast to it. Did you find that?

CLEVELAND: If you are thinking of it as having a southern cast, no. It had sort of an upper class cast. Most of the students were from families that were pretty well off. I was comparatively less well off than most of them. I had jobs. I waited on tables in the dining hall and sold sandwiches at night time. I did a lot of stuff like that to make ends meet. I think it was more sort of class and affluence than southernness. There weren't very many dark skinned people there, though one of my friends was a Japanese who was the son of the guy who had just become prime minister of Japan. He never did graduate because he didn't have his senior thesis done. He went down to Washington and came back with a senior thesis which had obviously been written by the embassy for him, and they never let him graduate. He was captain of the golf team and an extremely good golfer. I always put most of my time into studies in that area. A lot of politics, political science, some economics, some sociology and anthropology. I had an opportunity, they have a system there called the no course plan where if you do well enough through your junior year, you don't have to take any courses in your senior year; you had a thesis to do. I was in that category, so in my senior year I worked harder and took more courses I wished to take but couldn't fit into my program. I took a course in anthropology, for example. I also used the summers very creatively. Between freshman and sophomore year, I went with my brother on a thing called "Experiment in International Living." This is about the third or fourth year it had existed. We went to England, so we didn't get very much language difference. We had a wonderful time hanging around with a group of English and Scottish students. We walked all the way across Scotland from Edinburgh to Glasgow and had a good experience being with the families for a few weeks in London. Cemented the relationships with the Andover professor who was actually the leader of our group, and his wife. They were friends for life after that. At one point we thought that maybe he would marry my mother, but that didn't pan out. Between my junior and senior year, I went to the far east with my favorite professor, who was Bob Reischauer, the older brother of Ed Reischauer.

Q: This was a missionary family, wasn't it?



CLEVELAND: They were very famous in Japan, missionary family. They spoke Japanese fluently. He was being an historian but he was basically a far east specialist. He was my favorite professor, and it turned out I was his favorite student. When he organized a study tour for faculty members from all around the country, he was chairing and teaching and so on. He put up a notice looking for an undergraduate who was interested in going along. Then he asked me whether I had seen the notice. I said, "Yes, but I never answer stuff like that. It was one chance in a million." He said, "Why don't you apply for that one." The whole thing was so arranged they subsidized having me for an assistant. That was a fabulous experience. We went first to Japan for about a month. Down in Kyoto, was the first time I met Dwight Eisenhower. He was a graduate student down there at the University of Kyoto. I learned a little bit of Japanese, enough to get around. We were sponsored by an organization called the Society for Culture Horizons which was of course trying to cozy up to other countries because Japan was getting more militaristic and having more and more difficulty diplomatically, I guess. They were trying to do the cultural diplomacy bit. From there we were supposed to go to Peking as it was then called. Some people were already calling it Peiping. We couldn't go there because war broke out. The famous incident at the Marco Polo Bridge made it impossible, so we went instead to Tientsin and Manchuria.

We took a train up into Manchuria, a wonderful Manchurian railroad. It was the first time I had ever seen somebody hand you a washcloth wet with hot water - you know, like they do in airplanes now. Manchuria was then Manchukuo and was under Japanese control.

Then we went by boat to Shanghai. We were supposed to go down overland but it didn't work out that way. We spent two or three weeks in the Yangtze valley area, went up the river as far as Nanking and saw a lot of places en route. I got to know several Chinese guys quite well. The other student who was a graduate student at Stanford and I decided we wanted to go back to Tokyo to do some more interviewing. I was working on a senior thesis. It was going to be on Japanese militarism and I had some more interviewing to do, so he and I left Shanghai, and later the day we left, the war broke out. In our little Japanese liner, we went down the Yangtze River. There was a typhoon outside that was in the ocean, so it turned around and anchored in the river. The Japanese navy for the next two days used our boat as a marker to go around and shoot off another salvo at the city. We had a ringside seat at the beginning of the war in the Yangtze valley, a very important occurrence.



When we got back to Tokyo, we learned that in the battle of Shanghai, there were big headlines about Professor Reischauer being killed. I learned the whole story later that he and the whole faculty group were injured in a big sweep in a central hotel, the Palace Hotel. Some Japanese planes were chasing some Chinese planes, and out of one of the Chinese planes, a bomb had hit in the streets, a very crowded street right outside the hotel. It blew out the whole front of the hotel, and Bob Reischauer was standing at the desk. His colleagues I understand, liked to play cards, but none of them had any cards. He went down to the desk to get some playing cards. The obvious thought when I heard that was if I had been there, I was the gopher, I would have gone down to get the cards. This was a searing experience for me. The Japanese had assaulted one of their great foreign missionary friends, killed in the attack on Shanghai. While we were coming in on the boat, the other student, Johnny Meslin, and I were approached by a courier to come and meet Viscount Metillo, who was the number three man in the Japanese foreign office. He took us out to lunch. We had about three or four hours. He knew that we were going to go back and that we were associated with Reischauer, and he wanted us to have the right view of what was going on. I wish I had a tape of that because it would be a great document. He told us exactly why they were defending themselves, why they were attacking China and so on. It was a remarkable thing. At that point, I was still 19, I guess. It was a great experience there to be in the middle of this high politics. Then the rest of the group got on a larger Japanese liner that came by Yokohama, and we came down and got on and went home that way.

Q: You were working on Japanese nationalism at that time.

CLEVELAND: More on Japanese militarism.

Q: Well, this, of course, was the height of this. Did you run into any problems of being a non Japanese? I mean did you find military people in the street, maybe others giving you a difficult time?

CLEVELAND: No, I never had that feeling because from our point of view, Japan was not the enemy, and I guess we were not enemies either. If anything, we were associated with their good friend, Reischauer, so I didn't see any constraint at all. What I was writing was a senior thesis for the politics department, so my concern was the politics of militarism, that is how the militarists managed to get everybody on their side. I was able to analyze how the aristocrats got their way and why the civil servants were all on their side, and how it happened that some of the main parties which weren't very strong, all thought their bread was better on the side of the militarists. It was an interesting research project, but not very deep.



Q: But I mean it certainly was very much to the point. It was something of tremendous importance really to every American, and you were getting a first-line view of that.

CLEVELAND: And that turned out to be very important. For example, I applied for Rhodes Scholar because the guy who had been our leader for the experiment trip years before had been a Rhodes scholar, and he strongly advocated that I ought to apply for scholarships.

I applied where Mother was then living in Cincinnati. She had a job as assistant headmistress at a school there. I had a pretty competitive reason too. All those scholarships were at Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. I was applying at the Ohio level; they had a two step system. The day of our interview, we went and spent the day there. They would interview us one by one. There was a big incident about some gunboat, a U.S. gunboat, the Panay incident. For one thing I did know about the surrounding politics of that incident. I spent part of the day holding a seminar for all of the other candidates telling them what the background was so if they were asked about it, they would know what the professors on the panel were talking about. I was fluent on the subject. I got through that, and then the regional besides. The other guy who got it for Ohio was also elected at the regional level, so there were two of us.. He ended up as a long time friend and wound up working at Swarthmore.

Q: Was the Rhodes Scholar process essentially a series of interviews?

CLEVELAND: First you had to write out a big application and get people to swear by you and send in recommendations. You had to write an essay about what you were trying to do and why you wanted to go off. Then there was a two stage interview. A group was selected from Ohio, and a reviewing committee picked two of those. Those two along with two from each of five other states in the region, four were picked from that region, so it was a double jeopardy. They looked for all-roundness. They liked the fact that I had been active in public affairs. I got involved in the Roosevelt campaign of '36. I had done enough in athletics although I wasn't a star. I was playing lacrosse for Princeton I later played lacrosse for Oxford in a game against Cambridge. I had enough athletics and enough public affairs ambition and good enough grades, so I guess I was a good candidate.

Q: Moving back, I would like to pick up at Princeton during the 1936 campaign; Roosevelt, greatly beloved by many people, I think among some of the wealthier families, the reverse was true. Did you find yourself getting in sort of acrimonious debate, or confrontation over Franklin Eleanor Roosevelt?



CLEVELAND: Oh yes. Not so much Eleanor, we got to know her later as interns. She wasn't so much on the screen, but Roosevelt and the New Deal were very unpopular with the students. The faculty polled about a little over half in favor of the Democrats. The student body polled two thirds in favor of Landon. It must have been the only constituency in the country where he got two thirds. Also the war was coming over the horizon. I got very much involved in the Princeton anti-war society. I was president of the society and vice president of the political and debating society.

Q: Was there any reflection to the officer movement, "We will not fight for king and country." Was there a caption there?

CLEVELAND: We knew about that, but it was in general a pacifist stance. But it was the liberal side of the politics of the campus. We didn't have a young communist league or young socialist league, so we were it. I also worked for the Princetonian, the newspaper. I was basically an editorial writer for the Princetonian, so I was very much on the alert for political and international things. I got involved in the American Student Union, ASU, which was about maybe one-third young communist league and one-third socialist, and one-third miscellaneous. I was part of the miscellaneous. I went to their first national convention that they had. I was very much turned-off by the communist part because of their tactics which they skillfully did in those days. They would stay at the meeting longer and wait out everybody else, and then get their way. But I also became associated in people's minds with that whole group, and I just thought of myself as a political liberal which was minority enough for Princeton in those days. I was never rally attracted at all by the communists, and I was studying enough international affairs so that the Soviet Union didn't seem like the paradise that some of my contemporaries painted it.

Q: Well, at that time, you were getting, you know, some very positive reports about the Soviet Union at a certain level. How about the faculty? Were there any say ardent Marxists or admirers of the Soviet Union that you ran across as a sign of politics back then?

CLEVELAND: I don't really recall anybody that was overtly Marxist in the politics department. There were some kind of Marxian economists who regarded Marx as an important intellectual patron saint. Das Kapital was one of the books you had to read, and so on. I don't really recall many spectacular radicals on the campus. The only radicals that appeared on the campus were deliberately brought in for effect. We got into a big altercation with the university administration because we invited Norman Thomas.

Q: Good God! No one voted for him. You might explain who Norman Thomas was.



CLEVELAND: He was the socialist candidate for President in 1936 and was a very bright and extremely good orator. He was also a graduate of Princeton, so the university couldn't possibly object to our inviting an alumnus to come and talk at a public meeting on the campus. There was just no way they could say no to that. So we actually put up huge signs that Norman Thomas, Ought-6. Ought-5, Ought-6, whatever it is was.

Q: That was '06.

CLEVELAND: '06, to show that this was a member of the Princeton graduation class - a family member. I actually liked him very much and thought of myself as a socialist, for a little while, as a result. Later at Oxford, one of my professors was G.D.H. Hall, who was one of the well known guild socialists. Harold Wilson was my tutor there. He was in the Labor Party and the Labor Party was the Socialist Party. It did not seem off limits to me, but the Norman Thomas thing was an important moment for me because it was the first big public event. We had over a thousand people there. I was the chairman; I introduced him, and so forth. It was one of my first experiences at a big public controversial rally situation.

I always had experiences like that. I was on the debating team and so on. I figured the only way to learn how to be articulate in public was to be articulate in public. There is no way you can study that in a book. So, in a way, you could say at the time I was educating myself for leadership in some field. I didn't know what, but I thought probably the government.

Q: Well, this is one of the principles of Harvard, Yale, Princeton; and some other schools were designed to do; a little bit like the British public schools, to get you ready to be leaders in public life, not just to go into business.. I mean there was a sub-set within each one of these schools that was sort of designed to get you out and going.

CLEVELAND: Right it was a sub-set, because the main set was to go into a law firm or a Wall Street firm in New York. That was where people were heading. You didn't manufacture; you manipulated money or the law, or what have you.

CLEVELAND: That's right. That is where the majority of our classmates headed. I was always more interested in government work. Not so much in the liberal side as in government.

Q: As you became very much one of the figures in this, in 1961 when Kennedy came in, there was this great feeling of government service is good, and it is really good for you. What about Princeton and where you were, government? I mean you had the New Deal; you had Franklin Roosevelt in, but you were in a school that was basically anti-Roosevelt. How was government service viewed?



CLEVELAND: The part that I was in, the Woodrow Wilson School, the beginning of the Woodrow Wilson School which is now one of the great public affairs schools in the country, was really composed of people who were interested in government. The general propaganda you heard about Princeton was Woodrow Wilson's phrase, "Princeton in the nation's service," which was his mantra. That measure was going on all the time, and maybe just slipped off of people who were heading for a life in the stock market. It caught some of us very hard and we really thought of that. Today, that would be called education for leadership, but nobody talked about leadership. In fact the word leadership was sort of out of fashion because the leader was Der Fuhrer and so on.

Q: You talked about Japan. You had something going on in Europe which was essentially Adolf Hitler up to '38. Jews were beginning to come to the United States, including eventually Albert Einstein and all, to the Princeton area. Were you beginning to pick up any anti-Nazi things coming? Was there sort of a Jewish subgroup at Princeton? How did this work?

CLEVELAND: There were Jews at Princeton, but there was never an organized group that I saw in our political active groups. But we were very much focused on Hitler and how bad this was. And I was with a European background group which was especially worried about that.

Q: You were saying that at Princeton what was happening to the Jews, but also you raised the Hitler menace. Was this latter topic recognized then or, I assume your group would stay away from this.

CLEVELAND: Well, we were very ambivalent, because I think we were kind of appalled by Hitler and Mussolini and all that. At the same time we felt very strongly about being pacifists. When I got to Oxford, I put the two together and became very militantly anti-Chamberlain and the British government, which was in an appeasement mode at that time.

Q: But there weren't any particular sort of anti-Hitlerian anti-fascist movements going on at Princeton?

CLEVELAND: Well, anti-fascist yes, because the student union groups were part of their mantra at the time. You talk about mantras in those days.



Q: How about the Spanish Civil War? It pit the Catholics in the United States because of what the loyalists were doing to the church which was not very nice. They ended up as being rather pro-Franco, and the labor movements and the leftist movements were strong supporters of the loyalists.

CLEVELAND: I remember being very much in favor of the Spanish loyalists. That was sort of a minority view because in a way most of the campus wasn't paying that much attention. So, a lot of the people speaking up about Spain were the people in favor of the loyalists.

Q: What about ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps)? Were you going out and stoning the ROTC cadets?

CLEVELAND: No, the ROTC, as such, was not the kind of issue it became later on in the postwar period. There was never a controversy about having an ROTC on campus or anything like that at that time. We allowed the Princeton anti-war society to meet, campaigning against the local students who were wearing uniforms and like that. It seemed a perfectly natural thing to do so.

Q: Well, back to the Rhodes scholar. You were selected to go to be a Rhodes Scholar.

CLEVELAND: In '38, yes.

Q: What was your plan? You are supposed to give what you planned to get out of it. Did you have anything in mind?

CLEVELAND: I think very early the principle that I formulated, and tried to sell to the schools of planning and public administration, was improvisation as a general sense of direction. I guess I was improvising on the general idea that I wanted somehow to be in public affairs, in government, in the New Deal. That was the big thing at the time. I was very excited about what the New Deal was trying to do. They were trying to do something about poverty; trying to get the country back in motion, very much socializing government. I didn't care about Social Security or Medicare or things like that, but I was drawn to the anti-poverty aspects of it. I was drawn to the sense that if something needed to be done, the federal government ought to do it. This was very much the thinking at the time, if you were a Democrat.

Q: You were in a different area when you are talking about your days at Andover and Princeton. Had you very much exposure to what they call African Americans, blacks, to poverty the piney woods of New Jersey or anything like that, or was this more theoretical?



CLEVELAND: It was more theoretical and ideological. I later got an election job which was my first full-time job after that internship. The Social Security Administration was the huge agency representing different parts of the country. I was in the information division, so I was a propagandist. I went all over the country, and I learned a lot about what were some of the poorest areas.

Q: We will come to this later on, but we do want to get this first. Let's take the Rhodes Scholarship. You went off in '38. Things were beginning to heat up in Europe by that time.

CLEVELAND: They were indeed. I started off in a class they called the "regular three undergraduate."

Q: Were you in any particular college?

CLEVELAND: I was at University College, which is the same one Clinton went to later. It was a nest of the communists, and Beveridge was the master. You know Beveridge. Young Harold Wilson was sort of up and coming, an instructor I guess you'd call him. He was my tutor. I participated in a thing called the master's discussion group which went on for a few weeks. Somebody did a paper and we would criticize it, and so on. The very good friends, we were an inseparable threesome: Steve, who was a third rank and played piano very well; I heard jazz piano from him. The other one was Carl Burden who was training to be an economist.

Q: He gave me a D-minus in my freshman year in economics.

CLEVELAND: Was that at Swarthmore?

Q: No, Williams.

CLEVELAND: Well, he was the life of... what a sardonic sense of humor. The three of us were together extremely long. Every day we did something together.

Q: He was later economic advisor to President... no, directing the budget.

CLEVELAND: He was on the Council of Economic Advisors and later directed the budget.



Q: Under Eisenhower.

CLEVELAND: Toward the end he was with the Kennedy administration. He had one of the best political minds I have ever run across. Steve became very active and then paused for some education at Syracuse while I was in the Maxwell School at Syracuse. He wanted to prepare the way to leave there if it became possible, if the Democrats got back in. He had tenure and became the obvious person to be my successor. Also, he was one of my best friends for life.

Q: How did you find Oxford when you arrived in '38? What was your impression of British society, that segment of what you were observing?

CLEVELAND: Well, obviously, it was more stratified than anything I had been used to before, even compared to Andover and Princeton. There were people who went to Oxford and Cambridge and then there were other people who went to Leeds and Manchester and Birmingham, and places like that. We didn't know anything about those others. A good number of our professors that we listened to in lecture halls were people who were in and out of London. So some of the professors I had were people who were quite close to government and knew how it worked. I got a vision of the British government and came to understand the differences between the parliamentary and our system and the difference between their civil service and our messy system. Political appointees and our assistant secretaries have often been that way. I was interested in that sort of thing.

A Ph.D. had a gorgeous red robe. Not like the black robes that we had. I selected as my topic: compulsory military service in democratic states. My sources were piling up on me pretty fast as war came. I sort of started out with the idea that I do not favor military service. I concluded after studying that the democratic way was to have a citizen army. That was part of my conversion anyway from being greatly against war to being militantly against the Chamberlain policy of appeasement. I joined the Oxford University Labor Club which was probably the campus element of the party, and I became its director of propaganda. I organized demonstrations. I never really liked to participate in demonstrations, but I guess I was quite good at organizing them. I organized a large group of students all wearing Hitler masks and coming down the high and main streets. It was a wonderful opportunity. That picture got picked up all over the world. Oxford students demonstrating against Hitler. That was fun; I enjoyed that kind of thing.

Q: I would have thought that you would have found the labor movement really, up until the '90s, was so ideologically tilted in England, as opposed to a much more pragmatic labor movement in the United States. It would have been a little bit difficult for an American...



CLEVELAND: Well I was not in the labor movement. This was the Labor Party which had the trade unions as their biggest asset. But there were a lot of people like Harold Wilson who were not in a union of any sort, but they were kind of the natural leaders of the Party. I really didn't think of it as being in a league with TUC which was the liberal group out there. They weren't around Oxford. People at Oxford were the Harold Wilsons.

Q: In light of your later experience with this sort of thing in and out of government by people who were teaching at Oxford, did you find that there was much more of a practical approach to government? My experience has been that often with our academic world there is a real disconnect between the people who teach and the people who don't. I mean, they really don't talk the same language.

CLEVELAND: Well I guess I happen to mix well with people who did advisory stints on very practical issues. Keynes was an actual guru for it, but the issues were something they were using every day in thinking what the government ought to do. So, it worked out to be very advantageous to me to have gotten a good grounding on Keynesian economics. I read the general theory of the primary interest of money and so on. So I knew what that situation was even though I was not an economist. I had never wanted to be an economist. My brother Ben was a summa cum laude at Harvard in economics. He became an economist and wound up as the vice president for international monetary affairs for Citibank.

Q: 1938, of course, was the big year with Munich in Europe. How was that playing from your perspective, at Oxford?

CLEVELAND: Well, it was very controversial because a lot of people were saying we were not going to get into a war over this. Chamberlain was keeping us out of it. I was on the side that turned out to be on Churchill's side; something has got to be done to stop this Hitler. We weren't much moved at the time by what came to be known as the Holocaust. These years leading onto the war were fascinating and capturing...

Q: Well, it really hadn't started in full until about 1942.

CLEVELAND: Well, in full, but even during the '30s that was obviously a theme there. Nobody had any idea how virulent it was or was becoming. As you know, even Roosevelt denied that he knew very much about it. There was some controversy about whether he did or not. That was, at least the part of the controversy I was involved in, the Labour Party beating on Chamberlain for being an appeaser. We all hadn't decided that we wanted to go to war, I don't think. I don't recall meetings I went to where anyone was advocating that Britain should start a war against Germany. They were drawn into it by Hitler, as we were drawn into it by Pearl Harbor.



Q: I guess it goes back to the mid-'30s, the Oxford movement, we will not fight for king and country. Had that pretty well run its course by the time you got there?

CLEVELAND: It was still, the group of people who had been involved with that had already graduated. I think a lot of students at that time there were probably in my condition. They had pacifist feelings, but Hitler had gradually overcome them. For one thing, the year I was there, I don't think the Oxford Union ever had a debate on that subject, that famous theme: We won't fight for God and country.

Q: How about as an American, did you find yourself able, in a way, to float between the various worlds of Oxford without being, sort of, put in your place by the British system?

CLEVELAND: Oh, yes, because all of us who were over there had already graduated once. Even though half of us were taking what in their terms was an undergraduate course, we were a little older than they were. The Rhodes scholarships have sort of a cache also. To be a Rhodes scholar was something you sort of had to be. Yes, I guess I didn't have a feeling that I couldn't float where ever I wanted in that situation. I had a social problem in that I had promised my grandmother that I wouldn't smoke or drink until I was 21. I wasn't yet 21 when I was over there. I got all the way through Princeton without even having a glass of beer which was quite an accomplishment.

Q: I think so. Did you ever swallow a goldfish?

CLEVELAND: I never swallowed a goldfish, no.

Q: That was one of the things college students were doing at that time.



CLEVELAND: My brother got started smoking because my mother smoked like a chimney. My grandmother had a martini at lunch and a couple of drinks in the evening, but she thought that people shouldn't start that until it was good for them as her doctor said it was good for her. But she had made a deal with each of her grandchildren. We'd get \$500 if he or she didn't smoke until they were 21, and another \$500 if they didn't drink until they were 21. That was in the '30s when \$500 was quite a lot of money. When my twin brother and sister qualified at 21, there was an ethical conference as to whether they could count on me to stay with it until I was 21 too because it was important that we collect that \$3000 because that was what we needed to buy a racing sailboat together, which we did, which was of course, immediately named the Vientiane. The three of us were very successful with it for several summers thereafter. I didn't drink anything until February 19 when we had a party in my room with Steve and Kermit and others. The first thing I drank was some awful orange liqueur. I said, "Is this what everybody has been telling me I have been missing?" I have now gotten so I like whiskey very much.

Q: Were there any German students? I can't remember if there were German Rhodes scholars. How were they fitting in? Were they a problem at that point?

CLEVELAND: There weren't very many of them, and I didn't know any of them at all. I just didn't have any contacts of that sort.

Q: What was your impression of Harold Wilson? He later became a Labour prime minister of England.

CLEVELAND: He became a very young president of the Board of Trade and Parole board and various other things. He was a very active young political administrator. He was an absolutely first rate mind, wonderful use and very fast. When he asked you a question you had to be sure you absolutely knew what you were answering because if you didn't know what you were talking about he'd find that out fast. So I enjoyed contacts with him because he was so bright. I was a little surprised later on when he became a major political leader because it never seemed to me that he had the kind of charisma and external ability to turn people on that you would think a political leader as having to have. I was impressed with the fact that he was obviously on the make as a when I was 21, he was 21 at the time. When I got to be 22, he was 22, so from my point of view, he was more a colleague than a tutor, but he was beginning to act like a tutor.

Q: Arriving in '38 and a year later on the first of September, 1939, a little thing, WWII kind of started. What effect did that have because Rhodes scholars were on two year assignments.



CLEVELAND: Two years or more, if necessary. Let me interrupt that to say there was one very important thing that happened during the year that didn't have anything to do with the academic work that I was doing, but was very pleasant for me. We got these huge long vacations, six weeks at Christmas and six weeks at Easter. John Van Ness was back in Iraq and invited me to come out to visit during the Easter vacation. I couldn't get any airplanes in those days, so I went across to Marseilles and then a boat to Alexandria, and then a bus across the desert, and so on. I found out how to get there and back. I had something over two weeks in Basra. John and I went down to Kuwait, which was a pretty small place of sand, sitting on this huge lake of oil. We would wander out, there would be a demonstration every two or three days on something or another. There were always Iraqis in the streets. John and I would go out there without any sense that we were in any danger or that anybody was going to be against us. He spoke fluent Iraqi Arabic so it was quite a surprise. He was about six feet six with a shock of blond hair, and I was pretty tall, so there was no doubt when we were out in a crowd; we were there. Everybody could see us. They were so astonished by his garrulousness in their dialect that we were partly defended by that. Anyway, people weren't against Americans as such, particularly at that time. I didn't feel it.

Q: There was no particular reason to be because there was British Petroleum there, and I don't think we had much of a stake there. We did in Saudi Arabia, but not in Iraq.

CLEVELAND: Later the consortium of companies that bought in to Iraq's oil with an Armenian intermediary who became one of the richest people in the world, Gulbenkian. My wife has done business with his foundation in Portugal because one of the academy of science, the head of the European part of the academy, is an officer in that foundation. Anyway, I would never go out in one of the Arab countries today in the way that I did then, just turning 21. I learned a lot about that part of the world, its politics and geography. Ever since then, every time there is a crisis over the Persian Gulf or anything, I would feel I could visualize what was going on, who was where, and so on, much better than most people because of this exotic experience. In that summer, thinking back on it, I made the mistake of staying in London to work on my research. I worked at the London School of Economics' library which is a wonderful library, and lived in an apartment in South Kensington. What I should have done was to go on a wonderful cruise around the Aegean Sea, and so on. I didn't know it was all about to come to an end, so I figured I better get to work.

Then I was traveling in Europe on the continent at the end of the summer. I went to visit Geneva. My then girlfriend had a temporary internship of some sort there. She arranged for a group of us to go and tour around the old Leirer business building which was largely deserted by that time. A beautiful building. So we toured around, and as we were coming out we came by the press room where a number of reporters were sort of huddled around the radio looking very glum. We poked our head in and said what is going on. They said, "Hitler has just marched into Poland." That is how I heard about the beginning of WWII.



Then I got a message soon after that from Oxford, a circular message to all Rhodes scholars that they were suspending the scholarships while the war fights on, and they were particularly sensitive about any Americans because there would be bombing and some might get killed, and that would be their fault for having encouraged them to stay. So I was told to leave and arranged to come home. Of course, all my stuff was in Oxford, so I arranged for some stuff to be sent from there, and never went back there.

While I was in Geneva, I decided I had better start looking for a post-Oxford job, and I was interested in international affairs and international organizations. John Hannah had been governor of New Hampshire, I think, and at that time was the director general of the ILO (International Labor Organization). I got quite far along in the process of his hiring me as an assistant, but then I thought it would be best not to make any personnel commitments because they were thinking about moving the headquarters somewhere. And they did in fact move it to Montreal for the whole wartime period. So, I arranged to come home on a boat that left from somewhere in the Bordeaux area. It was a small American liner. Somehow I was coming back first class. I'm not sure how that happened. I guess it was just paid for by Oxford. There was radio silence, so they weren't getting very good information about the weather. It ran into a hurricane and a tidal wave which practically capsized this vessel, and 120-some people were injured. I was actually out on the promenade deck on the lee side. Fortunately they had put canvas things up between the rail and the promenade deck, because when the thing almost upset, it threw us all against the canvas or we would have been out in the drink somewhere. Still a lot of people were in the lounge. There was an orchestra there, and so on. The wave came up through the windows and washed the furniture and people and instruments and everything to one side. Then when it righted itself, everything got washed to the other side. It was just a terrible carnage. There were no fatalities among the passengers. The big problem was the whole place was a hospital. Of course we all volunteered to do whatever was useful. I spent that whole night sitting on a bunk with an elderly woman and holding her neck that was broken, pushing it against the chocks.

The whole boat was shuddering. The doctor that was responsible for her told me afterward that I had saved her life and told her, so for years we heard from her. We got Christmas cards from her. I learned an interesting and important lesson from all that. If people hadn't turned to or had been too scared or had not cooperated very effectively...

When we got to New York, we were met by a body of journalists. It was impossible not to notice that the people who had not been any help on board were trotting off to tell their story first. Those of us who had been helpful were sort of hanging back and not knowing what we should do, and so on.



Q: Why don't we pick this up the next time? You had just arrived back in New York in 1939 after war has broken out in Europe, and we'll pick it up at that point.

CLEVELAND: Okay, fine.

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Q: This is the second of March, 1999. Well, we are picking this up in 1939. You are back to New York. What did you do?

CLEVELAND: '39. That is just 60 years ago. My inclination then was to try Washington. It was still kind of a new deal in Washington. The American secretary of the Rhodes trust, Frank Aydelotte, was the president of Swarthmore. He had made an arrangement with the National Institute of Public Affairs (NIPA) which had a very successful internship program in Washington. That was before the government had its own internship program, so this was kind of an innovation from the outside, financed primarily by the Rockefeller Foundation. They had already gone through their selection process long before, but he had made an arrangement that they'd take any returning Rhodes Scholars, sight unseen, as an addition to their corps. There were about 35 people, young men and women. About nine or ten women and the rest men were already selected and already in residence down there. I elected to do that.

The deal was whatever I wanted to do for the next year Aydelotte would find me the money to live on if it had any educational usefulness. This obviously did. He found me a grant from the Carnegie Corporation which was not munificent but turned out to be enough to live on. It was about \$700 for eight months. A dollar, of course was worth a lot more then. So I moved to Washington and was taken in by a group of former interns, mostly from the previous year, who had rented a house together on Colorado Avenue. The house had eight beds and they had seven residents, so they invited me in to fill up the eighth bed and pay for part of the rent. That turned out to be a very nice arrangement. They were congenial folks and they had the same kind of experience that I was about to have.

When I was sort of figuring out what kind of internship I wanted to get into, the NIPA was mostly pushing for people to go into public administration, narrowly conceived that is, personnel, budget, organizational management sort of thing. I was really more interested in politics and I was referred to a fellow named Bob Hammond who had been an intern with young Senator Bob La Follette about two years before. So Phil took me up to La Follette's office and introduced me. Then I sort of produced this for the managers for the National Institute of Public Affairs program as a *fait accompli*. They had occasional interns on the Hill, but mostly in the executive branch.

Q: La Follette at that time was a senator from Wisconsin, wasn't he?



CLEVELAND: Yes, this was the son and former assistant of the famous Robert La Follette who ran for President and was a great progressive leader. There was still a Progressive party in Wisconsin I had a sort of a vague connection because I had lived for two or three years when I was a child in Madison. My father was the Episcopal student chaplain at the university there. If anybody had asked, I would say I came originally from Wisconsin. It really turned out to be a wonderful opportunity. I arrived there in November and between November and January, before Congress reconvened, in these days they didn't meet all year around, I was assigned to the staff of the civil liberties committee which was the great congressional investigative committee of the time chasing after the rich farmer organizations and intervening on behalf of the migrant workers, and generally being sort of a liberal outpost of the day. That was a lot of fun, but I was only there for a couple of months.

Q: By the way, while you were there, was the South, and dealing with African Americans, sort of out of bounds for the group or the committee?

CLEVELAND: No, but the main crusade of the day was sort of intervening on behalf of unions. This was in the '30s when there had been a little steel strike in 1937. In fact, the first job I had was to be the rewrite man, the editor of sort of a huge report of the investigation of the little steel strike. They were chasing after the associated farmers which was an outfit in California that was being nasty to the migrant workers and that sort of thing. The North South black white issues were not at that point the big issue, of course. They would be in the future.

When the Senator came back to town, I was brought into his office and in effect became a legislative assistant, trying to become an expert on farm credit. He was the ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, even though he was a one-person party in the Senate, the only progressive. so I got to know a lot about farm credit and other issues that were important in the New Deal days, which in fact, led to my first paying job.

As the academic year was reaching an end in May and June, the Rhodes Scholar group had circulated a list of Rhodes Scholars that would be looking for jobs. I was picked off that list by a Rhodes Scholar of about 1933, or so, named Jack Fisher, who was head of the information division of the Farm Security Administration, a huge New Deal agency. Jack was later editor in chief of Harpers Magazine.

Q: Well known.



CLEVELAND: You may remember him. I was the last person to join that staff. So as it happened, I was given the newest task, which was to relate farm security to the defense program. The defense program was coming up at that time. If you couldn't prove you were part of the defense program, you had more difficulty getting money out of Congress and out of the budget bureau in fact. As it happened, Farm Security had fallen into a couple of very useful defense jobs. Whenever the Army needed to requisition some land for an artillery range or something, they'd obviously take the cheapest land they could get. That was where the poor farmers were. It fell to us to relocate them, the farmers.

We had all sorts of fascinating adventures. I was sent in to a place called Hinesville, Georgia, where they were setting up a big artillery range. I became sort of the public relations officer to the county supervisor who was the officer in charge. The Farm Security Administration had a county supervisor in every county in the country opposite to, but not working for, the county agent which was set up by the old extension service. We were making loans to small farmers, people who by definition were not good credit risks. It was always one of our boasts that our rate of repayment was much better than the rate of repayment of the Farm Credit Administration which was doing it for the richer farmers.

Q: You were talking about acting sort of as the public affairs officer and dealing with the public as you were moving these military bases onto farm country.

CLEVELAND: My job was to help the Farm Security Administration county supervisor cope and help the farmers who had to relocate. We got, of course, a good deal of money from the Justice Department and the Army who were buying, and we had to help negotiate the price of these purchases, but then I had also some other problems like do we move the graves also or just the people and where do the people move to. Do they move as a community or do we just let them go wherever they would like to go. Most of these places were kind of closed communities, but they felt they really wanted to move as a group, so we tried to make it come out that way. Then because we were in the migratory labor business, and had a lot of experience with emergency housing, we were thrown in to helping the military when they would set up a new plant somewhere, contract with a new plant to make tanks or something. There would be a plant and a need for a lot of housing for the workers to live there, so we worked on some of those issues too. All together, it was a very exciting time for me.

Q: The part of the Department of Agriculture you were working for, was that also set up by Theo Lang, and others, to take pictures, James Agee and all of that to...

CLEVELAND: They had a section euphemistically called the historical section which produced photographs of drought scenes and so on, and produced several very fine documentary films, very famous at the time.



Q: "The Plow that Broke the Plains."

CLEVELAND: One was "The Plow that Broke the Plains;" another was "The River."

Q: "The River," oh, yes, beautiful music.

CLEVELAND: Wonderful music, beautifully presented all together. That was not part of the information division, but we worked very closely with them because we used their stuff a lot.

Q: Well, these were farmers weren't they, subsistence farmers. How did you find places to put them and a way for them to make a livelihood?

CLEVELAND: Well it was a question of relocating them in a place that didn't have enough farmers, enough people with their experience. That, of course, was done by the agricultural experts. It was, in fact, quite successful. People did get relocated. It didn't produce, as it could have, a big backlash of people rising in revolt and saying that the government was discriminating against them because they were poor. It happened that the New Deal already had a big machinery in place directed at the poor people, who were farmers in our case.. It turned out to be an important piece of the reconversion of the economy from civilian to defense purposes.

Q: Did you have trouble with the military or were they pretty new at this game, too? I would think it would be difficult for them to adjust to what they were doing.

CLEVELAND: Yes, but they regarded us as the answer to a maiden's prayer. They were having public relations trouble with the people they were displacing, and they wanted to get on with the job which was to build an artillery range or build emergency housing for a defense firm or so on like that. They didn't have the capability of doing that, and they were delighted there was somebody that did, and was anxious to help. So, on the whole our relations with the military were very good during that period. We were not doing something that they expected to do. Then we were making things legal and above board. There were no corruption problems connected with this as I remember. It was pretty straight forward. The good thing about it was in place both an attitude and some administrative machinery for helping poor farmers who were being pushed aside by the needs of the Defense Department.

Q: You were doing this until when?



CLEVELAND: Until Pearl Harbor.

Q: That is December 7, 1941.

CLEVELAND: 1941, so I was there for about a year and a half. I got promoted several times during that period. We were able on the basis of one of those promotions to get married. I had met Lois in the internship program where she was in the Department of Justice in the juvenile delinquency section, Bureau of Prisons. By the end of the intern year we were engaged. Both of our families had difficulty with the idea, so it took more than a year later before we were finally able to bring it off. Lois' family in the end didn't come to the wedding which was in Washington.

Q: Her family was from where?

CLEVELAND: Oregon. My boss, Jack Fisher was very sympathetic with all of this and wanting to make it happen, so he arranged for me to be assigned for the summer, I guess it was 1940, to the Portland, Oregon regional office of Farm Security to take the place of a man there just for the summer, who was coming to Washington to get some advanced training. It was in my field, it was in the public affairs side of the agency. The irony was the man who came to be trained, whom I replaced for that time, was a former boyfriend of Lois'. Anyway we went out there for the summer.

That provided not only a wonderful opportunity to get to know Lois' parents, but to get that all straightened out. It turned out that they had a lot of wedding presents stacked up for this very occasion. Lois was able to commute; it was only 50 miles to Salem from Portland. Also on the trip out, and particularly on the trip back, we saw a lot of the country. On the trip back we visited a lot of migratory labor camps and things which Farm Security was doing, so it became part of my education about the agency as well.



Then Pearl Harbor happened all of a sudden, and everything changed. They established almost immediately a board of economic warfare which was really a cabinet committee chaired by the vice president, Henry Wallace. He had been Secretary of Agriculture for eight years just before so most of the people he knew were in agriculture. He selected as the executive director of the Board of Economic Warfare a man named Milo Perkins, a businessman who had been brought in to run the Food Stamp plan which he had been doing very successfully. Perkins became the executive director. He didn't know anybody except people in the Department of Agriculture, so he just swept about a hundred of us in, and we became the Board of Economic Warfare. Jack Fisher became one of the assistant administrators, and I came in as his assistant. So, we were suddenly economic warriors engaged in preclusive purchasing of valuable raw material, conducting some strange sort of secret arrangements like bringing diamond bort, which is sort of crushed up diamonds in their original state, but that could be made into very good industrial diamonds. The best people for doing this were the Swiss, so we brought that stuff in from Genoa on neutral ships, Swedish ships mostly. It would then be taken on a train guarded by German guards into Switzerland where we would manufacture it into industrial diamonds, brought out again and shipped back to the United States for the war effort.

The Germans and the Italians had to take Switzerland seriously when they said, you know if you don't make it possible for us to do some trade, which they could have cut off entirely once they invaded France. The Swiss sort of stood there with their hand on the plunger saying the first false move and we blow up the tunnel and you won't have any way to get back and forth between the north and south of Europe to your front. So it was a strange time in many ways.

Q: Did you find yourself going after strategic materials? I think of wolfram in Spain, that most of us had never even heard of.

CLEVELAND: Yes and chrome in Turkey, and the like.

Q: The Belgian Congo uranium.

CLEVELAND: Yes, although I never learned much about uranium until the atom bomb surfaced. It was a lively time and I was still quite young, 23, 24, 25 during that period. I was a staff assistant so whenever they had some administrative emergency mess in some division, I would be sent in to be in charge of that division temporarily while they would turn things around and build a new directory. So, for awhile, I was in charge of economic intelligence for the Board of Economic Warfare.



Eventually I was put in charge of the Italian division of the Board of Economic Warfare, which became the Italian division of the Foreign Economic Administration when the entire agency shifted to beginning to think about what it was going to do in the post war period. The Italian division consisted mostly of enemy aliens, that is Italian refugees who had come over. Italy had become a co-belligerent by the time I took that over, so we were actually helping Italy, but for the first few months, the Germans still had most of Italy, and we were helping the air force figure out what to bomb. We felt it was part of our job to tell them also what not to bomb. So we made sure they knew where the cathedrals were and the like. Then we had one of the men on the staff become a very good friend of ours.

He had run a group of aluminum factories in Italy before, but they were Jewish. Mussolini decided rather late in the game that in order to curry favor with Hitler, they really had to be more anti-Semitic. So, they really started to make life difficult for Jews and a lot of those people came over. One of them was a first rate professor of law at the University of Rome. The other was a man whose father owned a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. There was another man who was already a finance expert, so we had wonderful talent. They mostly spoke English quite well but with varying degrees of Italian accents. So, I was younger than any of them and I was the only person who could go up to Congress and testify about any of that and not sound like a foreigner.

As the allies decided to invade Italy in '43, our function was switched from advising about warlike things to advising about how much food people in Sicily would need. As soon as we occupied it we would have to worry about that. So, we developed a whole passel of post war plans for Italy. That led rather naturally to my going to Italy in 1944 about three months after the fall of Rome.

Q: That was October or November. The fall of Rome was June 1944.

CLEVELAND: I got there in September of '44. The background of that was I was, of course, subject to being drafted all this time. I was kept out of the draft at first because we had one child, a so called pre-Pearl Harbor baby, conceived before and born after. Then they kept drafting me and I would go up for the physical exam. The eye doctors for some reason were always last in the maze of procedures I faced. They would reject me because I have one eye that doesn't work, a childhood accident. It made a big scar on the retina of my right eye, so I can really only see with the left eye. I have peripheral vision in that eye, but no direct vision. I never realized what an advantage that would be because I was one of the few young white male civilians around. So there were good opportunities for being promoted in the government during that time.



When the draft boards finally decided they didn't want any more 1-Bs, which were the limited service people - people who would become a soldier and sort shoes or something like that because they couldn't shoot - I was told by the draft board on a Friday that my card would be the next card to come up so I had better get ready. Sunday morning there was a big headline in the Washington Post that the Army decided not to have any more 1-Bs. Lois came rushing in from the front stoop with this headline I immediately set about trying to arrange to go overseas, because I had been disappointed that I wasn't in it, you know. The obvious place for me to go was Italy since I was working on it. A job was arranged for me to go in as a staff assistant to the political brigadier general, William O'Dwyer. He later became mayor of New York city, and that was part of the story, too, because I was signed up to work for him. The day I arrived happened to be the day that he announced publicly that he was going to come home and run for mayor of New York which he, of course, successfully did several times. So there was great confusion for several weeks. It was an emergency time. About the first thing I was asked to do was develop, for congressional presentation purposes, a balance of payments estimate and internal accounts reconciled with the balance of payments. This was regarded as an impossible assignment in Washington by the people who were supposed to be doing it. Because I had just arrived they said, what are we going to do about this? I thought it would be duck soup because that was just the kind of numbers we were always inventing in Washington. That was a normal thing for a young bureaucrat to be doing. So, I assembled a couple of even younger men, and we holed up for a weekend and produced the first post war balance of payments calculations for Italy. This was regarded as a major miracle. It wasn't, given the background I had doing that kind of work in Washington.

It brought me suddenly to the notice of everybody in the Allied Control Commission. The executive director was an Italian American named Tony Antolini, who was a Macy's buyer before the war and was promoted to be the vice president of the Allied Control Commission in charge of the economic section. This was the job O'Dwyer had. Then they kind of looked around and said who are we going to put into this number two job which was called the executive director. Everybody were specialists. There were port experts and experts on everything, but there weren't any generalists. I was enough of a generalist and I had just done this apparently miraculous piece of staff work, so to my surprise and to the great surprise of most of the staff, I was catapulted into this job, 1400 people supposedly working for me. The next echelon below me were American full colonels and British brigadiers. I had a uniform. Of course, I didn't have anything on my shoulder.

Q: Which was handy.



CLEVELAND: Indeed. It was very good to not have anything on my shoulder. I guess I was self confident enough about the substance of what I was doing. I was assigned an assistant, an American army regular full colonel who was an absolute godsend because he was the kind of a person who knew where all the bodies were buried and what would motivate all the senior people. He knew how to get medals for the senior officers and do all the things that lubricated the bureaucratic machinery. So Colonel Dinsmore and I succeeded because of his skill and working about 16 hours a day on my part.

Q: How did you find the Italians you were dealing with? I assume that they knew they were co belligerents at this time, but you were dealing with members of what passed for the Italian government.

CLEVELAND: Well the Italian government was just sort of starting up. In fact, we were in a way bringing it into being. It consisted of a coalition of the six Partisani parties, the partisan parties who had mostly been up conducting guerrilla warfare in the mountains in the north, but also in the area around Rome. They came together eventually under the leadership of De Gasperi, who was a great leader I think, in a coalition government. When they first made the deal to work together, we were encouraging them and feeding them information about what the allies wanted, and so on. They were having difficulty deciding where the first meeting of the new government would be held.

Tony Antolini and I shared a huge suite with an enormous sitting room in the Grand Hotel, right in the middle of town. So we said why don't you come and meet in our living room. It's a neutral zone. So the first meeting of the first cabinet in the new Italian government was held in our living room. I was a fly on the wall. I had not known Italian before I had moved there, but I spent so much time in meetings with Italians, many of whom didn't speak English, that I rapidly picked it up. I never had any lessons, but by the end of the two and a half years I spent in Italy, I could make an extemporaneous speech in Italian. It was a very tough, demanding but very exciting job. I was in effect responsible for the Italian economy.

Q: Well, how were things working? My last job overseas was as consul general in Naples. Naples was the center, it had the largest number of glove factories in the world, yet didn't have a single registered glove factory. The Italians by that time, were very good at working in the grey market, you might say, to arrange things as the Italians say. Did you find this ability was in full flower while you were doing your work?



CLEVELAND: Yes, and of course, the Mafia was in full flower too. Sicily had been reoccupied first. We would lose whole trucks of supplies. They would just disappear on their way from Naples to Rome. But we also had a lot of contacts with people. For example, Naples was a major port with major damage. One of the Allied Control commission's activities was to fix up the port of Naples and we put a lot of investment in there. We had a number of people who worked at the port and were well known to all of the Italians. So, for example, when I went down to Naples to meet Lois and our very young children when they came over, I had no difficulty negotiating myself a spot on the pilot boat going out. Most of the people waiting for their families didn't have that opportunity.

It is hard to imagine a situation where you are importing rather more than a third of a big country's GNP. Everything was imported. We were importing from the United States, wheat and coal. The idea of importing coal all the way across the Atlantic to a European country seems ridiculous, but that is what we were doing. The Ruhr wasn't yet available. The Italian farming areas were still recovering from being battlefields. We had responsibility for this huge importation of food. We therefore had got all involved in issues of what the ration would be. For a time once the Germans were chased out of northern Italy in early 1945, some of our people had to get into the reoccupied areas before our troops got there in order to paste up signs saying don't tear down the frescoes and so on, all the monuments.

I visited Florence just a few weeks after the Germans were chased out of there. The Germans were out of the Po valley but the Italian government didn't yet have a government up there, so it was still military government area. So for about four months I had the absolutely ridiculous job, a because I was nearly 28 by then, of being named the economic commissioner for northern Italy, which meant that every week I decided what the ration was going to be, how many grams of pasta a day and that sort of thing. Which industries would get how much power. Anywhere there was a shortage, we had to make rationing decisions. I have thought since that if I had that same job today, I would probably surround myself with consultants and be immobilized, but I was young and the situation was so emergency that you had to make decisions, so you just made them.

Q: When you were in Rome and when you were up in northern Italy, where were our priorities? I mean outside of obviously getting the people fed, were we looking at any particular industry or economic sectors that had to be done to get things going?



CLEVELAND: Well essentially, of course, southern Italy was sort of an underdeveloped area, but Italy as a whole was a major industrial country. The task from an economic point of view was to get it working again pretty much on the pattern that had been working before, with a different style of government obviously. It wasn't as difficult a thing, it didn't raise the kind of policy issues that the occupation of Germany raised where you had the Soviets coming in on the other side, and you had chunks of Germany allocated to the British and the French and the Americans. It didn't have the same uncertainty as the occupation of Japan later had, where the place was really being run by the Americans.

Q: MacArthur was El Supremo.

CLEVELAND: Yes. As to Italy, Churchill and Roosevelt had gotten together in one of their frequent consultations at Hyde Park. Over a meal of barbecued hot dogs apparently in some outdoor setting there, they had decided what the occupation policy was going to be for Italy. That policy was very simple: get Italy back in the hands of the Italians. It had already been a co belligerent for quite awhile so that wasn't as shocking as it would have been in Germany or Japan. So we had a clear mandate to build the Italian government, get it competent enough to take over the functions that we were performing, and then we could get out of there. That was the policy, and that was essentially what we did.

Q: How about Alcide De Gasperi? What was your impression of how he responded to the economic challenge, or was he pretty much on the political side?

CLEVELAND: Well, he had to handle everything during the frequent times that he was prime minister, but he was basically an active and skillful coalition builder. Although he was a Christian Democrat, they never had a clear majority in anything. There were all these other parties, so he had to keep moving people around and trying to inspire the general population with the good future for Italy. I think what we did on the economy was to provide an enormous blood transfusion and to build the industrial and economic and to some extent the currency stabilization environment for what came to be called after the war, the "Miracolo economico Italiano." Italy took off much faster than Germany or Japan, and a lot of that really was the result of a lot of little wise decisions made by the occupiers and the industrialists and the local political leaders.

Q: Were you ever called upon by the Italian government to say we have got, for political reasons, to make sure this coalition hangs together? We have to support the sewing machine industry as opposed to something else. In other words, some adjustments were for political reasons to keep things together.



CLEVELAND: There was some of that, but the industrialists were not closely linked to the party. Their general idea was just keep the government out of our hair, and we'll make it happen. People like the Agnelli family that was running Fiat...

Q: In Turin, yes.

CLEVELAND: And Aurelio Pachelli and so on. They were very competent top business leaders. They didn't want to be in politics because politics was too complicated. There were too many parties.

Q: Did you have problems with the Fascists? I mean fascism had been tied to big business to some extent at least in theory.

CLEVELAND: The corporative state.

Q: The corporative state, yes. Did you have a problem equivalent to as we did in German denazification. Did you have "defascistification" or anything of that nature?

CLEVELAND: No, there was never a thing of that kind. Maybe it was because the Italians were never willing to take that seriously, the sort of ideological fascism of Mussolini. I think that a lot of the corporative life of the country was theoretically run by the government. My office was actually an enormous office as executive director.

Q: A true Mussolini style.

CLEVELAND: My office was the office that had been the minister of corporations, and on a clear day, I could almost see all the way across the room.

Q: The Italians, particularly in that period, went for grandiose edifices.

CLEVELAND: Very heavy architecture. I think the top business people that I came to know had a general orientation like the top business people in this country. That is, they regarded the government as an inconvenient necessity. They had their own strategies and mostly their own links with America and other European countries.



Q: Was it pretty much American assistance that was doing things? I was wondering whether you had the British and the French. Were they involved at all?

CLEVELAND: The British, yes. The French were not. The Allied Control Commission was a U.S. U.K. thing completely. The British Eighth Army kind of came up the west coast, and the American forces, Fifth Army mostly, took care of the east coast and through Cassino, the Anzio landings, and that whole history. The American air force which was still an army thing at that time, and the Royal Air Force were working very closely together. There was a joint headquarters down at Caserta not far from Naples.

Q: I called it a miniature Versailles.

CLEVELAND: It was a huge place. We were of course G-5. We were the civil affairs part of the thing, but we were quite different and separate. We were set up right in the middle of Rome, in requisitioned government buildings and living in requisitioned houses. While Caserta was kind of our regional headquarters, most of our real dealings were with Washington and London directly by cable. People in Caserta didn't know very much about the Italian economy and didn't try to second guess us on that. Our second guessing was done in Washington, not in Caserta.

Q: What about the communists? I mean they were a major partisan movement, and when they came in during this early period, how did you work with them?

CLEVELAND: They were one of the six parties that formed the original government under a fellow named Bonomi. In fact, in that first cabinet meeting held in our living room, the minister of finance in the first Italian government was a communist. So they were not beyond the pale at all. In a way, it was a huge party. I mean they probably had more members than any party except maybe the Christian Democrats.

Q: They always had a disciplined party as opposed to some of the other ones that were sort of little tribal parties.

CLEVELAND: They were more disciplined than the Italian parties, but they weren't nearly as disciplined as the French or some of the other European communist parties. They were more of a membership organization than political parties often are. There was a time there in the early days when they were pulling down something like a third of the vote in Italy. In the 1948 elections which was sort of a crucial moment, they were only narrowly defeated.

Q: You left there when?



CLEVELAND: Well, I think, I didn't leave there until the spring of 1947, as the war was winding down. We were looking forward to what came to be called VE day and then VJ day.

Q: VE day was April, '45 and VJ day was August, '45.

CLEVELAND: Yes, and by that time, the U.S. and British governments had decided that the function we were performing, particularly in the economic side, should be taken over by UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which was already operating a small welfare-oriented relief program, and which also had sizable operations starting in Greece and Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine, China and elsewhere. So, I was appointed a member of the U.S. delegation to the meeting of the UNRRA council, which was the governing body of all the governments which met in London in August of 1945. I was the first to sort of write and politic about the resolution we needed from that governing body, saying that UNRRA would take over what we now call the AID program from the Allied Control Commission.

So we put through a U.S.-U.K. initiative. The U.S. had most of the clout in UNRRA, but the resolution said that the burden would be shared by the other countries too. That meant that there would be a large UNRRA mission, and the people who were running the UNRRA organization as a whole. Former governor Herbert Lehman of New York was the director general. The number two was a wonderful guy named Commander R.G.A. Jackson, Robert Jackson, known to all of his friends as Jacko, whose wife was Barbara Ward.

Q: The British economist.



CLEVELAND: He didn't appreciate being known as Mr. Barbara Ward. People sometimes called him that behind his back. They propositioned me in London. In one dramatic moment VJ day happened, so there were huge celebrations in Piccadilly Circus and Trafalgar Square and so on. We went down and it was just mobs of people. So it was just at that point in world history that this decision was being made. They asked me if I would stay in Italy and essentially do what I was doing, run the AID program, run the importation of assistance and all the complications that required in the way of arrangements for the Italians. I made two conditions which I didn't think they would accept. One that I felt they probably would accept was that I would be able to bring Lois and the children over. That turned out to be feasible. The second was I said the best way to build a new mission would be for me to just take the hundred best people out of my 1400 and give them all their first post war job. Every one of them is going to need a new job. Many of them were military; some were not. So I was able to pull together an absolutely first rate staff, much smaller but on the average more competent than we had in the Allied Control Commission even. I accepted then when they agreed it would be done this way. For a period of two or three months I actually had both jobs. I was both deputy chief of mission for UNRRA, because there already was a chief of mission there, a man named Sam Keeny. Tony Antolini had gone home, so I was made acting vice president, a job O'Dwyer had before, of the Allied Control Commission for it may have been as much as three or four months. Concurrently I was also deputy chief of the UNRRA mission making all these arrangements about people transferring, and also complicated arrangements about where the supplies were going to come from and who was going to pay for them and all that. It was very demanding and professionally a lot of fun. It was just an extraordinarily interesting job. I stayed there for a year conducting the AID program for UNRRA.

Q: Did you run across Fiorello LaGuardia at this time?

CLEVELAND: Oh I ran across him. He became the director general of UNRRA after Lehman. He made a kind of a state visit to Italy.

Q: He actually at one point had been consular agent in Trieste, way back.

CLEVELAND: I don't remember that.

Q: This was 1912, something like that.

CLEVELAND: Everybody assumed that he came from New York. He actually came from Texas.



Q: His father was an army bandmaster there.

CLEVELAND: He came over on a visit for the best part of a week. We programmed it very carefully. He was said to be unpredictable, and he turned out to be extremely unpredictable. There were some wild stories of that period.

Q: Could you tell any?

CLEVELAND: Well, one day, which was fortunately not my day for organizing, my colleague handled all the welfare and social programs. They took him out to, where was it? I can't remember, but outside of Rome. A sizable town outside. Everybody was mobilized. The Archbishop was there; schoolchildren were there; everybody was there to greet the great man. He was already very well known because he had this radio program during the war. As they get to the edge of this huge crowd, Fiorello LaGuardia says to the driver, "Drive on." Well what could he do. You were a driver and the great man says drive on, you drive on. He drove all the way through this crowd and out the other side. There was this long line of cars all of them marked "UNRRA Frascati." So they went through Frascati and into the next little town, which I think was Grottaferrata, I'm not sure. So, he tells the driver to stop. The driver stops and all the other cars stop. He gets out and sort of turns to the public affairs officer of UNRRA, who was traveling with him and says, "Why isn't there anybody here to meet me?"

The next day we all had to troop out to Frascati and apologize to the Archbishop and mayor and everybody for this behavior. Also on my day, he was very busy. We took him up to Bologna and Milan by charter plane, military plane. We visited a great steel mill. I can't remember the name, but it was a major industry. As we were touring the place, he noticed there was a big gathering of people in the cafeteria. So he goes into the cafeteria, and everybody greets him. I'm standing next to Mr. Falk, I think his name was, owner of this great establishment. He starts haranguing the workers saying they shouldn't take any nonsense from management. They should be sure and stand up for their rights. That is what he was there to tell them and so forth. With an industrialist standing next to me sort of not knowing what to do, obviously disagreeing very much but not wanting to say so and so on. It was just very embarrassing.

Then there was another incident in Rome toward the end of his visit. His Italian was reasonably fluent but with a very poor accent and a lot of sort of foul ups on vocabulary. He is visiting Capitoline Hill, where there is a statue of Romulus and Remus and the wolf. He places his hand on the wolf and he is talking Italian to the crowd and he says, "Mister Volpe." Of course, people don't want to laugh at the great man but he had said "this fox" and not "this wolf." It was just sort of one thing after another like that. We'd breathe a sigh of relief after he left.

Q: It sounds like he was playing more of the American politician than your UNRRA administrator.



CLEVELAND: Very much. He made several speeches to the general effect that you have got to understand where all this aid is coming from. It is coming from the American people. He forgot about the British and other allies.

Q: Irrespective of a certain New York politician, how did you find the UNRRA operation worked in Italy?

CLEVELAND: It worked very well, actually. It was in fact an enormous success. It was part of the post war economic miracle. We focused not just on the relief, but we focused on building industries, transportation, ports, airports and so on. We were really laying down the infrastructure for their post war recovery in a quite systematic way. We had very good support from our bosses in Washington, particularly this fellow Commander Jackson who became a very good friend. We were on the telephone with him all the time. We had very competent people because we had brought in this wonderful corps of people at the beginning. The chief of the mission, who was primarily interested in the social side of the mission, gave me a very free hand to work on the economic stuff, which of course, was the biggest part of it. with the biggest amount of money involved. There was a very generous ration of funds we were being given by the organization, so I think that it was really an outstanding success. It was by far the largest. I mean you can take UNRRA as a whole, including China. It was by far the largest operational thing the UN has ever done.

People talk now about how the UN couldn't fight its way out of a paper bag, and so on. But the fact is, there were many advantages in being able to operate as an international organization in such a situation. We didn't have to explain away what our government was doing about nuclear weapons or anything like that. We could act more professionally that it was possible for an AID mission to act.

Q: How about the Catholic Church? What was your relation with the church during this period?

CLEVELAND: Well, we didn't have a lot of relationship with it. At one point, a meeting of all the UNRRA missions was held in Rome. We arranged an audience with the Pope which is one of the first things he did, one of the first general audiences he held after the war.

Some of the group had a very late party the night before, Saturday night, so on a Sunday we came in and went to the Vatican. The man who was sort of our spokesman on behalf of all the UNRRA people who were there started off somewhat in a fog. He said, "We want to thank your Holiness for this audition."



But apart from formal occasions like that, we didn't have very much to do with the church as such. We dealt a lot, of course, with the Christian Democratic Party. They had a lot of interaction with the hierarchy, but we really didn't get to know them during the UNRRA period. I went to the first big public ceremony, laying on of hands of a lot of new cardinals. The most vivid comment I remember about it was my chauffeur who was a semi communist from Yugoslavia, married to an Italian. I said to him something like you know there are 40 new cardinals . He shook his head sadly.

Q: Well, you left there in 1947?

CLEVELAND: In the spring, in late April or early May.

Q: Now the crucial time as you mentioned before was the election of 1948. We went all out and the Soviets went all out to see if the communists could take over the government. Was the cold war apparent by the time you had left, and were we sort of seeing that this was going to be as critical as it was, or was it still the honeymoon post war period?

CLEVELAND: The honeymoon didn't last very long. Of course, Stalin's actions were clear early on. They were obviously trying to use the western European communist parties as agents. That was I think more difficult in Italy than it was in France. The Italians were somewhat less disciplined and they had this big party which appealed to large numbers of people. They were hard to bring into a disciplined cadre. But that was obviously going on and they kept trying. The '48 thing was kind of the watershed.

Q: Were you and others doing everything we can to support the Christian Democrats? This is going to be critical. Was that apparent at the time? Were we doing anything within your competence to bolster one side or the other?

CLEVELAND: There were several sides. We were trying to get a sort of center government. It obviously had to be built around De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats. We saw a lot of young politicians just a little older than I. One was named La Malfa. Ugo La Malfa, who later became a minister in various governments. That was the action party, and they were mostly in every government. The socialists were split. Nenni was the head of the socialists, but there was sort of a split off right wing of the socialist party that often participated in governments. Nenni could never quite decide whether he was going to be part of the left with the communists or if he wasn't. As a result, he never really played the role in post war Italian politics that he might have.



Q: It is interesting that Italian socialists never became the party that the German socialists or the labor party in France. These were major parties. The socialists in Italy were sort of undercut by the communists.

CLEVELAND: And it was undercut by their own unwillingness to divorce themselves from the communists. If they had planted their flag as the non-communists of the left, I think they would have become the kind of socialist party that France and Germany had. It didn't work out that way.

Q: While you were with the UN, was there any feeling as things were moving on of throwing support in one way or another to the non-communist side? I mean were we getting kind of interested in making sure that we were supporting the non-communists?

CLEVELAND: Yes, in effect. That was true all through the UNRRA thing. It was mostly run by the western countries; most of the money was coming from the western countries. We had a program of relief and rehabilitation in the Ukraine, part of the Soviet Union. But the Soviets were not a very important part of the governments because they weren't making much of a contribution. On the other hand, on some issues they made a big noise. For example, at one of the UNRRA council meetings, there was a big issue about refugees and whether they would be pushed to go home, home meaning the Soviet Union. There was a deep split, basically a cold war split among the countries, and it came out right that the refugee that was seeking freedom shouldn't be prevented from getting freedom.

Q: Was it apparent that the Soviets were exerting control and calling some of the shots among the Italian communists while you were there?

CLEVELAND: It was clear that they were trying, but it was also clear that the communist leadership, Togliatti, was wise enough to fend off the Soviets a good deal, and to keep sort of at arms length. Increasingly as they saw the cold war developing and saw that Italy was clearly going to be on the western side of that line, there was no future in their being the agents of the Soviet Union, so they had to be Italian nationalist communists, sort of. They still took in a big vote, like a quarter of the vote for quite awhile.

Q: Well, even in my time, which was '79 '81, they were still picking up 23 24 % of the vote. This is a family matter, almost. Were events in Yugoslavia with Trieste and all that, was that a complication or not?

CLEVELAND: Not really. We sort of watched the politics of that. I went up to Trieste once. My concern was which part of the territory we were going to be responsible for providing...



Q: Zone A, Zone B and all that sort of stuff.

CLEVELAND: And there were negotiations about the future of Trieste going on during some of that period early, which went on for years and years afterward. But I was never very much involved in all of that.

Q: Well, when you left in 1947, where did you go?

CLEVELAND: I went to China and became the head of the UNRRA mission in China, which was by far the biggest UNRRA mission, spending about 2/3 of a billion 1947 dollars in 2 ½ years. The decision had been made in the UNRRA headquarters that they would wind down the European programs in 1947, but that the China program would be run for one more year. The head of that mission was an American major general of engineers who at one time had been the governor of the Panama Canal. That was partly because one of the biggest single projects there was rebuilding the dikes in the Yellow River Valley, which was an enormous earth moving job. The engineer in charge told me it was the earth moving equivalent of building the Panama Canal, and therefore, he said tied for second in history behind the Great Wall. It was a huge endeavor. This fellow, General Edgerton, became ill and wasn't able to stay, and they had another year to run.

The thing at UNRRA was that an appointment to UNRRA was no longer a prestige thing; you just had to find somebody that could do the job. So I get a call one day from Jacko, Commander Jackson, out of the blue asking would I be willing to go to China for a year. Well, I obviously would need a job if they were going to wind down. On the other hand, Lois and the kids were with me, and it made for family complications. I didn't think I should take them to where there was a civil war going on. But it was a huge job. It was a much bigger job than I had; more responsibility and a much bigger staff. There were 3000 people scattered all over China in the middle of a civil war.

Q: I'm thinking we might stop at this point because, I'd rather start; I'll just put it on the tape here that we are going to pick up, you had been offered this job in China in 1947. It was a very big job, and you have given a little background about why you were offered the job, and we'll pick it up at that point with what you agreed to do and why you went there and what it was.

CLEVELAND: Right. We hadn't gotten very far along in my life. At this point I was still only 29.

\*\*\*Q: This is the first of April, 1999. Well, you are 29 years old and you are off to China. What did the job consist of as you saw it then and when was this?



CLEVELAND: This was May of 1947.

Q: How did you see the job as you went there?

CLEVELAND: Well, it was obviously a very big job especially for me at that age. It was the largest country program in the UNRRA setup. In the course of a little bit more than two years, that program put something over 2/3 of a billion 1947 dollars into China. I once wrote a long paper called "China is Hard to Help," discussing the difficulty of solving problems by throwing money at them. The war was over, but the civil war was going from bad to worse from the point of view of the nationalists.

I didn't bring Lois and the children over because I didn't want to have them there in the middle of a civil war. I had to go rather suddenly. When I came back from Europe, I had not more than a couple of weeks to get things set with Lois and then to do some consultation in Washington. I was able to make an arrangement in Washington that I would have the same authority that the heads of the European missions of UNRRA had. They were, of course, going through reduction in force procedures. I, fortunately, got the same authority so that I was able to release people if I didn't think they were contributing or if there was some cloud of corruption over them, as there was with some. I was able to get rid of people fast without proving anything against them. So I got that authority and I was still working closely with the deputy director general of UNRRA, Commander Robert Jackson, a really delightfully bright and vibrant person.



I got there and found there were theoretically over 4,000 people working for me, 1,000 expatriates, non-Chinese, and 3,000 Chinese. They were scattered all over China in the middle of this civil war 15 regional offices dealing with both the communists and the nationalists. We were the UN; we were supposed to be neutral. Many of our employees were actually working inside the Chinese government to sort of help them do their jobs. I brought just two people with me, an economist and a minister of assistance that I had worked with in Italy. Otherwise it was all new people as far as I was concerned. It was a little like my taking over the job in Italy during the war where I was young and didn't have a military ranking which was just as well because it would have been a low one. Just as the military, they were inclined to take me seriously because I was in the job; the same thing sort of happened in China. There had been quite a long hiatus where the chief of mission had been sick. He had been brought home, actually. So anybody who looked as he was in charge was sort of automatically popular, at least for a honeymoon period. We were operating all over China. The only way to find out anything - for example, if there was a flood in southern China - was to hop in an airplane and go and look. So we did a good deal of that, getting around in China on unscheduled airplanes, mostly former Flying Tiger planes and pilots. General Chennault had set himself up as a civil air transport company. Many of the Flying Tigers found their first post war jobs that way. So, I had the experience of sitting next to a pilot, who says, "I think I'll have a nap. Why don't you take over for awhile." He showed me how I should do it. Of course, I had neither the authority nor the credentials to do that sort of thing, and he didn't have the authority to turn it over to anybody either. But it was an informal time. I got around China a lot.

Q: What was UNRRA trying to do? How do you try to do something for China at that time?

CLEVELAND: Relief and rehabilitation. Trying to recover from the war. The biggest single project was a huge dike-building project in the Yellow River, where the Yellow River had been diverted from its old bed, its long historic bed, had been diverted by the Chinese as a defense mechanism against the Japanese. It wandered all over the country, destroying villages, and it seemed very important to get it back into its old bed so the power arrangements could be reconstructed and the country saved from this really huge river with its enormous silt content of the water. I was in one village where the only thing you could see of the village that had been there was the roof of the only two story building that had been there. Everything else was just sand like a desert. I went up and visited the Yellow River project several times. I said it was our star accomplishment.



On one visit I walked past a whole series of rusting bulldozers. I asked the young engineer in charge why they had all these Chinese going up and down this dike they were building with two baskets of dirt instead of using the bulldozers. He said, "Well come to my shack here and I'll show you." He did the calculations that demonstrated that it really didn't make sense to send heavy intricate machinery to an area like that if there were no machine shops within 1000 miles that could ever make a new part for them. Apparently one of the things that went out first was the clutch assemblies. He said Chinese drivers tend to ride the clutch. You remember what that meant in the old days when we had clutches on cars. So I watched 1,000 people going up and down with dirt, and laying the dirt on top of the dike and coming down and getting some more dirt, an extraordinary operation which in the end did divert the Yellow River back into its old bed. The engineer in charge of that operation, a wonderful older man named O.J. Todd, said it was about the earth moving equivalent of building the Panama Canal. Therefore, he said, it tied for second in world history behind the Great Wall of China which is apparently recognized to be the greatest earth moving job ever.

Another big crisis came over some very modern fishing boats that had been programmed and sent before I got there. They were the kind of boats they fish with off Seattle and Vancouver: two-way radios, power driven trolling nets, that sort of thing. They were enormously successful in bringing in a huge catch. They were so successful that they bothered the people who ran the fish market in Shanghai, the local Al Capone character.

Q: The mob.

CLEVELAND: The mob of that time and place. They declared a boycott on the catch of these beautiful boats. We had some problem getting the boats working. I found that these imported engineers mostly got seasick and really didn't want to go fishing, so we finally developed the idea of getting some Australian fishing captains to come in and be the expatriate bosses and got some real Chinese fishermen as their crew. These new skippers were very good at teaching the fishermen what they needed to know about the machinery. So, the problem was more human than machinery, though it was diagnosed first as a machinery problem. That was wrong.

Q: When you were looking at plans, were you able to, bring bulldozers to a place where they can't repair them? We tried to think in sort of western terms. Were you able to sort of modify what you were trying to do because of the Chinese situation?

CLEVELAND: Well, most of the heavy and complicated equipment had already been brought in before I got there. My problem was to adapt the situation to what we had. In this case, for example, of the fishing boats, we had to have a big negotiation with the fish market people and with the ministry of food of the nationalist government in Nanking.



We had a meeting in my office, I remember, at which, of course we didn't have air conditioning in those days, and we weren't very far from the market, so all the stench from the fish piling up that they weren't willing to sell was readily received by our noses. The minister of food asked one of his assistants to go and shut the window. I said, "No, I'd rather keep it open please," thinking that would help speed up the negotiations. Anyway, what we finally did was a typical Chinese compromise. Half the boats would be used for fishing, and the other half, I don't remember how many there were exactly, were being diverted to river transport because they were well equipped for it. They had too much equipment for that. They didn't need the trolling equipment, but the two way radios were useful. That reduced the amount of the catch sufficiently so that the market was prepared to absorb it.

We had a major agricultural industries service, so called, which was developing small industry in the rural areas. This was to prevent a situation where farmers would go broke and come into the city, and the cities would be overwhelmed with unemployed peasants. The sort of thing that happened in American history and the history of other countries, but in China it was really threatening the cities. So we had a group of very bright young engineers who invented all sorts of ways of doing processing locally instead of bringing it to big centers. That was one of the most durable kinds of relief and rehabilitation projects I thought we did, that, and the bank building. We had people helping with the water and power systems of the country getting them back into shape. We had a big import of food which we used for wages. All the people on the dikes, they didn't want the money, because the money by that time was almost worthless. The interest rate from Shanghai I remember was about 30% per month. They didn't want the money, so we would import this wheat flour, and stuff like that, and deliver it to people as wages. We'd bring flour all the way across the Pacific, and from Shanghai to the Yellow River Valley, to the port of Tientsin. Another big distance. I mean like putting in at Cherbourg and taking it to Warsaw, something like that. It was an expensive operation in modern cost-effective terms.

Q: Well how did you deal, I mean you were there from 1947 to when?

CLEVELAND: Until early '48.

Q: How did you deal with the civil war that was going on?



CLEVELAND: Well, we had several people who went back and forth to negotiate with the communists, and we did import some stuff that they needed and wanted. We had great difficulty getting them to agree that none of it would be diverted to their military. They regarded their military as just other citizens, you know. So in practice the lion's share of what we brought in went into the nationalist areas, and of course, the lion's share of the country was still under at least nominal nationalist control. There was a big problem just keeping the Yellow River project going because it was just in that area that the civil war was heating up the most when I first got there in the spring of '47. We got so frustrated by the fact that the workers would just disappear into the countryside every few days because they didn't want to be shot at. A quite normal motivation I thought. So we talked about it in our mission, and we decided to do something that I am really surprised looking back on it any of us had the guts to do. Without notice to either side and without notice to our headquarters, I declared a "cease fire" in the Yellow River Valley, with a sort of eloquent statement saying that we were trying to rebuild China for whomever governed it. That wasn't our problem. We wanted to rebuild it, and one of the things was this huge Yellow River thing, and we couldn't do it if they got shot at, so there had to be a cease fire.

This was such a surprise that both the nationalists and the communists took it seriously. I got very strong confidential support from my boss, Commander Jackson, in Washington. Some of the foreign office people who were representatives to UNRRA and the UNRRA council were grumbling about it. It was precisely for that reason that had I tried to clear it; it never would have happened. So it held for several weeks, and people got back on the job.

Then one night a communist raiding party knocked over a local nationalist unit, and the civil war was back on. But the interesting thing was they had gotten the idea, and thereafter they tended to lay off the areas where the dike-building was actually going on, so the drama of this cease fire initiative actually got through and became sort of a public fact, even though the cease fire itself went into history rather rapidly.

Q: What about the problem of the nationalist government particularly in that period, that was extremely corrupt. Was this a problem for you?



CLEVELAND: The problem wasn't much of a problem in dealing with the government people we dealt with. The man who was sort of my opposite number, the cabinet the head of what was called CNRRA, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, was honest and dependable. He knew that I meant what I said, and I knew he meant what he said. And Chiang Kai-shek himself, his family and friends, were heavily corrupt. But he actually lived a very austere life. For example, he'd only have three courses, he'd invite people to dinner and only have three courses, when the normal thing was about 20 courses at that time. We had some people in the mission who were lining their own pockets, or helping their Chinese opposite numbers do so. We conducted a number of investigations, and I had this authority to just say, "Okay, this is your last day of work." So, in most cases, I just did that. We didn't try to make a federal case out of each of them because we would have done nothing else. People got the idea after awhile that that was not going to be tolerated. After the first few firings of that sort, that sort of thing settled down a good deal. Some Chinese family members and others were really getting rich. It was bothersome, but there was also nothing I could do about it. It was also helping the nationalists to lose the civil war. We just had to watch and wait, rather than try to mastermind the whole situation.

We did have several rather dramatic incidents of confrontation. We needed to talk to a delegation of Chinese communists. We wanted them to come to Shanghai. We got the mayor to agree and to put them under his protection. The mayor was a very good friend and a very bright figure, one of the most honest people I met in China. K.C. Woo was his name. So we had this delegation come in. It was a strange series of events. I made sort of a welcoming speech to my opposite number in the negotiations. You could see him getting red in the face and mad at what I was saying, even though I was using my most flowery language. So I declared a recess and went out and talked to my Chinese assistants about what was going on here. They said, "Well this translator is translating all of your pretty words into the nastiest language he can think of as it goes through."

I learned my lesson. Everything I said would be translated by my own translator. At the end of that negotiation, we said good-bye to them, and they were to leave the next morning. The delegation left and it developed that their translator had decamped and had turned up in Hong Kong. He was sort of the KGB guy in the mission, but he decided he had had enough apparently. I never found out what happened but he was obviously escaping from the communists.



There was also a lot of what the nationalist government was doing was of course deeply affected by how the war was going. It was not well. There was an incident that I remember there which illustrates that. On one visit that Commander Jackson came over from Washington, we managed to negotiate with the government and the central bank that our proceeds of sale-fund would not be expressed in local currency but in bales of cotton because we didn't want it just to disappear with inflation. That was a very important invention, the proceeds of sale-fund in UNRRA. That idea was that you bring in dollar goods, and the government has to put the equivalent of that in local currency in a special fund under the joint control of the government and the UNRRA mission. That same principle was written into the Marshall Plan legislation later on. They called it counterpart funds. It had a very important role to play in the Marshall Plan. I must give you a copy, by the way, of a keynote speech I gave on the Marshall Plan during the 50th anniversary year a couple of years ago. It explains a lot of what I thought about the Marshall Plan.

Anyway, we made this deal that the local currency fund would be expressed in bales of cotton. Then Commander Jackson went back to Washington. I was getting weekly reports from the central bank of how much money we had in there and so on. I started looking at these reports very quizzically because the numbers were going up so fast. I finally called up the governor at the central bank who by that time was a good friend of mine, partly because I had said I didn't want the house they had allocated for the chief of the UNRRA mission to live in because I wanted to be downtown right near the office, living in a hotel. He turned out to be the next person on the priority system, and so he got the house. So, he always thought I was a good friend of his, you see. Anyway I called him up and said would you look at these figures because I think there is something wrong with the picture. He called back in about an hour splitting his sides with laughter saying you know what happened was that I told them to make it bales of cotton and I assumed it would just apply to them a normal interest rate without the inflation factor. They were continuing to apply the 30% per month. He said I have been doing some pencil work on my desk here, and I figure it won't be very many years before UNRRA will own all of China if this goes on. He was laughing and making a big joke of it. But he then told me a few weeks later about having been called up to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the sort of summer residence like Camp David in our set up. He said he was confronted there with a whole plan for changing the currency. Instead of being called the Chinese national currency it was going to be called the gold Yuan. They had an outside consultant do this without telling the central bank about it. Then they confronted the governor of the central bank with this plan. Dr. Jien Jienal, the governor of the central bank, said, "The Generalissimo asked me whether I thought the plan would work." I said I felt the plan would work just fine if he could hold Shandong because the communists were then threatening Shandong province.

Q: Which is a peninsula that sticks out into the Yellow Sea.



CLEVELAND: Once they had Shandong, they would be threatening the Yangtze Valley. In other words he was a banker and knew perfectly well that money was a factor of confidence. So he came down and the Generalissimo decided they would change the currency anyway. They changed the currency, but it didn't have very much effect on the inflation. as it was bound not to.

So there were many ways in which the situation in China was impacting our program. We just had to weave and bob and duck to try to make sense out of the really enormous bonanza we were putting into the country. It was hard to know exactly what proportion of their GNP. I developed the first calculation of Chinese balance of payments. We figured that about half of the balance of trade at that time in '47 was actually smuggling, so there was no way to get a series of figures that made any sense, that you could do the kind of planning we do now.

So, as you can see, it was a lively time. When there was a flood in Canton in the whole Kwangtung area, the only way to find out about it was to get an airplane. So we got an airplane in the morning we first heard about it, got the door taken off because we could see better that way. We flew at about 500 feet all over south China to get a feel for where the water had gone and how many people are being displaced, and that sort of thing, and where we should try to deliver food. That was all in a day's work. I have to say it was a very interesting job.

Q: Well, you left there in early '48. What was the reason for leaving? Was it impossible to do relief?

CLEVELAND: No, the program was just finished. It was going to be finished in the next couple of months. We worked out a way of trying to transfer to non governmental organizations most of the equipment and supplies that were lying around that hadn't been delivered yet, so that we wouldn't be overtly taking sides in the civil war. So we worked out a transition of that program, and the U.S. government at the same time was developing a new China aid program in support of Chiang Kai-shek. In effect we sort of married our program to that in terms of we'd stop the supply of certain kinds of equipment or certain kinds of food. But the American aid program would pick it up just at the point where we dropped it.

I came back to Washington which was the only place where I knew how to work. But the UNRRA program was finished at that point. That was even the end of the UNRRA agency. It was actually the largest operational thing the UN has ever done, though some of the more recent peacekeeping operations may have been more costly.

Q: But nothing like restoring the Yellow River to its riverbed, and all.

CLEVELAND: And all the stuff we did in Italy and Yugoslavia and the Ukraine, and so on. It was just a gigantic operation.



Q: When you came back, what did you do?

CLEVELAND: Well I was looking around for what to do, and I was hired by Paul Nitze, who had a little group of consultants whose job it was to invent the agency for the Marshall Plan. It was needed if the Marshall Plan went through Congress. The agency that came to be called the Agency for Economic Cooperation. But one of these strange things happened that happen when you are in emergency, fast-moving situations. The Congress attached Title IV to the Marshall Plan bill, which was called the European Recovery Act. Title IV had been aid to China. We began to get queries and questions about how to handle the China aid program as a part of the Marshall Plan. The first time anything with China on it came through, Paul would say, "Harlan, you are the only person around here who has even been in China. You better handle this." So by the time the law was passed, and signed on April 3, 1948, with Title IV in it, and Paul Hoffman was brought down at Senator Vandenberg's suggestion, amazing bi-partisanship that Truman was able to carry on in those days, even though a few months later he would be beating the Republicans over the head for being a do-nothing Congress.

Q: "The Eighty Worst Congress."

CLEVELAND: Right, and Truman had this very strong team of Marshall and then Acheson as Secretaries of State and was extraordinarily willing to work with people who started with much bigger reputations than he had. But he had a kind of instinctive self confidence and common sense that carried him through that period. Anyway, he appointed Paul Hoffman who had been head of the Studebaker company as administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration. Hoffman learned only when he got to Washington that he also had China, so he turned to a good friend who was helping him anyway. He was a lawyer with Sullivan and Cromwell. This man was helping him temporarily just to get set up. The wife of this man was Henry Luce's sister. They, of course, had been brought up in China and were always interested in China. Beth in fact was interested in China all her life and was very active in Christianity in China issues. He asked this friend of his to ask around who knows about this program and who can we get to work on it. Within two or three days, I was asked to join the Marshall Plan as a consultant on China. Shortly after I was made head of the China aid program. What it is to have, to know something about it in a bureaucracy is a great advantage.

Q: Absolutely.

CLEVELAND: So I did that job for about a year and a half, '48 '49. During '49, of course, the Chinese communists finally took over the whole mainland.



Q: Well did you find yourself being somewhat cautious about shipping too much stuff to China because of the thought you were watching the front coming and seeing how this might not...

CLEVELAND: Yes, we had to be careful about that. We were mostly helping the areas that were clearly under nationalist control and Taiwan which was. But the general assumption was they were going to get pushed off the mainland, so when they did take over the Yangtze Valley and chased Chiang Kai-shek out, we then had the very delicate problem of making sure that our people got out in time but not bring them out prematurely so it would look as if we had torpedoed the nationalist boat. For several years thereafter I was given credit in some of the right wing magazines like Human Events for having helped lose China. The person that I'd helped lose China was this Republican businessman named Paul Hoffman, so the whole thing was hard to take seriously.

On the other hand, that was the Joe McCarthy period. I had in my files a wonderful picture, a very good photograph, of being awarded by the nationalist government a high decoration when I left. The communists didn't do anything similar, but the nationalists did. The picture was of Madame Chiang Kai-shek pinning this medal on me with the Generalissimo standing by with a broad smile on his face. I thought that at the first whisper of McCarthy trouble, I would rush down to the Washington Post and give them this picture and say please print it. Anyway, I never had to use it as it happened, but that story did follow me around for quite awhile. Even when I came back into the government in 1961 some of that was still hanging on and held up my security clearance for awhile.

Q: Were you having any problems with people under you who wanted to hang on until the very last in China? I mean, was there a problem getting the people out?

CLEVELAND: No. We had two very bright and sensible people there. The chief of our mission was the former mayor of San Francisco, Roger Lapham, a very delightful person, but also a very canny person. Our sort of chief operational guy had gone on a mission for us to China and then was hired as my successor in what was by then the Far Eastern Aid program. I'll come back to that in a minute. Those two were both realistic, business oriented people with a high sense of politics. So we didn't have any sort of sentimental hanging on in that business. We were very much on the same wavelength.

One of the things that happened while I was still responsible for the China aid program was that we had to narrow our sights to concentrate just on Taiwan.

Q: What type of things were you doing toward the end there to help Chiang Kai-shek?



CLEVELAND: Importing still a lot of food, and agricultural machinery. We were still supporting the dike building which hadn't been quite finished by then. We had people operating in agricultural industries service all over the country. We took that over as part of our program. It was a major program and we had several hundred million dollars of appropriated money. When we had to narrow our program to focus on Taiwan, we decided it would be a good idea to start aid programs in some of the other countries around China for the political purpose of shoring up any possible domino effect of the Chinese communists taking over most of China. We went up to the Hill in one of the strangest things I ever saw happen in government. Paul Hoffman and Dean Acheson went up to each of the four committees that had authorized and appropriated money for the China aid program. I went up with them carrying the briefcase, to make the case as Acheson said to one of the committees, "What you really meant when you said China in this legislation was the general area of China wasn't it." Well they said, "I guess that is right. I guess that is what we meant."

On the basis of those hearings, without any further legislation, we took a hundred million dollars of our China appropriation and diverted it to the Philippines which had a small program already, also Indonesia, Burma, and the three associated states of Indo China as they were then being called, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were included. We also put some more money in the Korean aid program which was already a big deal. This happened before the Korean war started, but there was already a sizable economic aid program in Korea, in South Korea. So the far eastern aid program was formed. It included the China-Taiwan responsibility and for these others as well. I was assigned to start these other programs and continue to manage the China program, so I became head of the Far Eastern aid program.

Q: You were doing that from when to when?

CLEVELAND: Well, it must have been from probably late '49 to sometime in the fall of 1950. Until after the Korean war started.

Q: It started in June of 1950. Was there any sort of priority for where the money would go? I mean when you were looking at this to help?

CLEVELAND: Well, the priority, of course, the biggest part of the money was going to Taiwan and Korea; particularly after the North Koreans had rumbled across the 38th parallel in their Soviet made tanks, it became very important to shore up the event as a security matter, to shore up the South Koreans with economic aid.



So for awhile I was responsible for a rapidly enlarging Korea aid program and a still very large Taiwan program as well as for the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and so forth. The Taiwan program was being managed primarily through a thing we had developed and put into the legislation the year before called the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction which was a board of three Chinese and two Americans, which had begun to operate on the rural projects on the mainland quite successfully with land reforms.

But when the nationalist government got onto Taiwan, they were in a shocked condition. They were willing to apply much more radical measures to development. We helped persuade them to start a real land reform program and to combine it with a couple of other gimmicks that worked wonderfully well. The way it worked out, they would take the land from the landowner and actually give it to the people who were on the land doing the farming. They gave the landowner not money but shares in the industrial companies. The industrial companies were all nationalized, so this was before the word was invented, a privatization program. The land owners were baffled to be paid with this piece of paper saying they owned a machine tool company or something. So, they would stand around saying anybody, "Want to buy this paper?" That created a capital market. So in one fell swoop you had land reform, privatization of industry, and the beginnings of a major capital market in Taiwan. The Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction also had a vigorous social program featuring a birth-control effort through the rural health clinics that were run by the JCRR. Women could come and get information and the primitive equipment that was available at the time, which was mostly, if you can believe it, sponge and vinegar. That was the main thing to prevent having babies. But I have really learned from that operation that if women are given the chance to and the information to decide if they want to have babies or not, they will definitely decide not to have so many babies because it sure turned out that way in that case.

The result of all these efforts in Taiwan was to make Taiwan almost a cameo case of successful economic development. Even the yields of rice in Taiwan in some places were better than Japan's. We had the advantage of an educated population because the Japanese had been willing for the Chinese on Taiwan to be educated even into higher education. Whereas, in their Korean colony, they were not willing to have them get anywhere beyond elementary school. What happened in Korea was that the government, as soon as they found themselves in the middle of this big war, realized that it was a technological war full of military technology; the generals in charge figured they had better get everybody educated so they could handle this stuff. So they decreed universal education for everybody up through high school and some help even for people getting into college.



Two or three years later, I was no longer involved in it directly, the Korean government of the day which was still dominated by the military decided they really didn't need to spend all this money on education now because the war had tapered off. So, they tried to turn it off. By that time the parents in South Korea had unanimously come to the conclusion that all their children were going to go to college, and it was just politically impossible to turn off. The result of that mandated universal education was like the result of a similar policy in the early 19th century in the United States. We became a great country not because of the amber waves of grain so much as because we were an educated population.

Q: The land grant colleges and all that.

CLEVELAND: The land grant colleges, the extension services, and all that. It was an information revolution before its time anyway. In the same way in Korea, South Koreans went from being a very underdeveloped country. My deputy in the far eastern program was a man who, as it happened, had been born in North Korea of missionary parents. He used to kid us saying if they were going to give us half of Korea to work with, why didn't they give us the decent half, the iron and the coal and all that wonderful stuff up there. It turned out that it wasn't the iron and coal but the people's minds that were the real development resource. Less than 50 years later, 47 or 48 years later, after the war, Korea became the first really developing country to become a member of the OECD, the club of rich countries. Education was the key to that extraordinary development.

So then I left the Far Eastern program. We recruited my successor, a man from California who was running the Monterey Peninsula Herald who had worked with me in the China aid program. I was promoted to be deputy assistant administrator. I was deputy to Dick Bissell, who was the chief program officer for the whole Marshall Plan.

Q: This was in late 1950.

CLEVELAND: This would have been late 1950. I'll have to go back and find out just how those dates go. From then on I was working primarily on Europe because that was what most of the agency was working on. In fact my last year in the program they changed the name of the agency from the Foreign Economic Administration to the Mutual Security Agency for political reasons, to show that we were part of the defense program.



Hoffman had left, and Averell Harriman was now the head of it and was also an assistant to President Truman. His office was actually over in the White House, and I was one of the assistant directors under him. My job title was Assistant Director for Europe, which meant that at least nominally I was in charge of the Washington end of the Marshall Plan in its fourth and final year. All through the period when I was working with Dick Bissell, anything that came along that had to do with the developing world, whether it was the overseas territories of the European countries, we had one division for overseas territories, or whether it was Korea or Taiwan or these other places, anything that came up that wasn't Europe was automatically delegated to me to worry about. Everybody in the ECA was focused on monetary problems in Europe and the huge amount of aid that was going to Europe, five billion dollars in the first year, 13 billion dollars altogether that was transferred to Europe in the four year period. I commuted to Paris some and got to know the European program very well, of course. But I was still the person in the agency who was looked to for insight about the non-European parts of the program, the other precincts as it were, the outlying precincts.

Q: Well, did you get hit by Joseph McCarthy and company? You said you'd been accused. About this time, they were looking for subversives? Did you get into that?

CLEVELAND: Well, I didn't get into it, somewhat surprising actually, because I had China written all over my rī½sumī½. On the other hand I had been managing a major program of aid to Chiang Kai-shek's government, so I couldn't be said to be exactly unsympathetic to the Chinese nationalists. McCarthy wasn't worried about distinctions like that of course. Several people that I knew quite well were hauled up in front of that committee, but I never had occasion to use that photograph.

Q: How did you find Averell Harriman as a boss?

CLEVELAND: He was a very interesting person: very bright, curiously diffident. I somehow never expected a man with that much money to be diffident. But a very good understanding of international economics and international politics. He later, of course, became ambassador in Moscow.

Q: Well, actually, he had been ambassador in Moscow towards the end of the war.

CLEVELAND: I can't remember.

Q: I may be wrong but I think he was at Yalta.



CLEVELAND: That's right. He was at Yalta, he had that experience before. But I was thinking later in the Kennedy administration he was brought in as an ambassador at large and then as assistant secretary for far east. I find he was very good to work for. He was preoccupied with high policy in the President's office. He had been, of course, in charge of the Marshall Plan in Europe, in the regional office in Paris. But that regional office was no longer as powerful or as competitive as Washington for power, as it had been when Averell Harriman was there and Paul Hoffman was home. I found that he was very willing to delegate the day-to-day operations. In 1952, in my last year after the Mutual Security Agency was set up, I was made assistant director for Europe. I was asked in addition to that to be in charge of the total congressional presentation for the whole agency, including all the outlying precincts. I spent a lot of time mobilizing testimony and testifying myself, and so forth, on the Hill that last year.

Q: In dealing with Europe, I would have thought there would have been a couple of concerns that would have been difficult. One was the British. I mean their whole system didn't seem to take to this very well. Maybe I am wrong, but they seemed to have a much slower recovery than anybody else did. The other one would be the French, and the French always go their own way. Did you have these problems?

CLEVELAND: Yes, it was interesting that the relationship with the British was in a way the best because the British knew they had never lost control of their country, and they weren't about to delegate to any American mission the job of helping them decide what was going to be done. For example, on the counterpart fund in Britain, they would come to our mission chief who was Tom Finletter, and say here is our budget for next year. "To which parts of our budget would you like to attribute the counterpart funds?" They might even say things like "which pieces of our budget do you think might be most popular on Capitol Hill because that is where you are going with it, we know." Whereas, the French had a different problem. They were running a deficit in their budget. One way of financing the deficit in the budget was to go to the General Assembly and ask for an increase in the debt limit. Another easier way they thought was to come to the U.S. mission and say, "Why don't we take your counterpart fund, or part of it, and use it to finance the deficit in our budget?" David Bruce who was our mission chief there would say, "Well, that is an interesting idea, but first we have to look at your whole budget, don't we?" In effect, they sold David Bruce a chair at their budget table. Nobody raised any sovereignty problems or anything like that because something more important was at stake.



I talked about this a little bit in this speech on the 50th anniversary Marshall Plan. I'll give you a copy because it might even be worth attaching to this. In some of the other countries, by contrast, the counterpart funds were a very important way of getting things done where there wasn't political support in the country. Like helping the South of Italy, the Mezzogiorno; or developing educational programs in Greece; even some propaganda about the Marshall Plan itself was financed by counterpart funds. The counterpart funds were a very versatile and flexible instrument that operated in different ways in almost every country where we had missions.

I also emphasize in that writing how very important the decision was early on in the Marshall Plan to delegate to the Europeans as a group the task of deciding who should get how much money among the countries. In order to do that, they would hold hearings. I attended a couple of those hearings and was enormously impressed with the effect of that decision because it meant that each country had a right to intervene in the other countries and criticize their management. I was at one meeting when the Italians were on the griddle. The other countries were saying you are obviously discriminating against the Mezzogiorno, the south of the country, in favor of the Po valley and so on. I expected the Italians to say we can't discuss that. That is about our national sovereignty. Nobody mentioned national sovereignty. Now when the French were on the griddle, the big issue of the time was the enormous deficit the French national railroad, the Chemins de Fer Français, was running. I remember one of the critics from one of the other countries asked why the French national railroad runs such a big deficit? "The rest of us have railroads and we know how to run a railroad; why don't you know how to run a railroad?" I expected the senior French representative to say stop, enough. We can't discuss this. Instead the senior Frenchman sat quiet while the expert on transportation tried the best he could to decide why they were having all these cost overruns. I learned an important lesson on the limits to sovereignty in that relationship. Also I might mention, I also got to know Jean Monnet a little. My younger brother was in the Foreign Service and worked for him for a year and a half or so. For years after that we were on that select but large list of people who every Christmas got a bottle of Monnet cognac from that vineyard. I learned some things from him about the origins of the European Union experiment. His own biography, of which there is a good English translation, is one of the most illuminating books about public administration there is in the literature, I think. We used to assign it in our leadership program in Minnesota.

Q: How much did developments in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet threat play a role in your decisions?

CLEVELAND: In the Marshall Plan?

Q: Yes.



CLEVELAND: Well, the rhetorical stance was taken from Marshall's speech which was this policy is not directed against any country, or anybody else. It is only directed against hunger, disease, and all that. But in fact, during the same period the cold war was starting, and the NATO treaty was being developed. It was finally adopted in 1949. That was April, 1949, early, just about a year after the Marshall Plan had gone through. A lot of what was done in the Marshall Plan was helping to win the cold war clearly. We were propping up the Italians when they were coming up to the 1948 elections. That certainly helped the Christian Democrats and their allies to get in and the communists to fall short of what looked at one point as though they might get a majority. Both in France and in Italy the communist parties were very large mass parties, and were threatening to become majorities and actually form governments in the popular front. The Soviets were obviously betting on the communist parties in western Europe. I don't think we had any doubt in our minds that part of why we were doing this was anti-communist, and indeed that was an important factor in getting this huge aid program through Congress from the outset. But the rhetorical fact was that Hoffman was always very clear about this, that we are helping people to develop and grow, and we are not in this international politics business. But we were.

Q: I think this might be a good place to stop now because you left this in 1952, is that right?

CLEVELAND: I left in '52 when Eisenhower was elected. Adlai Stevenson was not elected. Although I was a civil servant and I had been handling the whole congressional presentation and so forth, I didn't think it was reasonable to suppose that I was not a Democratic partisan, and if I slopped over into a Republican administration, I would be tagged as a Democrat. I might as well get out, so I resigned to Harriman after the election and before the new administration came in. I was asked to stay for a few weeks, and I got to know Stassen at that time when he came in to be head of the AID program. But since I already had a job in New York, and I was on the way out, they didn't have to pursue any measures to get rid of me.

Q: Well, just to put at the end here, in '52, where did you go?

CLEVELAND: '53 actually, early '53. I had a friend, an Italian refugee named Max Ascoli, who had married Marion Rosenwald, one of the five children of Julius Rosenwald, and was thus a millionaire many times over. He had started a magazine, a political magazine called The Reporter.

Q: Yes, I subscribed to that.

CLEVELAND: Oh, all sensible people subscribed to it!



Q: I was getting it in Korea as an enlisted man.

CLEVELAND: Really? For goodness sake. It had started in 1949. I had seen Max occasionally, and every time he had said, you know, whenever you leave the government, I want you to come and join me. Not knowing how difficult he would be to work for, I always stored that up as a safe bet. In fact, when I decided after the election to do something else, I talked to him about it and he immediately reiterated the offer. I went up there to be his deputy, in effect to be executive editor. But then later I also became publisher.

Q: Well, why don't we pick it up then at that time. 1953, you told how you had gotten on The Reporter and we'll pick it up at that point.

\*\*\*Today is April 21, 1999. Why was The Reporter such an important magazine at its time? It has disappeared from view, but for a few years it was sort of a major intellectual magazine.

CLEVELAND: Well, it was, and we had a big circulation for a magazine of opinion or as we called it a magazine of facts and ideas. We considered our main competition to be Saturday Review, Harpers, The Atlantic, not so much New Republic and Nation. Partly it succeeded because it had a number of excellent people in it, editors and writers, and partly because it was produced with some pretty fancy technology. I mean it had four color covers and that sort of thing which was very unusual for political journals at that time. It wasn't what its inventor and editor-in-chief, Max Ascoli, said he was doing - which was producing an American version of The Economist. He wasn't interested enough in economics for that. But it was in its time, I think, the best of the journals of facts and ideas, and for most of the time I was there, especially the time I was publisher when I was mixing with the magazine business people. It was clear that our renewal rate, and our conversion rate from short term to long term were the highest of any magazine. We had something like an 80% renewal rate which was phenomenal, and we were almost 50% on conversion which was also phenomenal.

Q: Well, now, you were doing this from '53 to when?

CLEVELAND: '56.

Q: Since the thrust of my interviews is concerned with foreign affairs, were there any particular lines that an opinion maker journal, whatever you want to call it, that you were taking as far as foreign affairs went?



CLEVELAND: We were internationalist of course, Max Ascoli had been an Italian refugee who married one of Julius Rosenwald's daughters, Marion. Together they were therefore millionaires. This was something he wanted to do, so we staked him to it. He was always interested in international affairs, so a lot of our coverage was international affairs. For a time we had Teddy White, Theodore H. White, as our European correspondent. We had several well known writers who wrote from different parts of the world. It was an exciting time. I once asked Teddy how come he wrote for The Reporter. Here was a guy who could write an article for Look or Life and get \$5,000 an article. He said, "Well, you know, I write some of the stuff I really want to write for you. Then when I run out of money, I wrote an article for Look or Life and get \$5,000 for it. It is not a bad way to live."

Q: Well, this was '53-'56. The McCarthy years were still going. They were beginning to go down. How did the magazine do vis-a-vis McCarthy?

CLEVELAND: Our editor-in-chief was anti-McCarthy from the word go. He used to say that we were prematurely anti-McCarthy. We ran a wonderful lead piece by Anthony Lewis. It was called "Victim of Nameless Accusers," and it was a very powerful piece about one of the people who had been fingered by McCarthy. We ran quite a lot of stuff of that kind at that time. I think we were part of what turned out to be a growing wave of resentment of McCarthy's way of behaving which eventually brought him down, of course.

Q: Well, did you find yourself, you joined just when the Eisenhower administration came in, and this being a Republican administration, and The Reporter's thrust was more on the Democratic side? Did you find yourself, you might say, frozen out from government circles? How do you feel about that?

CLEVELAND: We were not really trying to be insiders on government anyway. We had sources of all sorts. We had Doug Kater as our Washington correspondent. His assistant was Meg Greenfield who now runs the editorial page for the Washington Post. They had plenty of entree for journalists. We did a number of sort of exposés and investigative journalism on what was going on in the Eisenhower administration. They put me to working on the business side also. We had just bought a business, and part of buying a business was to collect back from the treasury the taxes the business had paid for the last two years, offset against our losses. It was a wonderful day when the check arrived from the U.S. Treasury on my desk, the same day that our issue of The Reporter came out on the news stands saying what a lousy job the Secretary of the Treasury was doing in the Eisenhower administration.



So we had a lot of long range tussles with leaders in the Republican party. The senator from New Hampshire was the Senate minority leader. His name I can't remember at the moment. We did a very long article about the whole of his life, really. He threatened publicly to sue us. I went down that afternoon because Max was in Europe, so I was kind of in charge, to my lawyer's office, a man named Fowler Hamilton whom I knew very well from the government before, to ask him what was involved in this, if he did sue us. He said, "Well, the first thing that would be involved would be we'd spend two or three years with pre-trial depositions, and since the article talks about everything, we could keep that going for months and months. In fact I'll guarantee you'll triple your circulation if he sues." At the end of the conversation I said...

Q: Bridges. Lloyd Bridges.

CLEVELAND: Not Lloyd, it was something Bridges [Henry Styles Bridges]. He was on the fringe of the China lobby and so on. At the end of the conversation I said, "I guess, Fowler, that Senator Bridges is having the same conversation with his lawyer, and his lawyer is telling him the same thing, right." He said, "Yes, I'm afraid so, and he won't sue us."

Nobody ever did sue us, at least in my time and I don't think ever, partly because we had a very tough review system. We had two young people who did nothing but read what we might publish, circle every statement of fact, and try to establish it independently of the author. If they couldn't then go back to the author and find out why. As a result, we didn't get into some of the troubles that investigative journals have gotten in more recent years.

Q: Well, in 1956 what did you do?

CLEVELAND: Well, I'd signed on as Ascoli's deputy with the kind of idea that I would be his successor because he had cataracts; he was having difficulty seeing. He wasn't feeling well, and it looked as if there would be a succession. By 1956, the cataracts were operated on very successfully. It looked as if it would go on for a long time under his leadership. I was in the process of concluding that he probably didn't know what a successor was and he certainly didn't know what a deputy was.

During that time, I attended a conference on the American political executive held in Philadelphia. I was one of the main speakers. I wrote, spent a lot of time working on a long paper about the American public executive, which if I say so myself was quite a good paper. I gave this paper as an after-dinner talk at this conference. Right after that, a man whom I hadn't known well but whom I did know, Paul Appleby, who was dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, had formerly been Under Secretary of Agriculture and Deputy Director of the Budget in the Truman administration, or the Roosevelt administration I guess before that. He saddled up to me and said why don't you succeed me at Syracuse, just like that.



Averell Harriman had been elected governor of New York and had asked him to come as his budget director. He wanted to do that and that was going to create a vacancy in this job. It was a very good job in the academic firmament.

The Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs was then and is today the premier graduate school focusing on public administration. They had decided they wanted a practitioner, so despite the fact that I had no academic work in back of me, after the usual meeting and greeting and so on, I was asked to come up there as Appleby's successor as dean of the school. There was a little glitch because they didn't realize that I didn't have a Ph.D. When I came back from Oxford, there was the war and I had never pursued graduate work beyond that. But they finally swallowed that and made me a full professor, with tenure, after which nobody could say I wasn't an academic. I have told young people since then that the way to get ahead in academia is to start as a full professor with tenure.

Q: I think that sounds like very good advice.

CLEVELAND: So that was a major switch. I had been negotiating with the Carnegie Corporation, John Gardner and Jim Perkins, about taking a year off and doing a Carnegie study about Americans abroad and how they ought to be educated. So when the Syracuse job was firm I called up Jim Perkins who was the vice president of the Carnegie Corporation and said, "It looks like we can't do this thing because I am going to go off and take this job." He said, "Do you think it would be a disadvantage to arrive up there with a \$175,000 grant from Carnegie in your pocket?"

That was a lot of money in those days for a grant. I said, "No, I don't suppose it would be." It turned out the money the school had been living on which was the earnings from a synthetic textile plant that Mr. Maxwell had owned. He was a patent lawyer and wound up with the patent. Anyway, he was not an engineer or entrepreneur, and the rest of the industry went past that patent, and the funds trickled out. The funds for the Maxwell School trickled out just the year before I got there, so having a major grant in my pocket as it were, gave me the chance to encourage the faculty to go looking for grants. We got very much at the foundation trough after that. It was a lot of fun, that project, three of us doing it on the faculty. We got all over the world and hired some very good researchers. One of our researchers was Lou Harris, the pollster, just as he had broken off from Roper and was starting his own firm. We were his first client really. He helped us set up the research on the basis we had in depth interviews with 244 people in six countries. Then one of my colleagues, Gerard Mangone, went around the world talking with non-Americans about the Americans, not only in those six countries but in about six other countries as well.



Q: When you are saying Americans abroad you are meaning Americans who are working abroad.

CLEVELAND: Living and working abroad. About a third of them were government people, about a third were business people, and about a third were in missionary societies. Just before I left the Maxwell School in '61, in 1960, McGraw Hill publishing company published a major book called The Overseas Americans which was my first hard cover book by the three of us. I was the senior author. It was used for years in training programs, and so forth, after that. You know, for a book like that, it was quite successful.

Q: What did the three of you find where was the greatest problem in how Americans were educated?

CLEVELAND: Well, apparently it was that going abroad was a family affair. It was usually a joint decision between the man and his wife. We found that the wives made about two-thirds of the decisions to come home and at least half of the decisions to go, so they were much more important in the scheme of things than any of the organizations sending people realized. We also found to our surprise that it was only the missionary folks who actually knew how many people there were abroad in their category. There was nobody who knew how many business people there were abroad, and the government was divided up into so many agencies that nobody was keeping track. So we finally produced some numbers which were used for a decade or a decade and a half after that. They were the only numbers around. It came out to almost exactly one percent of the American population was living and working abroad. As I went up there to be dean of this already successful graduate school, and found that the dean of the Maxwell School was not only dean of the graduate school, he was also dean of all the social sciences at the undergraduate level. That meant and accounted for why each one of the social science departments was particularly strong on the government related activity and expertise. Whenever we needed a new professor in a department, as the dean I had some say in what kind of person we were going to look for. I was always pushing for people who had government experience and would be able to help in the public administration program which I conceived of as a cross disciplinary program. It was the star program of the school. There were several excellent departments including political science, economics, and anthropology, history. But, we were a national player in the production of people whose next job was working in a government agency somewhere, at all levels from city to national.

Q: Well, did you find that the school was called upon to produce speakers, think tank people and that sort of thing? I mean was there a pretty strong relationship between the government and the university, the Maxwell School as far as commissions, studies, and the like?



CLEVELAND: Quite a lot. Among other things, we were a think-tank on public affairs. For example, we conducted for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a huge study of the way in which the domestic and international parts of the foreign policy could be glued together better. I did a major piece on foreign aid at one point, looking at it from outside the government. Yes, there was a good deal of that. Increasingly graduates of the Maxwell School, usually after some experience in government, the more reflective ones would wind up at Brookings or in the other Washington think-tanks or in comparable institutions in some of the state capitals. It was clear that a whole community was building. It was in the early stages of building at that point. Brookings was one of the earliest ones.

Q: How long were you at the Maxwell School?

CLEVELAND: A little less than five years.

Q: So this takes you up to '61 or so. One of the important elections was the 1960 election with Kennedy versus Nixon. There was a change of administration, but it did seem to invigorate the university academic world to get more involved in government. Was that operating in your impression at the Maxwell School?

CLEVELAND: Very much so. I got quite deeply into it. I guess I was a relatively prominent upstate Democrat and it was not that hard to do in those days. There weren't that many Democrats. I sent one graduate student down to the library downtown to look up when Onondaga county, the county that Syracuse is in, last went for a Democratic president. He came back his face wreathed in smiles. He said, "You really want to know the answer to that question?" I said, "I certainly do." He said, "There was a fellow named Franklin Pierce a hundred and some years ago."



I, in fact, had been approached whether I would run for Congress that year in the Syracuse area. I considered it, but I decided I didn't really want to do elective politics. If I had a chance to go back into the administration as a political appointee, I would like to do that. I kind of had my heart set on that in fact. I got active in the Democratic Party in the upstate area, and I was appointed by the state committee to one of the slots on the convention delegation that didn't have to be run for. You know, there were people like Mrs. Roosevelt that they didn't want to have to run. I got one of those slots. So Lois and I went out to Los Angeles and had a wonderful time for a week going to everybody's cocktail parties and finding out how this worked from the inside. We were all Kennedy delegates. That had been decided before, but I was getting a lot of pressure as were some of the others on the delegation, from people who were in favor of Adlai Stevenson who had run twice, of course. They thought this maybe was the time for him. The thing was that Adlai himself had not decided that he wanted to run. It came to a head one evening at the convention. He had gone on the stage and gotten a huge ovation from the assembled multitudes. That evening a number of us were asked to come up to Bill Benton's suite.

Q: Bill Benton being the...

CLEVELAND: He owned the Encyclopedia Britannica, and was a wealthy magnate. He was also a vice president of the University of Chicago. We found ourselves at one of these ongoing cocktail parties that went on and on and on. The leader of our little group who was the Democratic leader of Nassau county said to Stevenson, "Well, Governor, what do you want us to do tomorrow?" Tomorrow was the nominations for President. Stevenson surprised us all by saying you are just going to have to make up your own minds about that. Even at that point he was not saying he was a candidate.

So, most of them drifted away; Lois and I stayed around for awhile and found ourselves off in a corner with Adlai Stevenson. He said to me, "You know, it is kind of embarrassing. Bill Benton asked me to come up here tonight, but I didn't know it was going to be a pitch for votes." I said to myself, my god what does he think is a pitch for at the convention the night before the voting. Anyway, I'd known Adlai before because we tried to persuade him to become editor in chief of Reporter Magazine.



This is a little known incident, but he was seriously considering getting out of politics, and saying that he was going to do something else in 1955. We offered him a chance to become editor in chief. Remain in Chicago, if you like. I would be sort of the liaison back and forth and help him. He would write a column. It was really something for Max Ascoli to relinquish the editor in chiefship. The whole purpose of this being to prevent him from being swallowed up in the 1956 campaign where he would have to run against Eisenhower and almost certainly lose. The scheme finally fell through and he decided not to do it. So I got to know him a little bit in that connection though I had never actually worked for him in a campaign. Later on we'll get to the later on story where he decided he wanted me to come to Washington. That is how I got back to Washington.

Q: I, like so many other people, had been entranced by Stevenson. I became a very firm Stevenson reporter, but I must say the more I heard, well disenchanted, maybe it is the right word. The problem was one of making up one's mind. This seemed almost a major flaw in somebody who was going to be in an executive position.

CLEVELAND: Well, that was a general impression about him. My impression after working with him closely for about five years when he was Ambassador to the UN - and I was at the State Department on the other end of his telephone line - he had no difficulty making up his mind on policy issues. The only thing he had difficulty making up his mind on was himself, what he was going to do and so on. I rather concluded after the fact, after he died, that it wouldn't have worked very well because, at the level of president, you can't make that distinction between yourself and the policy.

Q: Everything is personal. You were saying that as president, the personal and the policy became one in the same almost.

CLEVELAND: Yes, the Readers Digest asked me after he died, they wanted to do a most unforgettable man story about Stevenson. Since they were paying \$5,000 for writing it, it seemed like an interesting thing to do. But I decided I'd have to say what I just said to you. I didn't want to throw water on his ashes as it were, so I decided not to take that assignment.

Q: Well, as a Kennedy delegate, did you get involved, or let's say a close look at Bobby Kennedy, and how he operated?



CLEVELAND: Somewhat, yes. More in the campaign that followed than at the convention. In the campaign I was appointed chairman of Citizens for Kennedy for the upstate part of New York where I was, and gave office space to the regular campaign's regional man. It was a man from Wisconsin who thought he had recruited me to be the head of the Citizens for Kennedy - when he came to my living room one day he said, "Well, Mr. Cleveland, you know what we are looking for. We are looking for a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant." He sort of talked that way. Anyway, because in Syracuse, there were Irish and there were Germans and Italians, and I had to not be one of those categories if you were going to work with everybody.

Q: Yes, this man was looking to make, you had already...

CLEVELAND: Well, actually I had already accepted. My classmate at Oxford, Byron White, who later became a Supreme Court Justice and has recently retired, who was a great football player, too.

Q: "Whizzer White," yes.

CLEVELAND: "Whizzer" White. He was made the national head of Citizens for Kennedy. It had already been arranged that I would be the man there locally. So, I was quite heavily involved in the campaign.

Q: Any problem with the university, Syracuse University doing this?

CLEVELAND: No. In fact, it was rather expected that our faculty would be active in public affairs in one way or another. Appleby had gone from that to working for Harriman. We had accepted all of Harriman's papers when he stopped being governor, and hired Pat Moynihan as a faculty member as a part of the deal. That was actually his first academic job. He was a delightful colleague. He didn't have his Ph.D. yet. I felt badly on pressing him to finish his Ph.D. at Tufts University. We hired him as an assistant professor and we usually didn't hire an assistant professor unless they already had their Ph.D. He did in fact do it that year. Later on when he was in the Nixon White House and everybody was addressing him as Dr. Moynihan, I felt I had done something for my country.

Anyhow, I was very much involved in the campaign. We did very well there. We didn't quite carry Onondaga country, but we did carry Syracuse. Two years later, the Democratic congressional candidate won the seat from the Syracuse area. That has been I believe, a Democratic seat ever since. We had a whole storefront setup downtown in which we propagandized, and I got to know something of the way the regular campaign was working which was being run by Bobby Kennedy.



We had some tensions between the two kind of campaigns. We were trying to appeal to independents and liberal Republicans and so on. Also, I was homing in on the question of how to handle foreign policy in the campaign. I went over one time to pick up Bob Kennedy where he was making a speech in a nearby town and was then coming to us for a baked bean supper which was one of the things they did in those days for a New England candidate. I had given this memorandum to the campaign on foreign policy. What I heard him saying was not what I thought we ought to be saying about it. I undertook to discuss the matter with him in the car. At one point in the middle of one of my sentences he leans over and turns the radio music on loud so that we couldn't converse anymore. I said to myself well, gee, you know, I am trying hard to elect this guy's brother President of the United States, so he could at least be polite, but he wasn't.

Q: Well, this is not being polite but also not listening. A very unappealing person from what I have heard. I never bought this idea that he somehow turned into a warm, soft, caring person later on. It may have happened, I don't know.

CLEVELAND: He certainly developed a line of talking about policy that was very much more liberal later on when he was running himself. Arthur Schlesinger wrote a whole book about his conversion and so on, but I didn't see it so... He actually held up my appointment later on for about a month.

Q: Well, did you feel there were foreign policy differences between Nixon and Kennedy that were during the campaign?

CLEVELAND: Yes, I didn't think that there were huge problems. They were both relatively hawkish. In fact Kennedy had come out rather strongly on issues like Algeria that weren't exactly on every voter's mind. But on the big issues about the Cold War and so on, the Democratic problem was just not to look soft because that was always the charge coming from the Republicans.

Q: Well, Kennedy was elected. His administration came in in January, 1961. Were you looking towards getting involved there at this point?

CLEVELAND: Well, I was assuming I would be involved somehow, especially after all of the main people he was picking for foreign policy jobs were friends of mine, Dean Rusk, Chester Bowles, George Ball. I hadn't known McNamara.



Q: Harriman?

CLEVELAND: Harriman was brought in in sort of a peculiar way, not on a line job. But, one day Adlai Stevenson called from Chicago and said would I come out and visit him because he wanted to talk about the deal he had made with Kennedy having been passed over as President and then Secretary of State. He was offered the Ambassadorship to the UN. He had made several conditions, one of which was that he would get to suggest who would be the person in the State Department that he would be dealing with. He knew me better than I thought he did; that is he read more of my writing than I had realized, and we spent most of a day together talking about the UN and foreign policy and so forth. He was convinced that I should be in that job.

Q: You are talking about assistant secretary for international organizations known as IO.

CLEVELAND: IO, yes. And so still nothing was happening, and I wasn't getting any news. Then out of the blue, I get a call from Dean Rusk whom I knew. He had offered me a job when he was head of the Rockefeller foundation, but I had decided I was having more fun spending foundation money than giving it away. I always thought he would be someone I'd like to work for. He called and said there seem to be two ideas about me. One is to head the AID program, which was sort of an under secretary job. AID was then called ICA, but the agency still exists as the Agency for International Development. The other was to be in IO, the backstop for the UN delegation but also the supervisor for delegations to a number of other international organizations. I told Dean Rusk that if I were the administration, I think I would put me in the AID job because I used to do that sort of thing, and I knew a lot about it, and had worked on foreign economic policy a lot.

But if he were asking me what I would like to do, I would like to take a crack at political diplomacy and therefore the UN thing would be much more interesting. He said, "Well, I will try to make it come out that way, and that was the way it came out." Except that when I got down there three days after the inauguration I did something you wouldn't do nowadays I don't think. I just moved into the Assistant Secretary's office on the assumption that I was going to be that. This was even before I was nominated, let alone confirmed. It turned out there was a glitch, and the glitch was that Bobby Kennedy was objecting. That took about a month to work out.

Q: What was the objection?



CLEVELAND: I never really figured it out, and Dean Rusk never really said. One, there was a good deal of right wing stuff going around about stuff that the people who had "lost China," the previous generation. I was sort of on that list as having helped Paul Hoffman lose China. I thought for a Republican automobile manufacturer to be accused of losing China was a little much but the fact that whatever he had done, if I had helped him it was a good thing. Anyway, so there was that China problem. I mentioned to you I had in my file a nice glossy photograph of Madame Chiang Kai-shek pinning a medal on me when I left China for the UNRRA position. And the Generalissimo was standing by smiling. For a scene of real trouble, I was going to go down to the Washington Post and ask them to publish it. I never had that problem during the McCarthy period, and I didn't really get to that although some of the security people were questioning my security clearance on this China history grounds.

Also, a man in the regular campaign who had an office with us apparently had reported that we had hidden a lot of Democratic propaganda and had been unwilling to distribute it and so forth, which was not true, but that is the way this kind of word gets around. Anyway, the older brother finally had to overrule the younger brother, and my nomination was sent up to the Hill. There was no particular problem about confirmation. Nobody raised any of these questions.

Q: What at that echelon, at the assistant secretary level, which is the policy level of the Department of State, what was the atmosphere when the Kennedy administration came in? Was it going to make some real changes or carry on or...

CLEVELAND: No it was very creative. We all thought we were there to do what needed to be done and not very much had been done during the Eisenhower administration which was a static period of foreign policy. We had one of the world's great men up in New York as our gladiator and built a very strong staff under him. I had a very strong staff of Foreign Service people. We felt it was our task to come up with ideas and push them and do new things. We did that all through the period I was there.

Q: You were there from when to when?

CLEVELAND: From January or February '61 until the fall of 1965, not quite five years, well past the assassination of Kennedy. As for the rest of the department, it depended really on who was doing what, but I think the general feeling was one of feistiness. Imagination was being rewarded and that sort of thing.

Q: Was there sort of an unwritten contract worked out with Adlai Stevenson up in the UN, or did everybody know how they were going to operate? Were there any problems sort of adjusting to this relationship between your work in Washington and their work up in the United Nations?



CLEVELAND: Well, there was a long history of the mission to the United Nations. It was going to be my job to provide Adlai Stevenson and his colleagues with instructions from the government, from the White House and the State Department on what they could say and what they couldn't say. I hired one man full time as a writer who worked as a special assistant. His full-time job was writing things for Adlai Stevenson to say. He was a brilliant writer, Thomas W. Wilson, Jr. So, whenever there was any major policy speech at the UN, he would be one of the main writers on it. I did quite a lot of writing for Stevenson. I came to realize that one of the reasons he wanted me in the job was that he liked my writing and wanted me to be available for ghosting purposes.

Q: Well, Stevenson had a reputation, during his political campaigns, of working on many of his own speeches.

CLEVELAND: Well, he worked on his own speeches, but I came to the conclusion that he hated to write; he loved to edit. When he had a big speech to make somewhere, he'd ask two, three or four people to write it for him. After awhile I got to know what that circle was, Barbara Ward and Clayton Fritchey in his own office, and one or two others. So, I would consult around with them as to which of us was really going to write it because it was too much lost work for everybody to be writing it. Whenever he got a text, he would invariably improve it. He was a brilliant editor. In the almost five years I worked for him, I could only identify two or three things he started from scratch himself. That didn't mean he didn't make them his by the time they were in final form; they were very much his words.

We got immediately into crisis mode because we had that Angola issue, and...

Q: Bay of Pigs.

CLEVELAND: Before that even, we had the Congo which had busted loose. There was a UN force already there, so the big part of my job for the first few months was nursing the Congo operation, nursing the American support for the Congo operation. I went to the Congo myself a couple of times, once to develop an initial aid program, and once to learn just how the peacekeeping thing worked on the ground.

Q: Well, particularly there was a real concentration around Elizabethville. What did the UN troops do there? They were being pretty heavily pressed.



CLEVELAND: Yes, they were. The country was splitting into three parts. There was a fellow named Patrice Lumumba, who was sort of the left wing. There was a man named Abdullah in the middle in what was then called Leopoldville, now Kinshasa. Then there was Tshombe in the south in Katanga who had a very powerful gendarmerie, which was kind of a private army. He was being supported by the Belgian mining interests and others who had interests there. They were being supported in turn by some American senators and others. Senator Dodd, the father of the current Senator, was very much in favor of the Belgian view of that whole situation. So, they were constantly having trouble on the Hill about the Congo. We had developed a policy that said we were going to support the UN force because the UN force was frustrating the Soviets and, to some extent, the Chinese initiatives for trying to get influence in central Africa.

So, we were back into the White House every couple of weeks with the President on this issue. He would say to me, "Harlan, I remember you saying that if the UN wasn't in there, we'd probably have to be in there ourselves. Is that still right?" I said, "Yes, Sir. That is still right." He was very strong and consistent on it. Indeed he really had to face down some of the Senators on this issue a couple of times.

Q: Well, did you find that the UN, I have talked to people who were in Katanga at the time who felt that the UN was not very strong. There were Indian troops there, but they sort of didn't want to use them. There was considerable provocation. Finally, the Indians went ahead and sort of took care of the Tshombe problem without really UN support.

CLEVELAND: Well, I think they did take the matter into their own hands to some extent. It was very strong, a small force, less than 5,000, but well led. They were Indian Gurkhas who knew what they were doing. But they were also very good at knowing that they were soldiers without enemies; this wasn't a normal kind of campaign. I spent a little time with them myself.

Q: I have interviewed Jack Dean and Lou Hoffacker and Terry McNamara who were there at the time. They had great admiration for the Indian troops, and felt that the United Nations high command, which, of course, had been played out again and again and really had too many masters and was unable to...

CLEVELAND: Well, it was responsible to the Security Council. But the man in charge of the operation at the UN was Ralph Bunche. He was, I thought, very good and very tough, but also very careful politically. We were having a lot of difficulty with the Belgians because the Belgians were responsive to the pressure from the Arminiore Company and rather thought it was just as well for Katanga to be a separate country. Then they could deal with it. They didn't want to preserve the Congo, but the purpose of the UN was to preserve the Congo as a country. It didn't result in it being well governed because Mobutu, who wound up in charge, turned out to be...



Q: Yes, Kasavubu and Mobutu.

CLEVELAND: But in any case, I was very much involved in that in the early period. In fact, it was one crisis after another the whole time I was there in that job. I claimed afterward that I had 100% success in being involved in every piece of a security crisis the U.S. had during that time. Because, you see, mostly there would be a UN aid of some sort. Even when there wasn't, as in Berlin, our gladiator Adlai Stevenson, was a member of the Security Council and a member of the cabinet. He would come down, and each time he would come down, he would expect me to serve him up with facts and ideas to go on. That gave me a license to intervene in the internal affairs of some of the other bureaus, find out what they were doing, and write stuff for Stevenson. It was a great experience for me during that time.

Q: Sort of in general terms, before we move to the very specific events, what was your impression of how Kennedy and his cabinet dealt with Stevenson?

CLEVELAND: Well, the White House, it was only Stevenson and Kennedy, the basic relationship. Stevenson, of course, was dealing out of a peculiar position. Here was this man who was about of an age to be his son as president. He was very loyal to him, but he also chafed some. Every two or three weeks, someone would come in and say, "Well, I was at dinner with him last night. He was talking about resigning." I told George Ball a couple of times about that. George said, "Don't worry. He'll grumble, but he won't resign." He was right, he didn't ever resign.

He was an enormous asset to the Kennedy administration. If he had defected, the whole left wing of the party would have crumbled as it were, all the liberals. So, it was very important to keep him on board.

Whenever Jackie Kennedy went to New York, she'd be squired around by him with all the media attention that would require. The President came up and gave a talk at the UN in his first year and also in his third year. He was very anxious to keep Adlai happy.



He even assigned Arthur Schlesinger a special mission to be sure that he was happy, which created what might have been a crisis if Arthur and I hadn't been able to work it out. For a couple of weeks there after that assignment, Arthur thought that meant that he was supposed to do the IO job too. We were then talking about a two-China policy, about Taiwan. I went over to see Arthur one day in the White House. I said, "Arthur, we can have a two-China policy, but we can't have a two-IO policy, okay." He laughed and agreed and we actually worked very well together. It was also part of my job to make sure that both that he didn't get off the reservation, but that we didn't get off the reservation with him. Fortunately, Dean Rusk had had the IO job back before it was IO, when it was UNA, UN Affairs, back a long time before in the Truman administration. So technically and professionally, he was very much interested in UN affairs. I had very good access to the Secretary and also to George Ball and Chet Bowles while he was still there. Both Dean Rusk and Adlai Stevenson apparently had enough confidence in me so that I was able to sort of manage this triangular relationship between the White House and Adlai and Dean Rusk. I felt like I was sort of managing it from below like a juggler. When something happened that required a decision to give a task to Adlai that required dealing with the Russians, such as during the Bay of Pigs after the crisis was supposedly over, we still had the big job of negotiating with the Russians about getting those missiles out of there.

Q: We are not talking about the Bay of Pigs, we are talking about the missile crisis. Bay of Pigs was the CIA sponsored invasion.

CLEVELAND: Yes. We had a problem about that too, partly because Adlai was not sufficiently briefed. I was at the briefing that the CIA gave him, and it was very inadequate. We didn't get any idea of the timing or the purpose even. So he felt very much out on a limb. There was a famous incident at the time you may remember. Just before the invasion, a day or two before, a plane with Cuban markings flew out of Cuban airspace and crash-landed in a swamp in Florida. The pilot said he was defecting, only it turned out it was a CIA plant. But we didn't know that at the time. It was my job to find out what this was about because on that very day, a previous Cuban item accusing us of wanting to invade them was up for debate on the floor of the General Assembly. So Adlai Stevenson was there defending us. I had to find out in a hurry about this incident. So I asked the Latin American bureau to find out from the CIA. What we got back was the cover story which I provided to Stevenson and he orated in the General Assembly as the U.S. view. Within 24 hours some enterprising newspaperman had gone and visited the plane in the swamp and scratched the paint, and found there were U.S. Air Force markings underneath. The whole cover blew off, and Adlai was absolutely fit to be tied. It was really a very unpleasant situation. The obvious thing for him to do was to blame me since I provided the instructions. He never did blame me. He knew that we were both duped by the CIA on that thing, and he really just blamed the administration in general and the President. He was surprisingly polite about it considering how fuming he was in private. It passed over, but it left a kind of a permanent sore, I think.



Q: Well, before we go to the Bay of Pigs problem, when you took over there, early '61, was there sort of a virulent anti-UN cadre, say within the Senate or the House, many right wing Republicans? Certainly it became more pronounced later on, but had that started yet?

CLEVELAND: There was always a theme in the far right literature, and there were a few people who were influenced by that in the Senate, but in general the feeling about the UN and our actions in the UN, was very positive. I did a lot of speaking around the country during that time, and I was always amazed at how little substantive criticism there was and how much support there was. There has always been very good support for the UN. During the five years I handled the congressional presentations, both on the money for dues and the money for voluntary contributions, like to UNICEF and so forth, we never lost a dime. The people in the Congress correctly believed that the dues was a treaty obligation which they were and are. We beat on the Russians for withholding some of their dues as a pressure point to try to change the Congo policy of the UN. We said that was illegal and they couldn't do that, and so on. But they got away with it because there was no way to lower the boom on them really. We tried to use Article 19, which says you don't pay for two years, you lose your vote. We incorrectly believed that any legislature would hold on to its own prerogatives, but this was a legislature of national sovereigns and didn't act that way. So the general atmosphere was one of very good support for the UN.

Q: How did you feel about the Soviet posture during the time you were there? Was it basically trying to impede the United Nations and make it difficult for us or did it have a policy beyond that?

CLEVELAND: They felt, correctly, that the UN was an obstacle in their path, and they tried in every way to weaken it, and so on. They couldn't do very much in the Security Council because we had the veto. Of course we couldn't do very much in the Security Council either, because they did. We were able to get around it on some issues like the Congo, like the continuation of the Korean conflict which they couldn't turn off because we had the veto. They, as you know, had been out of the room. They had been boycotting it at the time, so they didn't get a chance to use their veto when they could have. I developed sort of an unusual view about the veto. What the veto did was to convert the Security Council into a consensus instrument. You couldn't do anything unless you really talked it out, and it required us to talk at length with the Russians and the Chinese.



In the process we learned quite a lot about what they needed. Sometimes we were able to accommodate a little bit and they were able to accommodate us. We worked very closely with the Secretary Generals, first with Dag Hammarskjöld and then, when he was killed in an air crash, with U Thant. Sometimes we were torpedoed by our own government, a little bit. I can tell you some stories about that, but on the whole we had a very close relationship. So much so that the request to Khrushchev to turn his boats around, and not challenge the picket fence, was accepted.

Q: This is during the '62 missile crisis in Cuba.

CLEVELAND: In the missile crisis, what they were really answering there was a message from U Thant that we had developed which went to both Khrushchev and Kennedy. We were able to work effectively with the Secretary General and the people in his office.

Q: I will get to particulars, but I was wondering, did you have a problem of trying to, this is a loaded term but, "curb the arrogance" of the bureaus? You know, going out and saying, "We want such and such a vote and you tell these small little republics and whatever they are to vote a certain way." I'm always getting stories of people who were out in the field saying, "We get this shopping list and somebody was told to get Iraq to support us in Israel," you know.

CLEVELAND: Well, yes. Because the bureaus were organized regionally, they developed their own mystique about what ought to be done at the UN. I was often in a position of having to mediate between bureaus. At one point Dean Rusk said, "I want you to work this out. I want you to act for this purpose as if you were the deputy under secretary over these two bureaus, but if anybody says that, I'll deny it." Of course we had the great advantage of first of all we were the action officers on all this kind of stuff, and secondly we had this powerful, personable gladiator in New York that nobody could ignore. We said, "Well, Adlai won't do that." They didn't have anybody to tell Adlai to do it except the President and he wasn't about to on any small thing and even on big things. In that sense from a professional point of view it was an extremely interesting job because it got me mixed up with a lot of general foreign policy issues, simply because we had some piece of the action in the UN and we needed to act on it before tomorrow.

Q: Everything depends on the period, and we are talking about the '61-'65 period. How about getting the best officers to sign up for UN affairs as opposed to regional bureau? Was there a problem? How did you find it?



CLEVELAND: Well, I did not find that to be a problem. That was partly because we were creating quite a lot of excitement, and obviously having a good time. I think that was attractive to the kind of people we wanted, the feistier officers. We tried to participate in the effort they turned on early in the administration, to get more African Americans into the Foreign Service. We were able to attract a man who later wound up as ambassador to the UN, Don McHenry. He was a very junior officer when he started. We had him working on trust territories, and things like that.

Q: Also, wasn't this one of the bureaus which was more open to women? I would gather there were some very bright women who sort of specialized in the United Nations affairs because this is one place where they wouldn't be mothered by the old boy network. Is that true?

CLEVELAND: Well, I think that's true. Of course, there weren't all that many women in the Foreign Service, so we didn't have a big opportunity of choice there. I think it is fair to say that we were a center of and we were creating a good deal of excitement and interest.

Joe Sisco became my deputy and my successor later, and later was Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He had an unusual career in that his whole career had been in the UN, and he had never been out as ambassador anywhere, yet he became Assistant Secretary and then Under Secretary. But, he was an operational kind of a guy. When we moved him out of political section of our bureau and made him a deputy, his natural successor was Bill Buffum, who was also very bright, very operational, and later became the top American in the UN secretariat, the job Ralph Bunche had first had.

Q: I have heard that Joe Sisco, there have been a lot of stories in my interviews involving him, how he knew how to play Washington and the bureaucratic game almost better than anybody my interviewees had ever run across.

CLEVELAND: I think that's right. More than that even, he was interested and good at the tactical game in the UN, the rounding up of a particular commissioner or stalling something because we didn't have the support, or rushing it because we did, all that kind of thing. On important issues, we had a line that came directly into our office where we heard the debate as it was going on. We could intervene in it by calling people in our delegation up there in real time. We also went up to New York a good deal and he was active in that aspect of the business. My other deputy during most of the time I was there was Dick Gardner who was a young sort of lawyer economist, who had done his thesis about Breton Woods institutions and sterling-dollar diplomacy, and was very much interested in all of the economic and scientific agencies, and so on. There was a good division of labor between them actually.



Q: The Bay of Pigs came. It had really been set up during the Eisenhower administration, this is the attempted invasion of Cuba by the CIA. How did that hit you? I mean were you briefed very well on this because it ended up in the UN?

CLEVELAND: Well, it was in the UN right along. It was as I said before, we had this incident about this defector who turned out to be not a defector. We had a briefing by William Tracy, I can't remember if that were his first and last name. I went up to it in New York. It was not very forthcoming or helpful, and I watched the thing come apart. I had a ringside seat by accident in the cabinet room because the Cuba item was on the floor of the General Assembly during that week. So the whole thing was roiling and boiling in the media, but it was also roiling and boiling on the floor of the General Assembly.

It was very important that what was said from the White House about the Bay of Pigs and what Adlai was saying for the United States sounded like the same government. It was my job to keep it stitched together. So I watched that. It came apart very fast, over two days. The President was very impressive. Thinking about it afterwards I thought here was a guy whose last executive job was head of a PT boat. So he wasn't really used to being an executive. For example, he never really asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether they thought the military thing would work.

The plan had been cooked up in the CIA by a unit of the CIA run by an economist, Dick Bissell. I had worked for Dick Bissell; I was Dick Bissell's deputy in the Marshall Plan, but I didn't see very much of him even though he was there in the room some of the time. I have several vivid memories of that cabinet room those two days. At one point, there was a discussion about how close to the shore the naval units should be. People were arguing that maybe they ought to be over the horizon where they couldn't be seen. At one point the President gets up and goes around this long table to this big magnetic display thing where they had all these ships stuck to it, and he picks up one of the naval ships and moves it back so that it would be over the horizon from the shore. I just happened to look at that moment at Admiral Burke's face, Admiral Arleigh Burke. He was chief of naval operations and I think was probably the acting chief at that point, acting chairman that day at least in the room. He had this stricken look on his face. You could almost read his mind saying "God is this the former naval officer, a Lieutenant JG, micromanaging the Navy?" I can't live with this feeling. So I would say that Kennedy hadn't quite known how to be the executive who was in charge of that operation. He didn't know that an executive executes by asking questions mostly. He didn't ask enough questions. His learning curve was very steep.

By the Cuban missile crisis he was doing just that. He was participating personally in the staff work. That's why that came out better, I think. Also I was impressed with the fact that as soon as it was clear that it was a boo-boo, he goes out into the press room personally, and says it was a boo-boo, and "I am responsible for it totally." Just think if Nixon had done that the day after the Watergate burglary. It would have been different.



Q: This is the thing. I think it is getting harder and harder for anybody. You have all these staffs who spend all their time pointing their fingers at somebody else. I mean we are going through this now with the war in Yugoslavia, and you can just see that everybody is trying to cover their behind or cover their chief's behinds rather than figuring out what to do.

CLEVELAND: That's right.

Q: On the Bay of Pigs, were there any major developments in the UN or was it mostly it happened quickly and so it was sort of cleaning up the mess afterwards?

CLEVELAND: Yes. Basically it was a public relations mess. It was only a big thing in the UN because the Cubans, of course, were in there making their case which was pretty good. We were trying to invade them, they thought. Theoretically we weren't; it was just that our guys were helping their guys get over there, and so forth. But in the end, we didn't follow up with air power or naval power. It was just an embarrassing failure; and especially embarrassing for Adlai who had to be the gladiator out front.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point. We've covered up to spring of '61. We've covered up to the Bay of Pigs with the UN. We've talked sort of about the general administration, how Stevenson operated, his relations with Kennedy, etc. We'll pick up on more of the specifics and some of the issues you dealt with after the Bay of Pigs.

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We have you in Washington in 1961 dealing with the Bay of Pigs.

CLEVELAND: I finally got there, yes.

Q: What were the major issues you were dealing with in your job? I am trying to come back to what your job was at that time.

CLEVELAND: Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs, known as IO. At that time I had the responsibility not only for all of the international organizations, but also for an assortment of other cats and dogs they didn't know where to put. The State Department was pretty rigidly organized by geographical regions.



Q: You were in IO from '61 to '65. We had talked about the Bay of Pigs. What about the period just before that?

CLEVELAND: The big crisis was the Congo.

Q: How did the Congo work?

CLEVELAND: The Congo had just become independent from Belgium the year before. The Russians and Chinese and others were moving in to see what advantage they could take. The country was split between factions, one in the north around Stanleyville as it was called, headed by Patrice Lumumba. One in the center which was the national government headed in this period by a fellow named Abdullah. One on the south which was the mining area, Katanga, where Belgian mining interests were still very much involved and where a fellow named Tshombe.

Q: Moise Tshombe in Elizabethville.

CLEVELAND: In Elizabethville. So rather early on the UN with U.S. support decided we have got to try to keep the country together and put in a peace keeping force to calm down the rioting, and so on. Ralph Bunche went there several times. He was kind of in charge for the UN in operations. When Kennedy came in it was already set. The first things I did had to do with coordinating the reaction to the Congo because it involved two different geographic regions, Europe and Africa. It also involved a sizable military operation under the UN in which we were contributing not forces but most of the logistical support.

Q: How about the Belgians? Were they giving us trouble in the UN?



CLEVELAND: Well, not in the UN so much. Some Belgians, not really the government, the mining interests, were supporting Tshombe financially. He had raised a gendarmerie called the Katanga police. They had a sizable force there. A good part of the first part of that year was taken up with UN forces chasing the Katanga gendarmerie around. We had to handle it in the Security Council. Most of the Security Council had decided during the Eisenhower administration there was no way anybody could get it turned off unless we agreed. We didn't want it turned off. The president got very clear in his mind during one of our first briefings that if the UN was not there, and its presence was obviously buffaloing the Russians and also the Chinese were pushing in there, that if the UN wasn't there, we'd have to be there with some force ourselves. I know that each time we had a meeting in the oval office about that, about the Congo, he would turn to me and say, "I remember, Harlan, you said if they weren't in there, we'd have to be in there ourselves. Is that still right?" I said, "Yes, that is still right." It was a consistent threat despite the fact that we had some vigorous opposition from the House particularly led by Thomas Dodd, the father of the present senator, who seemed to be very much on the side of the Belgian mining interests. Anyway, we did support the government there. I went over and developed the first economic aid program for the Congo during the year and did a lot on the Hill about supplying the Congo, so it was a big thing in my life that year. The thing I remember about it particularly was the first meeting on that subject that I convened contained four former governors of American states: Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, Averell Harriman of New York, Chester Bowles of Connecticut, and "Soapy" Mennen Williams of Michigan. I felt a little bit out of my class. I was a much younger person than any of them, but I was in a position where I had to coordinate things, so I did.

Q: Well, one of the crucial decisions of this early time was getting the Irish and Swedish troops, who were terribly ineffective, out of Katanga and putting in a solid Indian brigade, I guess it was. Where was that decision made?

CLEVELAND: That was mostly in process before we arrived on the scene. During that first year, 1961, I formulated a principle of peacemaking which was if you want to make peace, get peacemakers from as far away as possible. The only troops that were kind of making local politics, and not being very helpful, were the Ghanaians. Otherwise, we had troops from India, Malaysia, and I believe Finland and Canada. So the problem about the Swedes and the Irish was before my time.

Q: I'm not sure, but they were, well some Irish got eaten as a matter of fact. They just weren't, the Irish had never really fought, and they just weren't trained to deal with that.

CLEVELAND: I think of the Irish as being tough fighters.



Q: Well, they might have been, but I mean there was still a matter of leadership, and all that.

CLEVELAND: The leadership of the Indian Gurkhas was really magnificent. I spent a little time with the brigadier who was in charge of that brigade. He explained to me that they really had to understand that they were soldiers without enemies and that even if provoked, they should be careful not to storm right away. There was one incident I watched very closely of these Indian troops being attacked by a group of women throwing things at them. They just stood there and didn't even shoot into the air. That was real leadership. I wrote about that in a book called *The Allegations of Power* in the middle of that decade.

Q: All right, we have got a man who is a young vice consul named Terry McNamara who was in Elizabethville at the time. He talks about this. What about other parts of, you were doing international organizations at a time when the pace of decolonization was picking up and you were getting a lot of new countries coming in to the United Nations. Was this causing us any disquiet about wondering where they are going to be as far as East-West?

CLEVELAND: Well, quite a number of the countries had already become independent: India and Indonesia. The whole Indian sub-continent had been shortly after World War II. The main problem that bothered us as a policy matter was the splintering off of smaller and smaller states. We were beginning to get island states like Pitcairn Island and Noumea, and so forth, wanting to be sovereign states with a few hundred thousand people or less. The way the UN was set up with one country, one vote, it was beginning to look grotesque. So the idea of a Security Council with a limited number of countries was a pretty good idea, even though some of us had been worried about the veto before. Then in April, we did have the Bay of Pigs.

Q: How did you feel that the IO was on the Bay of Pigs? Had you been prepared for this or did it just come?



CLEVELAND: Well, Cuba had been an issue in the UN. All along the Cubans kept charging we were about to invade them. It turned out to be a reasonable thing for them to think. At that time in American foreign policy, there was hardly any issue anywhere in the world that wasn't also a UN problem. I think I said to you before that I think I had a perfect record for those 4½ years, almost five years in that job, of being personally involved in every peace and security crisis that came along. That was even true of matters that were deliberately being excluded from the UN like Berlin, which was a great power issue because our gladiator at the UN, Adlai Stevenson, was also a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. He had to be consulted on anything important, and expected me and our bureau to do the Washington staff work for him on anything he could get. He didn't involve himself with the other regional bureaus too much. He'd talk to us, and we'd get the information from the bureau. So, in the case of the Bay of Pigs, it came on rather rapidly because there was a Cuba item on the General Assembly agenda, a Cuban charge that we were thinking about invading them. Actually the Bay of Pigs happened to be the same week that item came up on the General Assembly agenda. I don't know whether anybody at the CIA knew that ahead of time. They probably weren't noticing the General Assembly agenda, but that was the very thing. Then we had an incident, did we discuss this before?

Q: I think some of it.

CLEVELAND: A Cuban air force plane flew out of Cuban airspace and over to Florida and crash landed in Florida. That was a big event because it looked as if the Cuban armed forces were maybe falling apart or defecting, and so on. That day, Adlai Stevenson had to be on the floor of the General Assembly on the Cuba item. So we had to know what the story was. I asked our Latin American people, and they tried to find out from the CIA how things stood and what we got back was the cover story. A Cuban plane had come out and defected and so on. Within 24 hours an enterprising journalist had found out where the plane had landed in the swamp. He scraped away at the Cuban markings and found there were U.S. Air Force markings underneath. So the cover blew off very fast, and Adlai Stevenson was fit to be tied because his great credibility had been put at risk unnecessarily before the world. He was very good about it. The easiest thing in the world would be to blame me because I had given him the instructions, but he didn't. The CIA had come up to brief him, to New York. I went up with them, just a few days before, to tell him the Bay of Pigs invasion was happening. It was a very faulty briefing, not very candid. I don't know whether it was to deliberately keep the information from Stevenson for fear it would leak, or whether like other aspects of that operation not very well managed. In any case, we were kind of leery of the operation, and worried about having to defend it in the UN.



I spent two fascinating days in the cabinet room of the White House as it came apart. It was terribly important that the White House press officer, Pierre Salinger, go out every hour and say something, and there was a demand for something to be said. At the same time, Adlai Stevenson was in New York. Being with the same government, it was important that they be saying more or less the same thing at the same time. My job was to sort of make sure that that worked out. I watched that operation very closely as it came apart.

A few vignettes remain a vivid memory. One of them was when President Kennedy got up and walked around the cabinet room. At the head of the table there was a big map showing the environs of Cuba and showing where the naval forces were deployed. They used little metal replicas of the ships which would stick to this magnetic board. He picked up one of the destroyers that seemed rather close to shore and put it back over the horizon. I just happened to look at that moment at Admiral Burke, Arleigh Burke, who was the senior officer present in the navy and was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that day. I could just see, could read on his face what he was thinking. He was a U.S. navy man, being commanded by this former lieutenant JG. What on earth are we in for here? A look of desperation on his face. It was a trying time for all the people in the room who were involved in the operation itself when they realized it just wasn't working. Some of them hoped that Kennedy would be willing to up the ante by using air cover or moving the navy in closer or somehow defending the disaster on the ground. Kennedy was very clear that they were already in too deep, and it would be a mistake to start a really big conflagration. Kennedy at that time had been president for only three months. His last executive job before that, some years before had been to run a PT boat. That was the last executive job he had before being president. I think he wasn't really accustomed to thinking like an executive. An executive mostly executes by asking questions. He never really asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff what they thought from a military point of view about this military operation that had been cooked up in the CIA in a unit headed by an economist. So it came to pieces, and as it came to pieces Bobby Kennedy sitting at the end of the table was sort of glowering around at everybody saying something to the effect that I don't want to hear anybody saying they didn't think this was a good idea. When it was clear that it wasn't working, that it was going to be a failure, it was the President who decided to go out personally and meet the press and say there had been a mistake and we just have to go on from there. I often thought later that if Nixon had said that about the Watergate burglary, history might be different.

Q: Oh, absolutely. What about again dealing back to Cuba, the Cuban missile crisis? This must have put quite a strain on your office.



CLEVELAND: We were very much involved in that, too. I was called out of a dinner at the Swiss embassy. My call from Secretary Rusk asking me to come over before going home to come over to the office. I had an inkling there was something going on. There were a lot of rumors, but it wasn't clear what was going on. I asked him whether he wanted me to increase the rumor factor by having me get up suddenly and leave in the middle of an embassy dinner. He said, "No, you had better wait, have some coffee and then go." So I did that, and a whole second tier of officials were brought in to the secret meeting, to see photographs that had been taken by the U-2 of the missiles in Cuba which led then to the president's decision after awhile to blockade Cuba and threaten but not actually bomb the missiles. There were advocates of bombing the missiles right away. After some argument the President rightly came to the conclusion that to start things off by killing some Soviet citizens at an air base in Cuba would not probably be the way to handle it. So we came to this rather sophisticated decision.

Our part in it was by doing staff work for Adlai Stevenson as a central member of the little group that was gathering in the cabinet room every day. And then to come in and out from New York. The scenario that we developed was first to go to the western hemisphere, the Organization of American States, and get unanimous consent from the hemisphere that this was a bad thing to be doing, a Monroe Doctrine kind of ploy. And only then to go to the Security Council. So while the President was speaking on Monday night telling the world about the missiles, not using the pictures, the CIA was still trying to sit on the pictures because they were afraid of the consequences of the Russians learning how good the resolution of our cameras was.

He made his dramatic nationwide, worldwide speech. While that speech was going on, we deposited at the Organization of American States, a request for an immediate meeting which started the next morning. There was a request for an immediate meeting of the Security Council which we didn't want because we wanted to do the western hemisphere thing first. We thought that could be done in the morning, and Secretary Rusk handled that personally. But a number of countries had to go for instructions to their foreign ministers. That process would be finished by the end of the morning. So we scattered for lunch, and the Latin American lunch is somewhat longer than lunches in some other parts of the world. It was actually close to 4:00 before they reconvened.

Meanwhile the president of the Security council, who ironically was the Soviet representative that month, called the Security Council to order at 4:00. I was listening to the television in my office to the debate going on which started with Adlai making a speech mostly written by my assistant, Don Wilson, and Arthur Schlesinger, who had come over to my office. He had been working on this over the weekend. It was a long speech. It took nearly an hour. I was concerned that we wouldn't get word from the Organization of American States before the speech was ended. The key passage in the speech was supposed to be that we were doing this as a representative of our hemisphere.



So about five minutes before the end of the speech, I was following the text so I knew where I was, a call came in and my secretary came rushing in saying Secretary Rusk is on the phone with Ed Martin who is Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs. They told me to go ahead and authorize that he can say this is the whole hemisphere. Only Uruguay had not been able to respond. They had nine co-presidents at that time and they couldn't give a rapid decision. So I called a number, a phone just outside the Security Council where we had stationed a young woman from our mission to make sure nobody else used it so we could always use it for such an emergency. I asked her to get Joe Sisco, my deputy who was sitting right behind Stevenson. I could see him on television, come off, and take the call himself. We were assembled in the office, a number of staff members. We saw Joe Sisco get up and leave the screen and take my call. I dictated to him a short paragraph that said this was a hemisphere action and that we were declaring a blockade. We didn't want to call it a blockade so we called it a quarantine. I saw Sisco come back and put a paper down in front of Stevenson. Adlai was in full rhetorical flame. He was sitting down, but he had the manuscript folded up in front of him. It looked to me as if he hadn't been able to see this insert. At that point, the President is on the phone personally. So I picked up the phone and he asked did you hear about the OAS action? Is there some way we can get it into the speech before he finishes? I wonder what I would have said if we hadn't thought to cover that. So, I said, "Yes we have just put an insert in front of him, but I don't know if..." at that moment on the screen I see Stevenson notice the insert, pick it up, and before I had a chance to say anything more, the President, who was obviously watching the same TV show, said, "Oh, I see, he is picking it up and reading it now." Bang! So as I said later, the Cuban missile crisis wasn't over, but mine was. That was a good example of the kind of central position in the scheme of things that the IO bureau occupied in that period.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the Middle East, Israel, the Arab states?

CLEVELAND: Yes, because that was often coming up in a UN context either an anti-Israel resolution on the floor of the assembly or reauthorizations of the UN emergency force in the Middle East, which was still operating in the Sinai and operated for years and years in the Sinai desert. It was building up to what became a '67 war. So, there was constant argument and debate about it in the UN context, mostly though in the General Assembly, not in the Security Council.

Q: Who was the Secretary General during most of this time?



CLEVELAND: Well, Dag Hammarskjöld was when we first came in. I got to know him quite well, actually after three months. Then he went on an inspection mission to the Congo, and his plane crashed and he was killed. So, we had to subsequently deal with the problem of the selection of a new Secretary General. That was another dramatic period in my life. It was just at the beginning of the General Assembly session itself in the fall of '61. I was up consulting with the mission about various things we were supposed to do. We had already had a caucus with the President and Arthur Schlesinger and myself on the "Honey Fitz" which was his motorboat.

Q: A cabin cruiser.

CLEVELAND: Well, not very big actually. A small fishing boat really. I remember Jackie Kennedy pouring Bloody Marys for us in her bikini. We had laid out the kind of program and he had made the opening speech at the assembly, I believe, already by that time. Then Dag Hammarskjöld was killed, and we had to deal with that, so I spent several days in New York helping to think about who we should come out for, and how to handle it, consulting with other delegations and so on.

We finally decided that it was going to be Asia's turn in the job, and U Thant would probably be a good bet, although he was not anything like the direct action personality that Dag Hammarskjöld was. We later had some difficulty with Secretary General U Thant, most of which was not his fault but ours, i.e., Stevenson learning things from him that he didn't pass on to the government, and U Thant thinking he was talking to the government.

When it came to the Cuban missile crisis, for example, we provided U Thant with a letter to be sent to both Khrushchev and Kennedy asking both to cool it and not have a confrontation. It was actually that letter which Khrushchev was acting on when he decided to turn his ships around and not challenge the blockade. Then, after that, there was a long period during which Jack McCloy was rehired into the administration, a former assistant secretary of war, to handle the negotiations with the deputy foreign minister of Russia who was a man named Kuznetsov. That whole negotiation took place under cover of the UN, via the our mission to the United Nations to which McCloy was attached. The White House staff didn't want Stevenson to handle that job because they didn't think he'd be tough enough. I think they were wrong about that, but I didn't get a vote on that subject. But the thing was done as a mission thing, and therefore the first action office in Washington was my office in handling all the reports from McCloy and the instructions.

Q: Did Stevenson make it known that he wasn't too happy about being bypassed by McCloy?



CLEVELAND: Yes, it was sort of a chronic problem, particularly with Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General and some of the White House staff people who wanted very much to keep Stevenson in the Kennedy administration, which was essential politically because his defection from the administration would have lost Kennedy sort of the left wing of the party. People were still being called in those days, liberals and conservatives. So it was a chronic issue of that sort. On the other hand Kennedy personally tried very hard to keep good relations, from Jackie Kennedy going off to New York to be squired around by Stevenson, with all the publicity that involved, so the relationship remained viable. It was never easy, partly because Stevenson, who was a man old enough to be his son, saw Kennedy sitting in job that he had twice run for himself, so it was not an easy position psychologically for him or Kennedy.

Q: How did the transition come? Did you see a change when Kennedy was assassinated in November of '63 and Johnson came in? As far as you were concerned, was there a different look at the UN?

CLEVELAND: It didn't really affect UN policy so much. I'd say practically not at all. President Johnson's policy was let's have continuity at all costs. He asked everybody to remain in office. At first his intention was to not have any of us resign which would have been the normal thing. With a new president, everybody resigns, and then those he wants, he can ask back. Dean Rusk had a group of us in his office one day and said this is what the President is thinking about. Several of us strongly took the position that he should ask every one of us to resign. He shouldn't set a precedent that some future President wouldn't want to live with. Anyway, we did resign but he told us all to stay on the job.

Stevenson's reaction was interesting. His first reaction was, well, this is a man of my generation. I have known him for a long time. I can do well by him and get along with him. I think he really thought that this could be a much easier relationship. LBJ operated that way for the first few weeks. He had Stevenson come down to the ranch, all that sort of thing. But, that didn't last very long. I think to LBJ, Stevenson was too much of a liberal, and that wasn't his style, although interestingly, the positions that the President took on domestic affairs were bolder and certainly more effective with Congress than Kennedy's had been on civil rights, for example. The great Civil Rights Act of 1965 was in a way prepared by the Kennedy administration but it was really LBJ who got it through. He was a master at legislative tactics. I had learned that while he was Vice President about a UN bond issue we were trying to get through to help finance the peace keeping function, when the Soviets, by turning off their contributions, made it difficult to meet those bills. I had a chance to watch as Vice President Johnson called in his assistant, Bobby Baker, later famous for other things, and they went over one of those sheets with all the Senator's names on it. He discussed each Senator and what he would be most influenced by, and so on. So, on legislative strategy, he was somebody that really knew what he was doing, and did it well.



He was not ever comfortable with foreign policy issues I would say. In that sense, Stevenson had the advantage in not only that he knew a lot about it, but he knew everybody, all the leaders in the world. Johnson tried to shore up his personal connections by having a big reception in the State Department at the time of Kennedy's funeral when all the heads of state, De Gaulle and everybody else, were over. He talked second-hand with most of the world's leaders at that time. Stevenson and Ralph Bunche were very helpful during that time, and to some extent also in making those connections for the new White House, the President and the new White House staff. It was not entirely new though. Mac Bundy stayed on for awhile. Most of the people he brought in and the Kennedy people drifted off before too long.

Q: Within the IO organization, did you sense concern with the departure, the death of Kennedy and the coming on of Johnson, about where we were going and all that, or...

CLEVELAND: Not really as a matter of policy, no. The President was being advised by people who knew what we were doing, agreed with it. I think he had the same feeling about Stevenson, that it was very important to keep him on board, so that was a continuity. He was preoccupied in his first year and a half or so with domestic policy anyway. He was running for reelection to begin with. Then there was the big civil rights and other legislation in the first year of his elected term. So he did all the things he needed to do. He saw the statesmen from around the world as they came in and out of Washington, and was well briefed and knew what he was talking about. That wasn't the center of his interest at that time.

Q: What about the civil rights movement? I would have thought that this would have been something the Soviets, in our dealing with the African-Americans in the United States was pretty awful, particularly for a country that declares itself to be the great democracy. Did you find yourself getting beaten up a lot on this thing? Were you really engaged in it?

CLEVELAND: Well, we had a lot of defending to do, and putting incidents like the Selma civil rights demonstrations and their suppression, putting them in the perspective of what was a long period of progress. The civil rights legislation in '65 helped a lot in that respect. We were trying very hard to get the UN to set up a High Commissioner of Human Rights that would have some vigorous functions and some teeth in it, as we have now with Mary Robinson.

Q: She is very busy, as we speak, working on the problem in Kosovo.



CLEVELAND: Exactly. We wanted very much to get that set up. We had a lot of trouble with that on the Hill because of some of those southern senators particularly. Of course at that time the Democrats were in control of Congress, and control in the Congress was mostly in the hands of southerners. We had to deal with such questions as we don't want a high commissioner that could come in and actually investigate anything in the United States. I kept talking about Selma and the University of Alabama issue; the candle light was already shining on that. CBS and ABC and NBC and public television, all the newspapers and so forth, a UN inspection could hardly increase the amount of candlepower focused on the subject, so we weren't really giving up anything by permitting inspections. So our argument in a way was less with the UN and more with Congress on those issues.

Q: Well, you left in '65. You went through the election time and all. Why did you leave by '67?

CLEVELAND: Because I was offered a job. My assumption was that my next large stride in my career would be to succeed Adlai Stevenson in New York as the top ambassador to the UN. Dean Rusk had told me that was how he hoped to work things out eventually, whenever Stevenson had decided he had had enough.

Stevenson kept talking about resigning. He didn't, but was talking about it. But then Tom Finletter, who had been U.S. ambassador to NATO and had been there for several years, I guess since the beginning of the Kennedy administration, decided that he wanted to leave that job. Both George Ball, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense and Bob McNamara, who was Secretary of Defense, felt that I would be right for the NATO job. Well, because I think McNamara particularly had seen me mostly in my capacity as an analyst of international diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy. That was a multilateral diplomacy job, the best multilateral diplomacy job apart from the UN job.

So that decision was made, and I was already nominated when Stevenson suddenly died in London. He had a heart attack on the sidewalk in Grosvenor Square. I went through a short period of feeling if I hadn't already signed on to this other job, maybe I would be available. I was very glad it worked out the way it did because to the president, Johnson, the main thing he had to do was get a spectacular appointment as Stevenson's successor because Stevenson was such a well-known figure. He did that by persuading Justice Arthur Goldberg to come off the Supreme Court and take the job in New York.



Goldberg, who had ambitions in New York politics, felt that he could become governor of New York, so he took the deal. I learned later that Goldberg when he was arguing with the President that he really shouldn't come off the Supreme Court and so on, that one of the arguments he'd use was you have somebody right in the administration who could fall into that job and be a natural, namely Harlan Cleveland. But the president had brushed that off and said he had already taken the other job and maybe also he had in mind that he wanted to do something more spectacular than pick up one of the bureaucrats and offer him Stevenson's job. So, I worked very briefly with Arthur Goldberg. Basically the kind of function I had performed with Stevenson was performed with Goldberg by Joe Sisco who had been my deputy and became my successor as Assistant Secretary. Joe then went on to a very illustrious Foreign Service career. He became the Under Secretary of Political Affairs in the State Department, a very unusual career for a Foreign Service officer because he had never been stationed abroad in any job at all.

Q: Many in the Foreign Service used to remark when he would say he is a Foreign Service officer with a relatively high rank, they would, sort of be glowering into their martini glasses, he is not really a Foreign Service officer.

CLEVELAND: It would be better had he had a consular job or any of those things you do. He was always a UN tactician for years and years, and very valuable to me in my job. He was mostly the UN expert tactician, and my other deputy, Dick Gardner who was a lawyer and economist, was handling most of the other international organizations and some of the special issues like population policy for the UN, things like that which came up. It was a very good team. Bill Buffum who succeeded Joe Sisco as head of UN political affairs later also became assistant secretary for IO and was put into what I always thought was the Ralph Bunche job at the UN secretariat as the top American to the Secretary General. So, we had a strong team there, and we were dealing with powerful regional bureaus. There were a lot of important issues that wouldn't wait.

Q: Well then, in '65 you went to the NATO job?

CLEVELAND: So in '65 under rather dramatic circumstances, I went to the NATO job. Once I had been confirmed, then there were plans for the usual laying on of hands which usually took place upstairs in the State Department where our current ambassadors met. De Gaulle had threatened to start at that season the rhetorical barrage about the UN that ended up in the withdrawal of France from the military aspect of NATO. So somebody obviously had to say something in reply to this big ploy of General de Gaulle. The person to say that was obviously the President.



So, my laying on of hands ceremony was suddenly promoted into the rose garden, and I helped draft the speech that the President gave on that occasion. It sort of set our line about being flexible about the French but adamant about our support of the UN, of NATO.

So when we got to Paris, it wasn't until two years later that we had to move the whole thing to Brussels. That is a story in itself that we'll get to. One of the first things I did in the mandatory calls on all of my colleagues, the other ambassadors to NATO, I called on Pierre DeLouisse, who was an older man, more de Gaulle's generation, had known de Gaulle very well. It was interesting that the French all through this period put at NATO their best foreign service people. The French foreign office was trying hard to make sure they didn't have any Goths in that because de Gaulle felt so strongly about French sovereignty being compromised by their membership in NATO. So, I call on Ambassador Pierre DeLouisse, and had an extraordinary experience. I had no sooner sat down on his sofa when Ambassador DeLouisse, still standing, said, "I hope you are not going to ask me what the old man means." I said, "Well Mister Ambassador, I wouldn't really want to bring negotiations up in this first courtesy call." He said, "Now look. You and I don't know each other yet, but we are going to have to work very closely together. We can do it two ways. We can sit across the table and glare at each other, or we can sit down on the same side of the table and we can gaze up at the great enigma and try to figure out what the hell he means."

After that, I never could treat him at arms length. He had shown such a human side of himself as a diplomat. He was more than a regular foreign service person because when he left that job, he was appointed by de Gaulle as head of the ORTF, the French radio-television monopoly. So, he had a good in with de Gaulle, and he was also a very popular colleague with both his personal sensitivities and he was also a very bright professional.

Q: Well, what was our reading at that time? I mean, all right, de Gaulle wants us out, so we get out.

CLEVELAND: No, he hadn't said yet that he wants us to go out. There was a rumbling about it. He didn't actually lower the boom for almost two years. They were being difficult about a lot of issues, especially military issues. It wasn't really part of their policy to object to a North Atlantic Council, they were just objecting to all these military commanders, and so on, being in the environs of Paris, and all the troops. So it wasn't until two years later that he finally said all foreign military will have to get out of France. That meant not only the troops doing various things, communications, aircraft duty and so on, but it also meant the supreme commander of NATO, an American and his whole staff will have to get out. There was then a period of uncertainty. Some of the allies were soft on France, and we were inclined to be, didn't want to offend France by saying the North Atlantic Council had to leave too.



But as the American representative on the North Atlantic Council, I was clear we were going to have to go. I finally got the State Department at my recommendation, to instruct me to ask one question in the council chamber. In the event of a war in which France remains neutral, how does France propose that we keep closely in touch with our supreme commander who is going to be in Belgium? The French ambassador, who was a very good friend, I had told him ahead of time what I was going to be asking. He looked up at the ceiling for a moment and said, "You'll never get an answer out of the Quai d'Orsay on a question like that." I said, "I know. That is the idea." So, he absorbed the question and reported it to Paris and the military. After about three weeks of no answer, the Danes, the Greeks and others were inclined to be uncertain whether we should move or not. Everybody agreed to move.

Q: Well, I would imagine there would also be the problem that most just didn't want to move because Paris is Paris.

CLEVELAND: Well, I think there was some of that sentiment. We really didn't have that feeling. We were looking forward to the chance to see another piece of Europe, in personal terms. In fact our general experience was that we had a more fun time living in Brussels in a sizable house, but a lot smaller than the mansion that we lived in in Paris with a lot fewer servants in Brussels, but it was just a more congenial environment in general. The Belgians were more welcoming. They had us in their homes in a way that didn't happen in Paris.

Q: Well, you had the political alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and then you had the military. You were dealing mainly with the political side.

CLEVELAND: No, I was dealing with both. Remember I remarked before the decision was made by McNamara when I was appointed to make me his representative in Paris too. So, I was really reporting both to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. I had one of my deputies who was a civilian in the McNamara whiz kid think tank in the early part of the Kennedy administration, Jim Stanley. So I did a lot of business with the Defense Department as well.

Q: You were there from '65 to when?

CLEVELAND: To '69, almost five months into the Nixon administration.

Q: Had Greece and Turkey come into the organization by the time you got there?



CLEVELAND: Yes indeed. And the Greek and Turkish ambassadors happened to be extremely good friends. You would see them walking down the hall with their arms around each other and so forth. I had already been through one Cyprus crisis when I was in the State Department in the early '60s. In 1967 we had another one where at one point President Johnson had to send Cy Vance, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, at that point, over to try to make sure that the Turks understood that it was very serious violation of their friendship with us if they should invade Cyprus. I called Washington up one night to ask, "Shouldn't we get the Secretary General of NATO involved, get him to go down and make peace between these two allies, make the point that allies can't go to war with each other?" I had been really pushed into this by the Turkish ambassador who came to me in great alarm saying he thought the invasion would be tomorrow morning if I couldn't do something about it. So I went not as an envoy but as the American representative to the Secretary General. The problem is he had to go without having an invitation from either of the two countries at the time he left. We had an American plane standing by at the airport, a military plane to take him first to Athens and then to Ankara. We were able to announce that evening that the NATO Secretary General was going down, not as another piece of the deterrent in fact. The combination with Vance we thought was the most effective ploy. But the interesting thing was when I called to make that suggestion, the crisis task force was working on Cyprus. I had assumed they had already been considering this, but I can't remember who I was talking to, said that we haven't really discussed that yet, but that is a good idea. I know they were getting quick instructions. It often happens, it does happen I think in diplomacy, the person on the ground can better figure out what his instructions ought to be than anybody else, and shouldn't be bashful about making suggestions.

Q: Well, this Cyprus crisis came about to a certain extent because of the colonel's coup in Greece. That was in April of '67.

CLEVELAND: Yes, they were becoming more militant about it. But the Turks had made very clear that they were going to take no nonsense. They kept the Turkish military force in the Turkish part of Cyprus. It was clear that if the Greek Cypriots tried to sort of envelop the whole island, that Turkey would get into it. They almost got into it on their own initiative as it turned out, so it was a very dicey, hairy situation.

Q: What, during this time, '65-'69, what was the feeling about the Soviet threat at that point?



CLEVELAND: Well, it was regarded as a maximum threat. They had this huge inventory of nuclear weapons. I suppose at that time there were 10-12,000 nuclear weapons in the world; almost all of them ours and theirs, a few in the hands of the British and French and Chinese. Our problem with the non-nuclear allies, particularly Germany, West Germany at that time, Federal Republic, was that their political leaders tended to overstate the probability of a nuclear reaction to anything. You hear politicians say that the first Russian soldier or, East German soldier, who sets his foot across the demarcation line, all hell will break loose.

Well, we had started at my suggestion really, a nuclear planning group which still exists. We were anxious to be able to cut the non-nuclear allies in on what nuclear war would be like and you couldn't deal with it. It was becoming a lot more clear that there was no way you could have a nuclear war that you could win. You'd shoot your own foot as badly as you would hit the other fellow's foot.

There had been an idea of setting up a multilateral force, MLF so-called, to be another nuclear weapons system, surface ships, but we needed another nuclear weapons system about as badly as a hole in the head. We finally suggested we set up a group that included some of the non-nuclear allies, who would be rotated, so the total number would be kept to fewer than the 15 members. We had 15, too big for conducting serious conversations in secret. We established this group. We had the first meeting in Washington, McNamara presiding, and the defense ministers from the countries involved. One of them was Turkey. To everybody's surprise, including the surprise of the security people surrounding us. McNamara suddenly dives into this capacious briefcase and pulls out photographs, satellite photographs, of a defense installation in Russia. The code name was a classification that in itself was classified at the time and way above top secret. You could just see the security people blanching and fidgeting. But that was a case that we were taking this information sharing very seriously. Finally I said to McNamara, he really had to be personally present every time we met, otherwise it wouldn't work. He agreed to do that, and he did it.

Clark Clifford succeeded him. When the Nixon administration came in, Mel Laird also stuck by that principle. So we were dealing with nuclear policy by playing war games, by having simulated exercises. You had to assume that the enemy would come over into our territory first, but you couldn't assume anything about the defensive alliance. You couldn't assume a preemptive strike ahead of time or anything like that. We played a whole series of war games with these non-nuclear defense people as well as the French and the British. We never could play a game with these tactical nuclear forces where we didn't kill more people on our side than the other side. You might mess up an invading brigade, but you also messed up a number of communities in West Germany, mostly West Germany. So there was a sudden diminution of the nonsense coming out of the political leadership in the non-nuclear countries, particularly Germany. The plan worked, that is telling people the nature of nuclear war turned out to be a much better way of educating them than having them participate in a complicated surface force where everybody got to do different things.



Q: Well, was there any communication with the Warsaw Pact at this point? In a way, they must have been running the same games and finding out this wasn't going to work.

CLEVELAND: Well, no, there was not really any. Just intelligence people on both sides trying to figure out what the others were doing, but there was no real cooperation in thinking through. That was one of the things that bothered us, that they might think more highly of the possible advantages of using nuclear weapons than we were inclined to. Everybody in our camp was of the opinion that I came to, and that I think McNamara and some other top military leaders like Admiral Noel Gayler, who was the commander in chief of the Pacific did. When he retired, he said it was a weapon too big to use. I came to the conclusion, I started calling it not the ultimate weapon but the ultimately unusable weapon.

Q: Well, you had theorists and a sort of a lobby that was particularly powerful in scientific circles. Edwin Teller is the name that comes to mind. There were others who were playing games. If we lose two million, they lose three, and somehow we'll come out ahead on this sort of thing. Did you run across these people/? They tended to be more in the Nixon era.

CLEVELAND: Well, Teller actually was more active earlier in the argument about going from the A-bomb to the H-bomb. Yes, there was always this overestimation, and to some extent our own military politics and military dynamics tended to exacerbate the problem. The three services were competing for having nuclear weapons systems. The navy finally got the main deterrent system, the Polaris submarine and its successors. The air force had the bombers that were dual-capable as they called it. The army had the Pershing missile and other howitzers that were also dual-capable. I visited all the main military headquarters while I was in NATO. I learned a lot about the thinking, and the thinking often hadn't carried deeply enough, the analysis of what would be the effects of nuclear weapons both in the short term and the long term. Chernobyl hadn't happened yet, so they weren't thinking about the world effects of nuclear energy. Through all this time the Soviets, to answer your earlier question, were just being implacably the enemy. They weren't really doing anything to help us stop thinking of them as the implacable enemy.

Q: Well, during the time before de Gaulle finally said, "Everybody get out", there was this point in '65 when France was in the military organization. Was the rest of NATO beginning to move around and come up with the idea we can't depend on the French forces and make contingency plans, contingency thinking?



CLEVELAND: Well, the French really took care of that. They were in a way ahead of the allies moving in that direction. Within the French military forces there seemed to be some division of opinion. The cooperation in the Mediterranean with the French navy was completely different. Even after de Gaulle's pull out, the French navy continued to be part of NATO exercises in the Mediterranean which obviously made military sense.

Q: I know when I was consul general in Naples in '79-'81 the French navy was right there. In fact they were probably one of the strongest contingents of the Mediterranean fleet.

CLEVELAND: Indeed the pull out itself, the French pull out itself, was vastly over estimated at first by the press and some comments coming from Washington. I argued in a series of increasingly eloquent cables that here is a guy who is doing something for domestic consumption and to some extent for Soviet consumption, but what he had carefully not done is do things that would really be harmful such as forbidding over flights over France and interfering with communications through France. Both cases would have put a crimp on keeping the Mediterranean and northern fronts as part of the same military system. I said the fact that they haven't done anything about either of these indicates clearly that de Gaulle has thought this through and is trying to make his public declaration without hurting NATO. Don't let's help him hurt NATO more than he wants to. That did finally prevail but it got a lot of argument.

Q: Were you finding that within the French military there was some disquiet about pulling out? I would have thought that being by themselves did harm the military readiness by not being part of the NATO system.

CLEVELAND: Yes, it did. I didn't pick up, but I wasn't really in a position to pick up any dissension in the French military ranks. De Gaulle was so much in charge, particularly as a military man. He was, in fact, a great thinker among strategists of our time, which was revealed by the fact that he was able to pull off this political operation without really hurting NATO. Gradually the French got more and more cooperative with military exercises, and so on, but it has never been an easy relationship.

Q: Did you find you were there at a crucial time, of having to work and tell everybody, "Cool it. Don't aggravate the French anymore. Do what we have to, but at the lower ranks, let's not go into a pout on this thing?"



CLEVELAND: I did that kind of education with my own mission and to some extent with the other allies and with Washington. Fortunately, the president's political instinct, President Johnson, and the advice he was getting from Dean Rusk and others, George Ball, was very much along the same line. George Ball was in public somewhat more exercised than others. He regarded it as almost a personal affront.

Q: I'm told, I heard other people remark, that he wanted to be very tough at the beginning on this, and it was Johnson who said let's cool it.

CLEVELAND: Well, George had worked in France, had been a consultant to the French government. I think he almost felt personally affronted by the French getting off the wavelength at this point. It is true that the President was very clear on this from a very early stage which helped a lot. I was just trying to reinforce that from where I sat.

Q: How were the British and French taking this?

CLEVELAND: Well, the British were really pretty cool about it. There was no way in which they could challenge the French anyway, so they didn't. In fact, it wasn't even within the NATO circle. I think it was regarded more as a matter of French-American relations than it was anything else. Even the Canadian angle, which heated up when de Gaulle visited Quebec and said something to the effect of, "Vive le Quebec Libre." The rest of the Canadians always will regard that as an affront, but I didn't perceive their French relations as narrowly dicey as I thought our relations with France had come to be. I suspect that most of them felt that in the end that the relationship was going to be soured or sweetened by what the Americans did. That is what I was working toward.

Q: Well, was there any other sort of crises we had? I mean this was a longstanding crisis, wasn't it?

CLEVELAND: That really lasted in a way the whole time I was there. And the nuclear discussions were another theme that went all the way through. I learned a lot about consultation, the nature of consultation. I wrote a book about NATO as soon as I left the job that summer called NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain. I have a couple of chapters in there that are, in fact, a general theory of consultation which could apply in a lot of other contexts as well for foreign service people.



It was a particularly interesting and difficult assignment because in a way every member of the North Atlantic Council, when they spoke up, was speaking to the American representative, always trying to influence what the United States was going to do. So I felt that I was in a position that I had to exercise some leadership of the whole group while not seeming to, not being arrogant about it. I solved this problem mostly by working very closely with and through the Secretary General, who was a very bright, very wise, Italian diplomat. He and I were very good friends. Many of the things we wanted done, we would suggest to him that he take as an initiative. He wasn't just a patsy. He would think it through himself, but we were very often on the same wavelength as him.

So, as an education in the nature of multilateral diplomacy, it was a wonderful experience. That's why I wanted to capture it in writing before I went on, because I went from that job to the University of Hawaii, and I knew there wouldn't be that much time for writing about NATO after I got to Hawaii. That book, from the publishers point, was probably a dog.

Q: It's there.

CLEVELAND: It's there.

Q: These things go on library shelves and are used. The title again?

CLEVELAND: NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain. I am doing a session at the World Future's Society this summer. The title is in effect the Transatlantic Bargain Revisited now. Europe is becoming a union. I was always very much interested in the future of Europe. I had gotten to know Jean Monnet back in the early days. When my younger brother was a Foreign Service officer, his family actually was assigned as part of his staff for awhile. My other brother Van had also been very much involved in the State Department, earlier under the Marshall Plan and later in the international economic economists area. He was also involved in the early days of the European Union. He had a very warm feeling about the importance of European integration. I was always watching; I was always looking at the Transatlantic Bargain, NATO compact, as something that among other things would make possible the Europeans coming together. It certainly had that effect in gluing Germany to the west, and eventually gluing even East Germany to the west. It had the effect that we all hoped it would have, that a war among western European countries was inconceivable.

Q: This, of course, still remains to me a high priority to keep the organization going because if you don't tend and water that organization, people can start going their own different ways. You get different sets of politicians and we see, particularly in Yugoslavia, you get some particularly nasty politicians. You can end up with very bloody conflicts.



CLEVELAND: Yes. I would have preferred to see an operation shortly after the cold war was over.

Q: We'll pick this up the next time. You have left the government. You have left NATO and gone to the Hawaii center. We'll talk I guess in our last go round about the role of a think tank and sort of the academic side of global relations and your part in that.

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Today is June 7, 1999. In 1969 the new Nixon administration came in and you went out.

CLEVELAND: Well, I didn't go out right away. I stayed for, it turned out, almost five months. They asked me to stay on. I had known Nixon a little bit. He had visited me twice at NATO. I was always impressed by the fact that he was genuinely interested in foreign policy. He was able to remember the second time what I had said the first time that sort of thing. So they asked me to stay on. Part of the problem was we had cleared with both Nixon and Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, the notion of inviting NATO for the 20th anniversary meeting. We have just now had the 50th anniversary meeting. This was the 20th anniversary meeting of the North Atlantic Council. We wanted to hold it in Washington, and both candidates had agreed that it was okay to plan that for April which is the anniversary date. So we did that. I think that part of the reason for asking me to stay on for a little bit was that it would have been hard for somebody else to hit the ground running fast enough to organize that particular event. I was still at NATO when President Nixon and Henry Kissinger and others came for their first visit in person. I did some writing at Henry Kissinger's request, about NATO. We had actually a very comfortable continuity of policy because what we were doing at NATO was essentially what they wanted to be doing at NATO also.

Q: Yes, there wasn't really much, in those days particularly, political controversy over NATO, was there?



CLEVELAND: None really at all. We had this huge meeting in Washington of all the defense ministers and all the foreign ministers and heads of government. It was a gigantic affair with huge dinners and so forth. When that was just winding down, I was getting ready to go back to Brussels to clean up and leave. I was just negotiating with the University of Hawaii about the terms and conditions of coming out there as president of the university. I had a message to go up and talk to the new Secretary of State who was Bill Rogers. To my surprise he started mentioning other ambassadorships around the world I might be interested in. He mentioned Greece, he mentioned the Philippines and so forth. I was pretty much had my heart set on this next step if it happened. Just in that time in that same week, I got a firm offer from the board of regents of the University of Hawaii to come out there starting in the fall.

Then I got another message to go over and visit the Secretary. He offered me the ambassadorship to Italy. That was a different proposition from my point of view. I had spent many years in Italy. I spoke some Italian, and it was much more tempting. I like Italy, I liked the Italians and so forth. But we decided, Lois and I in the end, that a lot of it would be more of the same. The way to grow is to do something you didn't know how to do rather than do something that I thought I did know how to do. I knew something about Italian politics and I knew quite a lot about how to be an ambassador by then. So, we decided the University of Hawaii would be more adventurous and interesting. It did turn out to be indeed both adventurous and interesting.

Q: You were at the University of Hawaii from '69 until when?

CLEVELAND: '74, five years.

Q: When you arrived there in the fall of '69, what was the university like? How did it impress you?

CLEVELAND: I should mention as a parenthesis that I spent the summer writing a book about NATO because I figured if I didn't write it then, I never would. I holed up in Syracuse, New York, where we used to live, and wrote what I think still stands as a pretty good history of NATO of the four years I was there and some of the background.



The University of Hawaii was a very ambitious proposition not yet fulfilled. The governor, who had been there for a long time, Jack Burns, was very high on education. He saw education as the means of Hawaii becoming not just an ex-colony but a state. Of course, it already had statehood by then for 10 years, but still it was more a colony than anything else. All the people who wanted to be doctors and lawyers had to go to the mainland for their graduate work and so on. The university had a unique position in the scheme of things. It was the whole of higher education for the state of Hawaii. Community colleges, a four year college and a big central research oriented campus with some very strong scientific departments, notably in geophysics, astronomy, in all the marine sciences notably marine biology. There were obviously potentials there for building a university around its marine environment out there in the middle of the Pacific, and very good support from the people and the legislature and the governor. I saw it as a very interesting and important opportunity for institution building which is what I like to do rather than maintain institutions, and so it was a very exciting prospect for me. I knew that campuses all over the country were riled up with demonstrations about Vietnam. I rather thought that was tailing off. It was on the mainland, but these things happen in Hawaii about two years after the mainland. It is true of women's fashions, too. We were having Berkeley 1967 in the fall of 1969 when I got there, so my first year was taken up largely with crisis management.



I did manage to hold together a planning process during the fall, and over the Christmas vacation, Lois and I went over to Maui and holed up in a hotel there on the beach, and I wrote what I called a prospectus for the '70s for the University of Hawaii based on a lot of work that had been done by a series of committees headed up by a then vice president for academic affairs of the university, Dick Kosaki. But I figured I didn't want it to have just a committee product, so I issued it as a draft dated the first of January of 1970. It became very well known because the editor of the morning newspaper, The Honolulu Advertiser, George Chaplain, who had been one of the advocates of my getting the job, decided to elbow aside all of his other op-ed writings and run this rather long paper in I think seven different installments on the editorial page of The Honolulu Advertiser. So even if everybody didn't read it, there was nobody who could admit they hadn't read it. For years after that, legislators in committee hearings about aspects of the university, some representative from the university proposing something that would cost new money, the first question would be, "Was that in the prospectus?" So that turned out to be a good planning device. I issued it as a draft. It never got out of draft. It was just always subject to criticism and re-writing, but never quite rewritten. But, most of the time was spent dealing with the security problems on the campus. We had a whole series of incidents, a so-called moratorium on attending class, a strike in effect. We had the problem: what do you do when the students who have paid tuition decide not to come to class in a body. If somebody had paid tuition and doesn't come to class, that's his or her constitutional right. We were all public employees of the state, the faculty and I and others, and it was therefore up to us to be on the job and to turn up for our classes even if there was nobody there. There was one situation in which a young history professor picketed his own class to be sure that the students didn't attend. What happened during that time was interesting because the librarian of the university, there were several libraries scattered around the campus, reported there was a higher use than in the history of the library during this one week period of strike. In other words, a lot of students were taking vacations to bone up on what they should have been boning up on anyway, so it had an educational value that I hadn't quite anticipated. Another educational value that it had was that my office was occupied several times by students, the leaders of the campus demonstrations. They tended to be bright and feisty young people, so I turned those sessions into seminars, gave them things to read, and we discussed them. Raymond Aron, the French philosopher and journalist who wrote for Le Figaro in Paris, had just come out with a book called *Les Evenements du Soixante-huit*, the Events of '68.

I was in the middle of describing the scene on the campus during this October moratorium, which was an anti-Vietnam War demonstration. When the students would occupy my office, I would stay there and conduct seminars with them about the state of the world and even the state of what they were doing. Raymond Aron's book was particularly useful because he had some analysis of sort of the psychology of French students. He had one passage in which he said, "It is always possible to bring on the police brutality if you want to." There were many situations in which they provoked police brutality which as he put it, "They both desired and denounced." So that was an interesting byproduct.



Q: Who were the students who were doing this? One doesn't think of the University of Hawaii as attracting the same sort of students that might end up at Columbia or Michigan or at Berkeley.

CLEVELAND: Well, a few of them were alumni of the Berkeley demonstrations who were living on the beaches and coming up to participate, but there were a good many local students. One of the leaders was a young Fijian who was a very effective political leader. So it was partly Pacific people and partly because we had a lot of mainland students as well, so it wasn't a complete difference. Interesting to me, though, was the fact that as I look back on it, the actions taken were somewhat in keeping with the "aloha spirit," that is people would stop short of violence. There was only one case of arson which it turned out was the burning down of an ROTC building which was kind of a temporary building so it was made of wood and easy to burn. That was done by a group of people from outside the campus including, however, a former assistant professor of religion who was participating in that protest.

Q: What happened to him?

CLEVELAND: I don't think he was ever jailed for that. I was just delighted that it wasn't one of our own students or faculty. As an exercise in crisis management, it was interesting to me that in tranquil times, the students and faculty members were really insisting on participating in the governance of the university. When it came to a crisis in which people were occupying the buildings and making a lot of noise outside. Of course it is easy to have an outside demonstration any time of the year in Hawaii because the weather is almost always good, I didn't find any line forming at my door to help participate in handling it. It was something I had to handle myself with my own staff.

Q: How did you find your faculty on something like this? Was it the usual, the young instructors, assistant professors would be more radical than the older ones?



CLEVELAND: Yes. There was one fellow, there had been a big row just before I got there, it was settled just before I got there. It had to be before they could hire anybody. An associate professor of political science had been denied tenure through a procedure that was not very well thought through. It was that incident that derailed my predecessor. He was one of the firebrands, and there was a man there, a senior professor, an historian, who later produced a whole series of books of documents about Adlai Stevenson's career. He was very much a radical in those terms. Mostly it was the younger members of the faculty, which I guess was true everywhere, and some of the brightest members of the student body. I met them, got to know some of them very well because they were in my office a lot. It was a little bit hairy at times. We had three threats to my life and to the family. I consulted the FBI about the threats. The local FBI chief told me that I needn't worry because it wasn't the people who make overt threats that actually carry out assassinations. That wasn't altogether comforting. We had to have the hood wired shut in our personal car so nobody could put anything in the engine. The police later found that one of the threats had been a phony, had been called in by the university security officer who had been assigned to protect me and drove my car during that period. The rest of the time he was on our porch being fed goodies by our housekeeper. It turned out that he rather liked this tour of duty and tried to extend it by adding another threat. The other two apparently were real, but nothing came of them. On the whole, while it divided the community and the campus, of course, most of the time I had the feeling that by keeping my cool, I could help cool things off. I did some writing about it at the time. I wrote a long piece; it was a two part piece that ran in one of the local newspapers called Dissent and Disruption. It kind of reviewed a lot of literature on the subject and analyzed why we were handling it the way we were and so forth.

Q: You were the brand new guy on the block, and all of a sudden you find yourself up against this. How well were you supported by the political establishment and the university establishment, the trustees and so on?

CLEVELAND: There was very good support because nobody wanted us to knock students over the head, you know. Most of the demonstrations were not violent, so we had a deal with the police who would come in when we asked them. They would be right on the TV near the campus, but they would come only when we asked them because we were afraid that their presence might produce more trouble than otherwise. The very bright, relatively young police chief of Honolulu, who had a master's degree in sociology, really thought about the situation very hard, so it was very good to work with him.

The only problem we had in the political establishment was the mayor of Honolulu who was running for governor the next time, and who lay low during the period of the most disruptions. Then, when we had calmed it down, he came out with a statement about the pusillanimous university administrators who don't know how to handle these things.



I had gotten to know Claire Booth Luce quite well who lived there. We were at her house several times. During the spring of that first academic year, she wrote a letter to the newspaper complaining about weak-kneed university administrators. Interestingly, she went on a long trip to Europe and I think the Middle East too during the summer. When she came back, she wrote me in effect a letter of apology. From then on, we were on every one of her guest lists. When Buckminster Fuller came to town and had an 80th birthday party at her house, we were invited, that sort of thing. She was wise enough not to invite us to come to a purely Republican affair when Nixon turned up, although I might have gone since I had been a member of his administration. I would say on the whole, most of the political leaders were inclined to let us handle. Even the regents were inclined to say that is something the president should handle. I wasn't getting a lot of pro-demonstrator flak from outside the campus.

Q: When you had the moratorium, you kept the classes going even though people didn't go to them, is that it?

CLEVELAND: That was it. That was our doctrine, yes.

Q: How did it come out? Did you give exams at the end of the year and all that?

CLEVELAND: Yes. It only lasted a week, so it was not a big deal. As I say a very large number of the students were in the library during that week, so I really don't think they missed anything much. We recommended, the administration, the university recommended, that every faculty member find ways of discussing the Vietnam situation in the class from their point of view, whether it was chemical engineering or political science or whatever, because if that is what the students are interested in, that is a good way of you build education on what people are paying attention to.

A good deal of this was going on all through the first year. It kind of tapered off after that. It didn't actually prevent us from getting on with the academic side of the business. The prospectus was a big factor in that, I think. Also, I was able to attract a brilliant and still relatively young scientist to come and be dean of marine programs as a kind of coordinator of all our marine science activities. He developed some very popular undergraduate programs, a marine option on your diploma and so forth, which involved not only study but also getting out on the ocean in sailboats and swimming and so forth, and of course learning about marine biology and marine geophysics.



The university was growing quite fast. We were doing a lot of planning: do we need a new community college here, and do we need another four-year campus? We had one four-year campus. We reorganized the arrangements on the big island. We had a four-year campus and a community college. We had a big Peace Corps training institute which had mutated into an overseas training institute. We put all of those together in what we called the University of Hawaii at Hilo, and put a chancellor in charge of that. Almost every day or two, there would be something about the university in the newspapers. Everything that happened on the campus was, of course, free game for the newspapers.

My last year there, we figured that the university had one out of every 16 people in the Hawaiian Islands as its student. If you added up in California, the University of California system, and the state university system, and the community college system, you could get to one out of every 19 people in California, a student in one of those systems. We had all of those systems in one, of course in microcosm, but it meant that my last year there, we actually had about 52,000 students on nine campuses out of a population at that time of about 800,000 residents. It didn't count the six million visitors a year.

Q: I would have thought that one of your biggest problems would be just the expense of everyone, the students and faculty, living in Hawaii. Hawaii is an expensive place. Everything has to be imported.

CLEVELAND: Yes, it is, but for the local people, they were used to that, of course and a lot that you don't need. You don't need heavy clothing and you don't need heating and so forth. So there are some offsets to that, the high costs the tourists feels there. I was used to services that local people don't think they need. You don't have to pay to go to a beach. All the beaches are public. That is one of the wise provisions that was made early on in the state constitution.

Q: From your background, did you find that you were pushing or focusing more of the university toward the international field, both economic and political?

CLEVELAND: Yes, I was constantly pushing that, and it seemed a kind of natural thing to do because there we were five hours from our own mainland and only a little farther to Japan and the Far East, and with people who were an ethnic mix. I used to go around saying everybody is a minority. We don't have a situation where you are a member of a minority; everybody is a minority. We developed a university wide council on international affairs and tried to push a more global perspective into the educational process. So, just as I had tried to do at the Maxwell School while I was there much earlier, and as I again did in Minnesota later on, I was always pushing the idea that Americans needed to understand about the whole world.



One thing that I pushed quite hard was getting overseas experience. In many cases, the students reacted very positively to that because what you had was students in a generation where they had resisted having to be bicultural. The Japanese boy or girl would try very hard to be an American and didn't want to be thought of as a Japanese, would even resist learning Japanese. I once arranged a special opportunity for a very bright student of electrical engineering to go to Japan for a year as part of a process and financed by a donor. When I asked him to come in and talk about it, he asked exactly the wrong question. He said, "Does it lead to being an electrical engineer?" I told him, "No, it leads to being a more interesting person, bilingual and bicultural and taking advantage of his own genealogy." He finally did it, but it wasn't an automatic sale in his case. But in many cases it was, and that was sort of a popular thing to do, of course. So, I had some special experiences like that with people.

Q: Was there much directing people toward the Foreign Service? I am talking about the Foreign Service in its broader sense, AID, USIA, CIA, other things like that.

CLEVELAND: Well, there were some members of the faculty that had some kinds of experience along those lines, so there was a good deal of that kind of encouragement, informally. We never really had a formal situation, and we didn't really have much in the way of recruiters coming out to do it. Probably they would have difficulty justifying to their own offices the expense of going to Hawaii to work, you know, when people thought the main reason to go to Hawaii was just to not work. On the other hand, the weather was a great recruitment device for us to get first rate faculty. We'd wait until about February and then invite them out for a week, which is what they had done to us. They invited us out during the spring, Lois and me, first class travel, all expenses paid for a week. That was almost unfair to come from Brussels where you never see the sun for several months to Hawaii where you see the sun every day. So, we got some very good people we were able to hire away from Michigan and MIT and the University of California and so on.

Q: I take it the university probably had more orientation towards Asia than most other American universities do.



CLEVELAND: Yes, and a lot of that was natural to the situation. Again I pushed it very hard. One of the things I said in the prospectus was we were already the Korean study center of the nation. If you looked around, you found at Harvard that one person's full time job was full-time research activity on Korea. I think at Columbia there were two such people, and that was the highest number in any place. We looked around and found we had 15 people whose whole life was studying Korea, some of them Koreans, but not all of them. We managed to develop the idea that we should have a Korean study center for we were the Korean study center. So then, I made a trip to Korea with the help of a guy we had hired from I forget where, Tulane or somewhere. We wanted to carefully calibrate it between the Korean government and business and so on. There was a lot of trouble between the government and everybody else there at the time. I visited several of the universities, and we raised quite a lot of money from the Korean government for a building. Then we came back and raised quite a lot more from not only the Korean community, which is relatively small, but really from all the Asian communities to have one building on the campus that would clearly be an Asian style architecture. We finally built a really spectacular building with curved roofs and painted tile and so on, the whole, and it was the Korean studies center in a place that was right near the East-West Center which was also part of the university while I was there. It was our tenth campus in effect though it was on the main campus.

There were many opportunities for making new things happen that hadn't been done before. One year, I got the legislature to let me reserve in my office, one percent of the academic budget. It was called the President's innovation fund, and it could only be used for things that hadn't been done before. One professor of speech was very much interested in satellite communication. He came up one day and said that the government had a satellite that had already been around for five years, and that they had just announced that they were not going to use the satellite anymore and anybody who wanted to use it for a good educational or non-profit purpose, they could. He said by using this satellite, we could probably develop a whole network around the Pacific of all the educational institutions in the Pacific. He was associated with a wonderful crazy electrical engineer who was a ham radio buff and who said that he could build a ground station on the top of the engineering building, which was flat, to communicate with that satellite. We said, "Okay. Now how much would that cost?" He said, "Well, I can do it for \$5,000." I appropriated \$5,000 out of the innovation fund. He built it for about \$2,400, and staffed it with enthusiastic graduate students. We then persuaded all the other institutions in Papua New Guinea and the University in Fiji, the University of the South Pacific. The king of Tonga figured they had better get into the act. The Polytechnic Institute in New Zealand which was just playing around with satellite communications noticed that we were beginning with ATS-1 which was the name of the satellite, Advanced Technology Satellite #1, I got a letter out of the blue saying they would like to participate in whatever we were doing. We had somebody at the University of Alaska. So before we got through in a year and a half, or two years, we had a whole network which operated for several hours every day exchanging information, holding conferences, and so forth among the educators of the Pacific Ocean.



That, like everything else, leads to unexpected political dilemmas. One decided that our network would be a good way to recruit people to come out against the French nuclear sites in the Pacific. I had to rule that it wasn't usable for any such purpose even though I agreed with it.

The general support for the university was very strong in most of the years until the last year I was there. The governor would go into a relatively tight budget in general. That was his general philosophy. Then the legislators would spend all of the first half of the year adding things to his budget. They never cut his budget. It would have been terrible to cut it. They all got political credit for adding things to the budget. Then all that was stacked on the governor's desk, and during the fall, the governor would release goodies of various sorts which meant the governor had contrived to make the legislature the authorizing body while he was the appropriations body. It was a very clever way to work. Anyway, the result was we not only got our basic cost well supplied but we got a lot of innovative things done by the legislature. We were a popular place for doing things because their constituents were all people who by that time had gotten the idea that all of their kids were going to go to college.

We went through a process a little the way Korea went through in the second half of the 20th century of starting with a decision that universal education was produced by the dynamics of the Korean War, a technological war. The generals that started the process couldn't stop it. They found that everybody wanted their children to go to college. Well, that was very much the feeling. I also developed the idea that if a student came to community college, and did well enough to have 60 credit hours of transferable work, not machine shop or that kind of thing, but anything that would be college work, that they ought to have a right to go to either one of our four year colleges or to the university campus itself. The Minoa campus had 23,000 students. That took a lot of bargaining and negotiation with the faculty because they felt they would be getting inferior students this way. We finally got through the fact that it was an entitlement of people who did well enough at the community college to transfer to the Minoa campus. In my last faculty meeting, a peculiar arrangement there, as the president presides over the faculty senate meetings, I was able to announce that the students graduating that June, comparing those who had started in community colleges with those who started on the main campus, the ones that started on the community college campuses had a slightly higher grade point average than the ones who had been there all along, which was greeted by sort of a hushed shock. But, there were many opportunities for educational experimentation in Hawaii. We really did create a true open admissions system for the state, and that is one of the few states, maybe the only one. They talk about open admissions for everybody; we were really making it happen

Q: Were the native Hawaiians, the Polynesians a problem or not?



CLEVELAND: Well first of all, the native Hawaiians, there is almost no purity of Hawaiians. Everybody is a mestizo, a mixture. As they say, "We are all mix up." There were many who were regarded as Hawaiians or part Hawaiians, and who had special privileges as a result. For example, there was a very good school, the Kamehameha School which was only available to people who were part Hawaiian. While I was there, the proportion of Hawaiian you had to be to get in kept dwindling. It got down to one-thirty second or something.

Q: Is this because of the lack of having enough really full blooded Hawaiians?

CLEVELAND: Yes. But there were political groups that were important, and it was important in doing anything. Managing anything in Hawaii was a little like managing Tammany Hall. You had to be sure that every ethnic group was buying into what you were trying to do. We established a university wide advisory committee to me which was part of trying to get everybody in. I remember spending a weekend trying to figure out how to get a universe of 36 people statewide who would really represent the state. Toward the end of Sunday afternoon, my assistant suddenly pokes me in the ribs and says, "I think we have got it made if we can just find a Korean woman from Kauai, then we will have the balance right." We were always playing ethnic politics. The Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians had been stacked at the bottom of the heap. All the immigrants from elsewhere, the mainland, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, tended to be better off than they were. That was partly cultural, partly there was something about Polynesian culture that they describe as crabs in a bucket. That is if one gets to the top of the bucket and wants to look around, the other crabs will drag it back down. That was often used as a reason for why things were the way they were.

On the other hand, there were some very bright and ambitious Hawaiian students or part-Hawaiian students, who were very anxious to help the younger ones. We finally had a dinner on our porch. Everything can be done outside there, so it is nice. We had a dinner on our porch where we had a number of the senior students and some of the main drumbeaters for Hawaiian rights from around the community to consider what we ought to do about this, about helping the Hawaiians who were often having academic trouble. What they really recommended and what we did was to establish a sort of homeroom for the Hawaiians right in the middle of the campus. We cleared out a couple or three classrooms on the first floor of a classroom building and built a very pleasant library with books and a place to sit and read and so on. The arrangement was that some of the senior students would be kind of in charge of this, which meant that the freshmen and sophomores who were Hawaiian could sort of repair there and get charged up again and be told they were as good as everybody else and to act like it and so on.

Q: You were talking about the Hawaiian students being able to have a place to go and get help from their seniors and get them back on the campus again.



CLEVELAND: That worked. In other words there is a dynamic on every campus of ethnic groups having lunch together, segregating themselves. I didn't want to have a situation where we tried to solve the segregation problem by too much segregation, but in this particular case, I thought it was good doctrine to have a battery charging part of the society.

Q: Protecting our culture. Today one of the big problems at the University of California at Berkeley is, they have got so many students of Japanese ancestry who do so well in the more engineering type courses, and the Chinese too, that they sort of swamp anchors with everyone else. You almost have to have reverse discrimination in order to keep these places from being completely Asian dominated. Did you have that?

CLEVELAND: We had that. It wasn't a problem; it was an incentive. It was true the oriental students, students of oriental parentage even if they hadn't lived there, their family upbringing, their whole cultural situation was that school is a place you had to work hard to get somewhere. Sometimes when I would go past the library, I'd look in a whole series of windows with cubicles where students would be studying. I'd be astonished at the very high proportion of people with oriental faces because it was a high proportion anyway, but even higher than you would expect, who were studying in the library. But, one of the results of that was that it enlivened the other students academically. I used to claim our students probably had on the average higher student relation than any campus in the country.

Q: In many ways you are replicating what happened particularly in New York City in the '30s and '40s with the children of Jewish immigrants coming in who were adding an awful lot of intellectual stimulus to the universities there.

CLEVELAND: Right, and we, of course, had it built in spades because something like two-thirds of our students were of oriental parentage. Most of them were actually local, and about a third were either people who came to college or graduate school, particularly graduate school from the mainland.

Q: Was there any movement at that point of young Japanese women from Japan who were attracted to going to school in Hawaii because of the discrimination against women in Japan?



CLEVELAND: Well, there may have been some of that, but it wasn't a major phenomenon or it would have been more discussed. We did have a good many students from Japan but there was a resistance apparently in Japan to sending people particularly women to Hawaii because when they came home, they'd be acting different. They'd be walking different, and it was uncomfortable for the parents and associates and so on. It was a problem for women of oriental parentage in a way because when they would go to Japan, everybody would immediately assume they were fluent in Japanese which many of them were not, and were shocked to find them striding down the street in an American way. So there was a real cultural accommodation.

Q: How about the role of the East-West Center at that particular point? What was that playing?

CLEVELAND: Well, it was a very important role. The arrangement was that they had a lot of research programs, but they didn't give degrees, and so a lot of people studying for graduate degrees at the University of Hawaii were really working in the East-West Center. A number of people in the Center also held faculty positions in the university, so it was a big subsidy to the university, to the state to have these people coming in and be able to look forward to have a Pacific conference on something and so on which otherwise we might not have been able to do. Toward the end of my time there, it began to look as if it would be very important in getting the money from Congress each year, if we could indicate we were raising some real money in Asia, in Korea, in Thailand, in Japan and other countries where there was a lot of money and people were doing very well. So, my last year there we reorganized the East-West Center and set it up with its own board, a very strong board that included a number of high level Asians, scholars more than politicians. It was still there on the Minoa campus, and there was still a lot of interaction on the graduate level. I felt that you couldn't really go to Thailand and ask them for a grant to the state board of regents. In the United States, it just wouldn't work. In fact, it hadn't been terribly successful as a fund raising device, but to my surprise, the Congress has stayed with it all this time, partly because Senator Daniel Inouye is always available to help in Congress, and he has been very senior and very influential member of the Senate for many years. I think we were lucky we had good political support on the Washington end, good state support, and a number of friends in key countries of Asia who helped us maintain the reputation of the East-West Center. It is a dicey kind of organization to have at any university.

Q: I'm sure it is.

CLEVELAND: I think it was better to have it set up with its own board but to work closely with the university. Part of the deal was they wouldn't go into the degree giving business in competition. As far as I know, they haven't ever done that.

Q: Well, in '74 you left the University of Hawaii. Then what?



CLEVELAND: I left because the political support and budgetary support was beginning to run out, and it looked as if it were going to be a maintenance job. Also several members of the board of regents really felt there ought to be a local Hawaiian, a person born in Hawaii, as president. To hedge that bet, I had built into our administration a vice president for business affairs, a very bright Japanese American, Fujio Matsuda, who had been a member of the governor's cabinet as head of transportation and in fact presided over the huge enlargement of the Honolulu international airport.

So, when I announced I would be leaving at the end of my fifth year, the worldwide search came up with him as the next president. I'd do an oral history of him too. By chance I ran into the president of the Aspen Institute when I was at the Ford Foundation looking for money. He had worked in the Ford Foundation before, and he was there, and I met him in an elevator. I had known him somewhat. He asked me how it was going, what I was doing, and I told him the situation that I was leaving. So, he perked up his ears and soon offered me a job of starting an international program for the Aspen Institute which had been primarily domestic in orientation before that. He wanted me to help internationalize their board, which I did by getting several people that I had worked with on their board, and also to establish a subsequent program in international affairs. I did that for six years.

Q: This would be '74 to '80.

CLEVELAND: '74 to '80. They had established a headquarters in Princeton, but they said you can establish it anywhere you want, but not as far as Hawaii. So, we established it in Princeton. Then for two or three months every summer we were in Aspen, so we were constantly moving from one place to another. I got a lot of work done, books written and ambitious research projects accomplished. Essentially it consisted of me and an assistant and a secretary, a big travel budget and a happy travel agency and so on. Could I just interrupt a bit. I need to call on this executive committee of the American Refugee Committee, so if we need to run on for a bit, maybe we could do one more interview.

Q: All right, sure, we'll do that then. I want to make a note here that you just showed me an oral history the University of Hawaii had at Manoa done November 1998 about the presidents of the University of Hawaii, so if there is somebody who wants to add on to what we are doing here, we will refer them to there which I assume will be available at the University of Hawaii.

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Today is the 10th of September 1999. We are going to pick this up after the Aspen Institute, and if you could tell me what did you do after 1980.



CLEVELAND: Well, in 1980 I got a telephone call from an economist named Walter Heller, who had been chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors in the Kennedy administration. I had gotten to know him well. He was back on the faculty of the University of Minnesota where he had always been. He called up to say they were starting a new public affairs school. They were going to call it the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, There would be a combination of graduate school, continuing education, and research. He said eventually they would get around to trying to find somebody to run it, but for the moment they are just trying to expedite the university into something important and useful. They had already hired professionals, and we would like to use my name as the kind of person who ought to be the dean. Hubert Humphrey's sister, whom we knew in Washington, had already mentioned that possibility to me. So, I said, sure, you can mention me if you want. One thing led to another, and I was offered the job and we decided to move from New Jersey to Minneapolis and start a new life there.

Q: You were at the university from when to when?

CLEVELAND: University of Minnesota, from 1980 to 1988. I retired in 1988 as a professor emeritus, but I found an office in the building that I'd helped build, and remained for a time. I was still engaged in a big international research project, rethinking international governance which became eventually my 1993 book, Birth of a New World.

Q: Well, back and talk about the time from '80 to '88. Was the school dedicated to national or international service? What was it trying to train?

CLEVELAND: It was attracting people who were interested in public affairs broadly construed. The kind of people who wanted to get jobs and some of them did get jobs in the public affairs or environment divisions of corporations. Our concept was that public affairs isn't a new discipline or a new subject. It is the integration of a lot of disciplines and subjects; therefore, it was inherently an interdisciplinary program. I thought of it as kind of vestibule to the university which was already managed by disciplines, former ways of thinking. But the outside community was organized by problems that they were trying to get out of. What should we do about this new highway system or what should we do about the health program or social security and so on. In order to look systematically at any of those problems, you had to use the insights and methodologies of several, sometimes many, academic disciplines. That meant that the people in the university had some difficulty understanding why the university should have a thing like this in it. What was the basic discipline?



The community people outside also had some difficulty understanding how we were organized or how we were... Of course, we had to serve as some kind of switchboard between the disciplinary setup of the university and the problem orientation of the community. So I was constantly explaining to both sides what we were up to. We decided on a personnel policy. We had inherited a small school, and we added to its faculty. Then we did two other things. We decided we wanted to make treaties with the various disciplinary departments. What we did was to try to get the best people in political science, economics and so on to be part time with us. We paid for part of their salary, and they became adjunct professors with us. They were sort of adding what was called senior fellows who were career practitioners in various fields. Some journalists, people who had been in government, people who had been in business, people who had been very well known in women's affairs and so on. We tried to get them recognized within the university as members of the university faculty. They were full members of our faculty, but to members of the university faculty, they would have had to be have Ph.D.s and so forth. I found that the only reason for being a member of the university faculty would be you could enjoy a seat on the university senate. None of the people we brought in were the least interested in being on the university senate at all. So, it didn't matter very much that they were not formally members, they had all the rights and privileges. Inside they were treated just like other faculty members with all the health benefits, retirement benefits and so on that the professors had.

Q: Now, was this graduate or undergraduate?

CLEVELAND: Graduate, unlike the Maxwell School which was both.

Q: Was there sort of a concentration on Midwestern or international affairs?

CLEVELAND: There was a concentration on whatever the faculty and senior fellows really wanted to work on. We had a public affairs degree and a planning degree also. Those were our degree programs. Otherwise, in terms of research, we were doing some things locally, some things in education, and things on national affairs, and quite a lot on international affairs because of course, that is what I was interested in. Some of the people I brought in, that was their central interest.



So it was a very wide agenda. I know we didn't have as much money as the JFK School at Harvard or the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton. We were in pretty good shape. We raised a lot of money outside. When I first took the job to build this institute, they already had \$12,000,000 that they had raised apparently while Humphrey was still alive. We more than doubled that, and got a number of endowed chairs and several sizable research budgets. We had a big grant for several years from the Agency for International Development, AID, to conduct environmental education in Eastern Europe and Russia, particularly the Eastern European countries. One of the legacies of communism was just a lot of dirt, a lot of toxic chemicals and so on. We had a Polish senior fellow who was an environmental economist himself, and he did a wonderful job of putting together a major project.

I developed a project that we called Rethinking International Governance chaired with another one of the senior fellows, Geri Joseph, who had been Ambassador to the Netherlands, and had been a quite close friend of Hubert Humphrey, and at one point had been the top woman in the Democratic National Committee as well as the committee from Minnesota. She was in charge of women's affairs there. She and I conducted this really very large project. We got, all together, 31 people from 22 different countries who were willing to participate without a consulting fee, just travel expenses. We brought them together four different times. The puzzle we were working at was, starting in 1985 or '86, how should the international world get reorganized once the cold war was over.

Q: Well, you were at the Hubert Humphrey Center. Did you find that being considerably removed from Washington made it harder to have a connect with sort of things happening in the real world?



CLEVELAND: No, actually I found an interesting thing. Being five hours from Washington, I didn't need to think about each appropriation or each tactical move, and I was able to develop a much more strategic sense of what the U.S. government was, what was going on in the world. I was reading the New York Times every day after all, and I was working on this international research project which was very broad. That required a lot of consultation with people all over the world. I thought that I was very much in the world. Also the twin cities of Minnesota are extraordinary in the density of people who are really passionately interested in public affairs including international affairs. I used to say there were more policy knocks per square foot in the twin cities than any place in the world. I think it would have been quite difficult to build a major national, international public affairs school in most other cities in the Midwest area or elsewhere, but doing it in Minnesota and doing it in Humphrey's name made the whole thing go extremely well. We got a total of about \$18,000,000 from the legislature to build a building that was partly occupied by business school people because they had an overflow. But it was mostly ours, and it was a lovely facility, a very excellent piece of architecture. It was an architect that really listened to what we said, to our objectives and some of the problems we foresaw. For example, I told the architect that there have to be spaces that fit between calling somebody on the telephone and having lunch with somebody, where you didn't want to develop an hour or hour and a half, but you couldn't do it in five minutes. So he built into the stairway that went into a big atrium, there was a stairway that sent from the first floor to the second and third floor. He built into the stairway at each corner, a sort of pod where people could go off and sit on benches and talk. Those pods were heavily used by students in between classes.

Q: That is a great idea.

CLEVELAND: A very nice idea. It was probably patterned after in a different way the JFK school. We studied all the other schools. He bid very low for the job because he was a great fan of Humphrey's. He wanted to be the architect who did the Humphrey building. It was important to him.

Q: Well, you did this until '88. Then what?

CLEVELAND: Then I stayed there, Lois and I stayed there, moving after awhile from Medina, a suburb where we had a big house because we needed it for entertaining visitors and all that sort of thing. We moved into town, got a quite large apartment, a downtown condominium where we were just a few blocks from the orchestra hall and from the best theater. The Guthrie Theater is one of the best orchestra venues in the country and quite near downtown shopping. So, it was quite convenient arrangement for us. We were very happy there.



We were beginning to wonder whether we needed the Minnesota winters for the rest of our lives. In the wintertime you kind of stay indoors and not go out at night. We got a letter out of the blue from this place called Falcon's]Landing, which hadn't been built yet, saying they started with Air Force retired officers but they think they are going to run out of Air Force retirees and they are opening it up to other categories. The fact that I had been Ambassador to NATO automatically put me on that list. I was coming down to Washington anyway the next week after that letter. Lois came down with me and we came out and looked at the plan. We decided to bid on it, and got the house that you are now sitting in. It is a house without the disadvantages of a house, the shoveling and the planting and the mowing and all that.

Q: What else with you? You have continued with your writing, haven't you?

CLEVELAND: Yes. I finally got that book out. A little bit off because I had a heart attack in 1992 when the book was manuscript without publishers to look at. As I came out of a coma about three weeks later, the first news I had was I did have a firm offer for publishing the book.

Q: That was a nice surprise.

CLEVELAND: I didn't do religion for a while, and I didn't have any idea how to handle this kind of book, and I just kind of did it myself. One of my friends was chairman of a literary advisory group. He recommended that it would be very good, and it was a shoo-in after that.

Q: Well, that is excellent. I think this part is a good place to stop. I want to thank you very much. This is great.

CLEVELAND: You are very welcome.

End of interview